Posthuman leadership and the roles of computational objects by Friedland, Barton
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/77000
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
Posthuman Leadership
and the




Submitted to the University of Warwick






List of Tables v




Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2.1 The Computational Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.2 Why are Computational Objects Important to Leadership? . . . . . 3
1.2.3 Why Look at Practices? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4 Content and Format of the Present Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.5 Organisation of This Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Chapter 2 The Ideologies of Studying Leadership 12
2.1 Organisation of This Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.1 The Pre–Modern Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.2 The Modern Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.3 Debates in the Study of Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2.4 Beyond Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.5 A Fivefold Typology for Identifying Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . 32
i
2.2.6 A Relational Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2.7 Internal Goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2.8 Summary of Grint and Kempster et al.’s Contribution . . . . . . . . 35
2.2.9 Applying the Fivefold Typology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3 The Arc of Social Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.3.1 The Unreliable Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.3.2 Rede￿ning the Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3.3 Keeping the Subject at Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3.4 Contextualising the Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3.5 Unifying Subject and Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3.6 Comparing the Moves in Social Theory and Leadership . . . . . . . 48
2.3.7 An Invitation to Theorise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3.8 Recapituation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.4 Conclusions and Direction of This Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Chapter 3 Methodology 80
3.1 Methods (and Madness) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.1.1 Research Approach and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.1.2 Re￿exivity and Di￿raction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.1.3 Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.1.4 Episode Selection, Data Analysis, and Interpretation . . . . . . . . 98
3.2 Ethical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.2.1 Anonymity and Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.3 About the Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.3.1 About Eta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.3.2 About Epsilon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.4 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Chapter 4 Pair Programming 110
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.2 What is Pair Programming? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.3 Findings: Pair Programming at Eta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.3.1 Episode One: ‘Driving’ and Other Forms of Leadership . . . . . . . 113
4.3.2 Analysis: Episode One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.3.3 Episode Two: When Machines Lead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.3.4 Analysis: Episode Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.5 Summation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
ii
Chapter 5 Emailing 136
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.2 Email: A Brief History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.3 Findings: Email at Two Di￿erent Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.3.1 Episode One: Email Up Close . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.3.2 Analysis: Episode One—Where is the leadership? . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.3.3 Episode Two: Email at a Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.3.4 Analysis: Episode Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.4 Discussion and Summation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Chapter 6 Breakdowns 168
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.2 Breaking Down Breakdowns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
6.3 Findings: The Indeterminacy of Breakdowns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
6.3.1 Episode One: ‘Freezing Up’ with Walt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
6.3.2 Episode Two: Improvisation with Ari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
6.4 Analysis: When is a Breakdown? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.5 Summation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Chapter 7 Re￿ections and Di￿ractions 185
7.1 Research Motivation and Principal Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
7.2 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
7.2.1 Computational Objects Are Entangled in Leadership Practice . . . 188
7.2.2 The Disjunction of Responsibility from Authority . . . . . . . . . . 192
7.2.3 Leadership is Produced Through Citationality . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
7.3 Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
7.3.1 Entanglement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
7.3.2 Disjunction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
7.3.3 Citationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
7.4 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
7.4.1 The Ethnographic Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
7.4.2 Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
7.4.3 Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
7.4.4 Generalisability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
7.5 Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
7.6 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
7.7 Final Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
iii
Appendix A Acronyms 217
Appendix B List of Terms 219
Appendix C Text of 2013 Apple Advertisement: ‘Our Signature’ 222
Appendix D Shadowing Activities 224
Appendix E Interview Activities 226







2.1 Ten De￿nitions of Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 The Arc of Social Theory in Five Moves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.3 Leadership Theories: Past and Present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4 Chronological Comparison of the Five Moves in Social Science and Lead-
ership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.5 Ihde’s Conceptualisation of Human-Technology Relations . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.1 Eight Metaphors as Central Problems in Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.1 Analytical Summary ofMaterial-Discursive Practices observed in Pair Pro-
gramming and Their Associationwith Dimensions of Leadership, Grouped
by Episode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.2 Array of Computational Objects Deployed for Remote Pair Programming . 117
7.1 Analytical Summary of the Roles of Computational Objects . . . . . . . . . 189
D.1 Shadowing Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
E.1 Interview Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
v
List of Figures
2.1 The Scholarly Literature on Leadership in the Fields of Business, Psycho-
logy, and Sociology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 Analysis of Scholarly Literature on Leadership: 1872-2010 . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Grint’s Fourfold Typology for the Ways Leadership Can Be Understood . . 29
2.4 Grint and Kempster et al.’s Synthesised Fivefold Typology ThroughWhich
Leadership Can Be Identi￿ed and Understood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5 Print Advertisement from Apple’s Recent ‘Our Signature’ Campaign . . . . 41
2.6 Evolution of Leadership Theory: 1869–1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.7 A Linear View of the Progression of Leadership Theory . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.8 Latour’s Transformation of Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.9 The Material-Discursive Practice of Intra-Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.1 Di￿raction Patterns on the Ocean Surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.1 Image of Remote Pair Programming Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.2 Pair Programmers Seated at a Worktable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.1 AppleLink™ User Manual Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.2 Internet Use 1996-2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.3 Top Online Activities 2002-2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.4 Image of Executive Assistant’s Desk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
7.1 The Citational Production of Member-Recognised Leadership . . . . . . . 200
vi
Acknowledgments
I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, without whom none of this would be possible.
Beyond this, there is an uncountable network of people and objects that have helped and
supported me in this work. I wish to express my humble gratitude here to anyone—or
anything—coming across this text; thank you for your participation and support of my
work. I have been deeply enriched through my journey of doctoral research. I would be
remiss, however, were I not to acknowledge a principal ￿nding of this study here, which
claims that responsibility is becoming increasingly decoupled from authority in the de-
ployment of computational objects. I therefore assert, for the record, that any errors or
solecisms in this work are my responsibility alone.
vii
Declarations
This thesis is submitted to the University of Warwick in support of my application for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It has been composed by myself and has not been
submitted in any previous application for any degree.
viii
Abstract
Leadership is a central topic in business and one in which organisations invest heav-
ily. Despite the tremendous in￿ux of computational objects into the workplace and their
use as part of the operational framework through which organisational life is enacted,
little empirical research exists that explores the relationship between leadership practice
and said objects. This study helps to close this critical gap in both practical and theor-
etical knowledge. Through an interrogation of leadership practice and their enactments
with computational objects across a range of situational and comparative empirics, this
research develops three original theoretical contributions. First, it presents and develops a
range of roles through which computational objects are enmeshed within leadership prac-
tice. Second, the study proposes a novel posthuman perspective that attempts to address a
historic privileging of the human, positing a disjunction of responsibility from authority.
And third, it theorises leadership as a processual phenomenon produced through cita-
tionality in material-discursive practice. Through an ethnographic work practice study,
this research contributes an original articulation of a posthuman, practice-based theory of




Computation is embedded into the technology and practice of everyday life; we
continually use computational devices without thinking of them as computa-
tional in any way (Dourish and Bell 2011, p. 41).
My preface by way of an extended epigraph marks the frame of this book and
introduces its themes: the irreducibility of lived practice, embodied and enacted;
the value of empirical investigation over categorical debate; the displacement
of reason from a position of supremacy to one among many ways of knowing in
acting; the heterogeneous sociomateriality and real-time contingency of perform-
ance; and the new agencies and accountabilities e￿ected through recon￿gured
relations of human and machine (Suchman 2007, p. xii).
This dissertation concerns itself with understanding the role of computational
technology in organisational practice. Its speci￿c aim is to understand the relationship
between computational objects in enactments of leadership practice. Suchman’s epigraph
above aptly bounds the concerns with which the research is focused as well as o￿ering
a sense of the theoretical and methodological vectors employed to mobilise it. In this
chapter, I describe the contexts within which the questions I am addressing are relevant
(section 1.1), o￿er a rationale for the research (section 1.2), explain the research questions
(section 1.3), describe the content and format of the research study (section 1.4), and out-
line the chapters in this dissertation (section 1.5).
1.1 Context
The topic of leadership is highly prized in both business schools and organisations, with
a great deal of economic and material resource allocated toward leadership development
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and training (Alavi 2008; Day and Antonakis 2013, p. 226). Yet, leadership scholars write
of ‘crisis’, using the term a) to associate current volatility in the global economic system
with a need to develop a di￿erent way of thinking about leadership (Heifetz et al. 2009b);
b) as a reason to reassess the project of leadership entirely (Alvesson and Sveningsson
2003a; Khurana et al. 2004; Miner 1975); and c) to call for revitalised scholarship in order
to meet the challenges that ‘crisis’ has borne (Nohria and Khurana 2010, p. 3).
Whether or not, as Heifetz et al. claim, conditions will remain ‘uncertain, urgent,
and risky’ (2009a, p. 28), scholars from a variety of disciplines agree that the momentum
of the Industrial Revolution has given rise to globalism and argued that new forms of
organisation, and thus ways of organising, are upon us (cf. Borgmann 1987; Grint and
Woolgar 1997; Hayles 1999; Heidegger 1977; Giddens 1991; Kallinikos 2011; McLuhan
1962). Without doubt, leadership practices are subsumed within this process.
Despite this, within the study of leadership, a central but perennially overlooked
theme in these transformations is technology (Bass and Stogdill 1990b, p. xiii; Kahai 2012;
Lowe and Gardner 2001, pp. 501-502) which has lead, according to Ihde, to a way of life
that is ‘technologically textured’ (1990, p. 1). Thus, the Industrial Age has given way to
the Information Age, manifested in part due to the existence of modern computational
technology that has, since the mid-1950s, become increasingly miniaturised, portable, and
networked, yielding what I refer to as the computational object. I explain this titular term
in greater depth in section 1.2.1.
1.2 Rationale
This study addresses a lacuna at the intersection of three academic disciplines: human-
computer interaction (HCI), information systems (IS), and leadership studies, evidenced
in part by the particular challenges faced by organisational leadership and their complex,
critical, and status quo responses to these (Grint 2010c, p. 307). More speci￿cally, within
the leadership literature, the relationship between computational objects and leadership
practices remains a largely unexplored territory (Avolio, Walumbwa et al. 2009, pp. 440-
441). I elaborate on this gap in section 1.2.2. By adopting well-established HCI and IS
perspectives that assert a co-constitutive relationship between technology and practice
(Orlikowski 2000; Suchman 1987), I develop a rich understanding of everyday leadership
practices and the roles computational objects play in their enactments. Further, through an
interrogation of the material-discursive practice (Barad 2007, p. 178) between leadership
practices and computational objects in present-day organisations, I aim to develop new
understandings, including those that allow for the development of an integrative theory
of leadership that includes the roles of computational objects.
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1.2.1 The Computational Object
In this research, I employ the specialised term computational object to foreground the ma-
terial interfaces through which humans interact with broader computational systems and
their manifestations. I argue that computational objects are phenomenologically distinct-
ive; through them humans experience—and extend—distributed computational platforms
via material-discursive practice. As a site of practice, they may be found in the form of a
personal computer, smart phone, tablet, or embedded within other objects.
These computational objects are distinctive from other forms of technology, such
as airplanes or toasters, yet share a material and embodied aspect through which humans
interact with them (Dourish 2001). They signal Turkle’s ‘evocative object’ as ‘a compan-
ion in life experience’ (2007, p. 5), acting as a critical site for human relationship (1984 /
Turkle 2005, p. 1). Nicolini et al. observe a similar quality in objects that ‘acquire a deep
emotional holding power [. . . and an] intimate attachment that creates social bonds [. . . ]
and sense of belonging’ (2011, p. 614). The term is also derived from Hayles’s ‘compu-
tational universe’, which functions as a link to materiality in its ‘claim for computation
as ontology [. . . ] the means by which material reality is continually produced and repro-
duced on atomic, molecular, and macro levels’ (2005, p. 3). The existence of such objects
and the material-discursive practices humans undertake—with and through them—signals
a critical transformation beyond the liberal human subject that has held sway since the
Enlightenment: what Hayles calls posthumanism (1999, pp. 283-291). This posthuman per-
spective attempts to address the historic privileging of the human perspective by including
perspectives which go beyond the human.1 In sum, the term computational object is a trope
that simultaneously signals my emphasis on materiality, relationality, and a posthuman
perspective that moves away from human exceptionalism.
1.2.2 Why are Computational Objects Important to Leadership?
There exists a signi￿cant body of work practice studies that demonstrate how technolo-
gies a￿ect work practices and vice-versa (cf. Bailey and Leonardi 2015; Barley 1986; Clark
et al. 1990; Leonardi 2011; Markus 1994; Miller and Slater 2000; Mumford and Banks 1967;
Nicolini 2011; Orlikowski and Yates 1994; Zubo￿ 1988). All of these studies assert a co-
constitutive relationship between work practice and technologies. Computational objects
in this context are seen as essential for communication, collaboration, and the production
of knowledge work products, such as strategic plans in modern organisations. They are
ubiquitous and said to be involved in an ever-increasing range of work practices (Barley
1988, p. 33; Zubo￿ 1988, pp. 124-126). Yet, if technologies are known to have such a signi-
1See section 2.3.5 for an elaboration of a posthuman perspective.
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￿cant impact on work practices, it is surely an omission that studies of leadership have not
meaningfully explored their presence in the enactment of leadership. Indeed on review, it
is as if computational objects have been ignored; if and when they are included, leadership
studies mostly delimit their exploration to ‘virtual teams’ (cf. Alavi and Yoo 1997; Avolio
and Kahai 2003; Avolio, Kahai et al. 2000; Bell and Kozlowski 2002; Oakley 1999). This
stands in stark contrast to the empirics presented in this study, where those in leadership
positions often move ￿uidly through virtual and non-virtual contexts, often intermixing
the two as a hybridised space, and de￿nitely relying upon computational objects in the
process. It is on this basis that I argue for the importance of a modern conception of
leadership that includes the role of the computational object.
Further, this gap I have identi￿ed exists at two levels. The ￿rst level is that theories
of leadership tend to limit themselves to human actants, rendering non-humans invisible.
One need only to consider the extensive use of computational objects in globalised busi-
ness organisations and the ways in which these are interwoven in everyday experience to
recognise this. From this perspective, I suggest that continuing to ignore computational
objects in the study of leadership and in the production of its theories is a grave error, in
that it fails to account for the production of leadership in ways that matter; that is, produ-
cing material outcomes that change the world. The second gap is the dearth of research
on leadership that takes the practice of leadership as its unit of analysis. On this point, I
claim that a practice theory (PT)-based approach (Nicolini 2012; Reckwitz 2002; Schatzki
2002; Shove et al. 2012a) can inform the development of current leadership theory and
enable richer understandings. My research programme addresses these two gaps, thereby
contributing to the ￿eld both by extending theory of leadership to computational objects
and by grounding its study ￿rmly in practice.
1.2.3 Why Look at Practices?
A number of leadership scholars have argued that future research should be undertaken
exploring the role of technology and leadership using a qualitative approach (Avolio, Kahai
et al. 2000; Avolio,Walumbwa et al. 2009; Gronn 2002; Yukl 2009). However, I maintain that
the general category of ‘qualitative’ is not speci￿c enough. Here, Van Maanen observes,
ethnographic ‘￿eldwork is one answer—some say the best—to the question of how the
understanding of others, close or distant, is achieved’ (1988, p. 2).
More recently, a number of scholars have mobilised this methodological approach
under the moniker leadership-as-practice (LAP) (cf. Carroll et al. 2008; Crevani et al. 2010;
Denis, Langley and Rouleau 2010; Endrissat and Arx 2013). This work takes the strategy-
as-practice (SAP) stream (cf. Chia and MacKay 2007; Jarzabkowski 2005; Jarzabkowski and
Spee 2009; Seidl and Whittington 2014; Tsoukas 2010; Vaara and Whittington 2012) and
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its reliance on practice theory (PT) (cf. Nicolini 2012; Orlikowski 2010; Reckwitz 2002;
Schatzki 2002; Shove et al. 2012b) as its theoretical guide.
According to Alvesson, some practices, and the relations these are seen to form,
are characterised by group members as leadership (2013, p. 184). But on inspection, the
detail of such practices appear to lose the luster and sheen of ‘leadership’ (Alvesson and
Spicer 2011b, p. 196). In this sense, leadership is an amorphous and ideological concept
(Miner 1975, p. 202) that becomes di￿cult to tether when isolated to individual practices.
However, when such practices are performed in series, as with the animation of a ￿lm,
there is no doubt that members recognise such practices as associated with leadership.
It is here that I employ Barad’s theoretical term material-discursive practice (2007, p. 178)
interchangeably with the term ‘practice’ throughout this work as a means to call particular
attention to the often invisible dimensions ofmatter andmeaning present in the enactment
of practice.2
What then, is the bene￿t of looking at material-discursive practices so closely in
a study exploring leadership, when focusing on practice makes leadership less visible? I
believe one answer lies in the choices that members make about their practices. Interrog-
ation of practice makes visible aspects of experience that are obscured by lack of attention
to them (Szymanski and Whalen 2011b). It o￿ers informants and readers the opportunity
to re￿ect on their own practices (Alvesson and Spicer 2012, p. 385) and the extent to which
these embody the style(s) of leadership they wish to personify.3
A goal then of the research is not to capture ‘leadership’ so that it can be laid out
starkly for all to see; rather, starting from a di￿erent set of ontological assumptions, its
aims are to critically interrogate how leadership is constituted through practices (Alvesson
and Spicer 2012, p. 11), to render assemblages of practices in a way that o￿er an illumin-
ating perspective on what is actually happening (Akrich and Latour 1992, p. 259), and in
so doing, to stimulate and engage the thoughts of informants and readers alike (Collinson
and Grint 2005, p. 5). In sum, I hope to contribute to the articulation of a posthuman,
practice-based theory of leadership not fully accounted for by received conceptions of
leadership.
Thus, in taking material-discursive practice as a primary unit of analysis, this dis-
sertation adopts an approach to the study of processual relations between computational
objects and leadership practices that, according to Barley and Kunda, holds the promise of
enabling possibilities for ‘breaking new conceptual ground, resolving existing theoretical
puzzles, envisioning organizing processes, and revitalizing old concepts’ (2001, p. 76). I
o￿er this investigation at a time when enhancing the capacities of leadership is seen as
2For an elaboration of material-discursive practice, see section 2.3.7.2 on page 66.
3As it pertains to computational objects, a similar principle is at work; computational objects also tend to
become invisible as they are enrolled in practice (Latour 1988, pp. 59-110; Suchman 1995).
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pivotal to satisfying increasing ‘demands for leadership insights’ and restoring trust in
institutions (Nohria and Khurana 2010, p. 5).
1.3 Research Questions
The research questions this study explores were di￿racted (Barad 2007; Nicolini and Roe
2014, pp. 86-94) through two di￿erent lines of extant thought relating to human involve-
ment with computational objects.4 By di￿racting, I mean the development of an under-
standing of how di￿erent theoretical perspectives, when viewed through one another,
produce novel perspectives that may be useful. According to Barad, the aim of such an
approach is to:
[R]ead insights from these di￿erent areas of study through one another [. . .while
remaining] rigorously attentive to important details of specialized arguments
within a given ￿eld, in an e￿ort to foster constructive engagements across
(and a reworking of) disciplinary boundaries (2007, p. 25).
I begin this process by suggesting that one of the extant lines of thought regard-
ing human involvement with computational objects emphasises the role of technology
while the other examines the changing identity of the human subject in relation to an
increasingly technological environs. The ￿rst of these theoretical perpectives emphas-
ises technology as a regulatory mechanism (Brate 2002, p. 14; Kallinikos 2011, pp. 12-33;
1948 / Wiener 1961, pp. 6-7). Here regulatory is not limited to commonly (or negatively)
conceived views of control, but also functions akin to a bodily organ contributing to the
maintenance of conditions within its environment. From this perspective, Kallinikos ob-
serves that:
[T]echnological design may not unambiguously determine use, but it is not
devoid of implications either. Indeed it would be reasonable to assume that
design and use, possibility and actuality are interrelated in many and complex
ways that have to be disentangled conceptually and studied empirically over
time (2011, p. 16).
One way to interpret what Kallinikos suggests is to frame it in terms of the aca-
demic discourse regarding structure and agency (cf. Archer 2000; Berger and Luckmann
1966; Bourdieu 1977; 1969 / Elias 2000; Giddens 1984; Haraway 1988; Ryan 2004; Sewell
4I elaborate on the use of a di￿ractive methodological approach within this research in section 3.1.2 on
page 82.
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1992), where the question of ‘how the action of individual agents is related to the struc-
tural features of society’ (Elliott 2001, p. 294) is central. In order to address the questions of
regulatory role in which technology is presumed to be implicated, Kallinikos advocates a
research approach exploring the distinctions between what people may idealise and what
they actually do in practice, both in terms of their direct use of technology and in terms
of outcomes resulting from technological engagement.
The second line of thought challenges the received view of the human subject and
falls under the category of posthumanism (cf. Braidotti 2013; Halberstam and Livingston
1995; Hayles 1999; Wolfe 2010), as outlined in section 1.2.1. Under this view, Hayles argues
that the adoption of computational objects in everyday life:
[I]s so broad in its e￿ects and so deep in its consequences that it is trans-
forming the liberal subject, regarded as the model of the human since the
Enlightenment, into the posthuman (1999, p. xiv).
What Hayles claims above is that altering the boundaries between human and
machine cannot help but alter identities. Indeed, this line of thought is consonant with the
Suchman epigraph opening this chapter, which suggests the possibility of ‘new agencies
and accountabilities e￿ected through recon￿gured relations of human andmachine’ (2007,
p. xii).
Thus, I suggest that within these two lines of thought that typify concerns found
in the literature regarding human involvement with computational objects, the former
focuses on the regulative role of technology while the latter attends to the changing char-
acter of the subject. Consequently, between these lies a continuum where I suggest that
relations between humans enacting leadership practices through computational objects
can be located. While one line of thought looks to technology as a structuring force, the
other explores the ways in which the subject is transformed in relation to technology.
In the simplest possible terms, the former signals the role of structure while the latter
explores new possibilities for agency. Thus, between these lines of thought lies also the
terrain of the central academic debate between structure and agency in the social sciences
(Astley and Van de Ven 1983, pp. 251-253).
It is through these concerns that I propose the following research questions to
guide an initial mapping of the unexplored terrain between leadership practices and com-
putational objects (Lowe and Gardner 2001, pp. 501-502):
1. What roles do computational objects play in the enactments and possibly the cre-
ation of leadership practices?
2. How do informants’ perceptions and use of computational objects align with respect
to the constitution, (re)production, and articulation of leadership practice?
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3. How is ‘leadership’ produced and recognised qua ‘leadership’ in practice?
These research questions are not only derived from extant theory exploring the
speci￿cs of human involvement with computational objects, but as explained above, they
are also relevant to a much broader debate in social theory regarding the relation between
structure and agency. As such, they guide the collection of data that will allow the ￿ndings
o￿ered by the present research to contribute to speci￿c literatures within leadership, HCI,
and IS, but also respond to the broader purview of social theory where speci￿c calls for
exploration of technologies in relation to organisational settings have also been issued
(Ashcraft et al. 2009, p. 20).
1.4 Content and Format of the Present Research
The aim of this research is to interrogate the ‘unexplored area’ (Kahai 2012, p. 102) between
leadership practices and computational objects, thereby ‘opening up the technology black
box [. . . in order to] discover new insights into how the Digital Age is a￿ecting leadership’
(ibid.).
As an area of study where scant research exists, it falls into a category for which
Eisenhardt recommends an iterative approach to theory induction based on the case study
(1989, p. 532) and for which Lee suggests such studies provide an environment for ‘natural
experiments’ which integrate ideographic and nomothetic approaches to the production
of scienti￿c knowledge (1989, p. 119). Further, as Ragin notes, ‘thinking without compar-
ison is unthinkable’ (1989, p. 1), suggesting that a comparative case study can elucidate
observed variations in leadership practices and modes of engagement with computational
objects. Moreover, as a study designed to understand leadership practices, it follows an an-
thropological tradition, suggesting an ethnographic methodology (Boellstor￿ et al. 2012;
Dourish and Bell 2011; Szymanski and Whalen 2011b, pp. 61-91). Such an approach, as
described in section 1.2.3, also emphasises practice theory (PT) (Nicolini 2012; Reckwitz
2002; Schatzki 2002; Shove et al. 2012a).
Themajority of the empirical data collected for the study has been derived through
observational ￿eldwork with organisations at their o￿ces in London and Silicon Valley,
based to a large extent on the shadowing (Czarniawska 2007; Nicolini 2012) of formal lead-
ers, ‘tracing the associations between human and non-human elements and studying the
e￿ects that the resulting arrangements make in the world’ (Nicolini 2010, p. 1394). The
research is further enriched by extensive interviews (Whyte and Whyte 1984, pp. 97-111;
Alvesson 2011a) as well as a variety of virtual methods (Boellstor￿ et al. 2012). Through
this array of methodologies, the research provides a grounded empirical base from which
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analysis of relations between leadership practices and computational objects can be un-
dertaken.
For this purpose, a number of multinational corporations granted me access to
their sites in both the UK and US over a period of two years. Details of the various
methodological and site selection choices are elaborated further in chapter 3. Through
an intensive investigation, a variety of circumstances unfolded for which I was present,
revealing key features and implications for the enactment of leadership practice through
computational objects. Further, as detailed in chapter 2, these have been analysed against
a theoretical framework I have synthesised based on the work of leadership scholars Grint
(2005a) and Kempster et al. (2011). As I will show in chapter 2, leadership studies are ￿lled
with debate about what ‘leadership’ actually means; however, the framework of leadership
dimensions I propose have the bene￿t of being those for which extant leadership theory
easily map onto, thereby providing a theoretical base to integrate with, rather than deviate
from general leadership theory.
Thus, the overall objective of the research is to produce a high-quality exploratory
and comparative case study to generate a theoretical understanding of leadership practices
in modern organisations that includes the role of computational objects.
1.5 Organisation of This Dissertation
This study is presented in the following order: Chapter 2 situates this workwithin prior re-
search at the intersection of studies on leadership, HCI, and IS. Moreover, within chapter 2
I present a survey of the extant theories of leadership that frame how I plan to study it,
and o￿er a ￿vefold framework based on the work of leadership scholars Grint (2005a) and
Kempster et al. (2011) to study leadership in situ. I then situate the study of leadership
within the broader arc of social theory and discuss in greater detail the social theories that
I will mobilise in this study. In this fashion, both the present chapter and chapter 2 lay the
theoretical and meta-theoretical groundwork for the study. Chapter 3 then sets out the
rationale and attendant details for the methodological and site selection choices that have
been made in conducting the study.
The next three chapters present the empirical material from three distinct view-
points. Chapter 4 o￿ers an exploration of leadership practice in an unlikely location: two
programmers engaging in the material-discursive practice of pair programming (Williams
2001). I call this location unlikely, for within the human dyad of the ‘pair’ there are no
formal leaders. Yet, I suggest that it provides an ideal location to interrogate the construct
‘leadership’, for as the chapter reveals, it provides a compelling account of how leadership
is enacted through material-discursive practice, even in cases where there is no formal
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‘leader’. What I show in this chapter is that leadership is manifested even in the interac-
tions of a human dyad where there are no formal leaders. Moreover, the cases presented
in this chapter build an empirical foundation for what it might mean for a computational
object to lead.
Chapter 5 focuses onmaterial-discursive practice of emailing by formal leaders and
the outcomes of such human-computer interactions. Speci￿cally, by closely examining
formal leaders’ material-discursive practicewith computational objects, I demonstrate that
what we construe as ‘leadership’ is deciphered as a ‘nexus of practices’ (Schatzki 1996,
p. xi). This conceptualisation of leadership-as-practice (LAP) (Carroll et al. 2008; Crevani
et al. 2010; Endrissat and Arx 2013) is much less attached to an individual and much more
dependent on various approaches to—and therefore distributions of—material-discursive
practice (Barad 2007, p. 178; Nicolini, Mengis et al. 2011, p. 8; Shove et al. 2012b). Here,
I draw attention to the way in which such distributions also include the apparatus of
computational objects.
In Chapter 6, I am guided by the call of Sandberg and Tsoukas (2011) to employ
breakdowns as a site for understanding the relationship between leadership practice and
computational objects. To locate breakdowns in the literature, I brie￿y review the various
approaches to studying breakdowns in the extant literature to develop a useful framework.
This perspective enables me to explicate the relationship between leadership practices
and computational objects from a perspective that di￿ers from the previous two empir-
ical chapters. In particular, this theoretical sca￿olding allows my analysis to elucidate
the ways in which leadership practices are enacted through—and their dependency on—
computational objects, while simultaneously highlighting the role of human decisions in
these enactments.
Then, in chapter 7, I take a step back and synthesise the ￿ndings presented in the
three empirical chapters, re￿ecting and di￿racting (Barad 2007, pp. 86-94; Nicolini and
Roe 2014) these through both the empirics and extant theory. Within this concluding
chapter, I integrate the various points raised by the dissertation and summarise its overall
implications, limitations and contributions, and areas for future research.
More speci￿cally, in chapter 7, I detail the various ￿ndings throughout the empir-
ical chapters and explore their implications. These include how leadership is understood
and recognised by members, how leadership is distributed across people and objects, and,
perhaps most radically, what the study reveals about human choice, agency, and their rela-
tion to an anthropocentric perspective. Here, I present an apparent paradox, namely, that
some material-discursive practices are recognised by members as leadership, while other,
functionally equivalent practices, most often enacted by computational objects, go unre-
cognised as leadership practices. In this sense, building on Grint and Woolgar’s sceptical
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constructivism (1997, p. 143), what this study explores are possible versions of ‘leader-
ship’, some of which are recognised by members as such, and some of which may go un-
recognised. The implications of these ￿ndings are then discussed in relation to the extant
literature.
Signi￿cantly, within chapter 7, I present a range of roles built on Ihde’s human-
technology relations (1990) and analysed from the empirical data in this study. These roles
provide a framework to explain how computational objects support enactments of leader-
ship practice. Building on this, I then present a detailed original theory that explains lead-
ership as a processual phenomena produced through citation (1993 / Butler 2011, pp. xxi-
xxiv; Derrida 1977, p. 18) in material-discursive practice. In this theory, leadership, rather
than standing as a phenomenon per se, acts as a ‘symbolic resource’ (Ailon-Souday and
Kunda 2003), standing for particular values within the context of a community, such as an
organisation. Thus, I argue that leadership, when recognised, always stands for something
else for which the word ‘leadership’ is a proxy or container. As a symbolic resource, I in-
sist that such leadership always points to an underlying process of categorisation (Bowker
and Star 1999) of value and worth (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006).
However, a citational theory of leadership alone does not address all of the ob-
served phenomena that, following Grint and Woolgar’s sceptical constructivism, could
be understood as leadership. For this reason, and also within chapter 7, the study o￿ers
a parallel theory of posthuman leadership to explain those enactments of computational
objects that appear to produce functionally equivalent engagements and results as recog-
nised leadership practices, yet, are not recognised as leadership by group members. In
other words, starting from the observation that humans tend to overlook computational
objects and their roles in leadership practices, I explain how this reveals a disjunction of
responsibility from authority in the delegation of authoritative roles to computational ob-
jects. This leads to a theory of posthuman leadership that provides a cogent explanation
as to why humans do not consider what computational objects do as leadership, but, more
importantly, explains how various situations come about, where people ￿nd themselves ‘at
the mercy’ of computational systems without ever realising it. This is amply evidenced by
a wide range of large-scale computational system failures (Nicas and Carey 2013; US Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission and US Securities & Exchange Commission 2010).
Through these theoretical contributions, chapter 7 brings to bear a detailed theor-
etical perspective that both explains the production of leadership and includes the role of
computational objects in leadership practices.
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Chapter 2
The Ideologies of Studying
Leadership
Language is not only the foundation for the whole faculty of thinking, but the
central point also from which proceed the misunderstandings of reason herself
(Johann Georg Hamann, quoted in Müller 1898, p. 94).
Words can be made to yield a sense in which they mark one of the deepest di￿er-
ences which divide writers and thinkers, and, it may be, human beings in general
(Berlin 1953, p. 1).
I￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, I argued there are signi￿cant gaps in leadership researchon at least two levels. The ￿rst level is that theories of leadership tend to limitthemselves to human actants (Latour 1999, p. 303), rendering non-humans invisible.
I contended that the use of computational objects in globalised business organisations is
deeply embedded in everyday experience and that to ignore these in the study of leadership
and in the production of its theories is a grave error. The second gap is that there exists a
dearth of research on leadership that takes the observed practice of leadership as its unit
of analysis. On this point, I claim that a practice theory (PT)-based approach (Nicolini
2012; Reckwitz 2002; Schatzki 2002) can both inform the development of leadership theory
and enable richer understandings. I argued that a research programme that addresses
these two gaps will contribute to the ￿eld both by extending the theory of leadership to
computational objects and by grounding its study ￿rmly in practice.
My research programme is consequently situated at a nexus of knowledge do-
mains, including leadership, HCI, IS, and organisational studies (OS). In this chapter, I
begin to focus at the level of theory, engaging with resources from within these various
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literatures, while recognising that any position that I take carries with it a certain world-
view, or Weltanschauung (Staiti 2013, p. 34). One way to describe this is with the concept
of ideology (Marx and Engels 1970, pp. 39-40), a concept that Kunda also mobilises in the
context of his ethnographic study as:
[B]odies of knowledge that must be understood in the context of the social ar-
rangements within which they arise and which provide the grounds for their
assertion (Kunda 1986, p. 54).
Thus, the naming of this chapter is grounded in the position that all knowledges
are situated and partial (Haraway 1988; Harding 1991) and, moreover, that they can only be
understood through the social contexts in which they are mobilised.1 This ‘social context’
is the one in which Kunda’s de￿nition of ideology provides the ‘grounds’ that legitimate
the ‘assertion’ of ‘bodies of knowledge’ (1986, p. 54). Such a position reveals an ‘ethno-
graphic sensibility [. . . ] in keeping with a hermeneutic-phenomenological stance’ (Yanow,
Ybema et al. 2012, p. 367), which I take to be central to my theoretical orientation.
Having presented this foundational aspect ofmy theoretical view, I explicate below
my plan for the remainder of this chapter.
2.1 Organisation of This Chapter
In this chapter I will engage with the following topics underpinning the theoretical as-
pects of the present work: First I review the extant theories of leadership and frame how
I plan to study it (section 2.2). Within this section I present a ￿vefold framework based
on the work of leadership scholars Grint (2005a, p. 18) and Kempster et al. (2011) to study
leadership in situ (section 2.2.5). I will then discuss the arc of social theory and its bearing
on the study of leadership (section 2.3). Within this section I will also describe the key
1With regard to the term situated, Ciborra and Willcocks note that:
[T]he adjective “situated”, the noun “situation”, the Latin expression “in situ”, and the abstract
concept of “situatedness”, are liberally employed by those researchers and scholars who want
to take and articulate alternative approaches to the study of organizations. (2006, p. 129)
In response to this, he points out that the term originates from the phenomenological tradition, spec￿c-
ally in Heidegger (1953 / 1996) and his use of the German word be￿ndlich, which, according to Ciborra and
Willcocks:
[N]ot only refers to the circumstances one ￿nds himself or herself in, but also to his or her
“inner situation”, disposition, mood, a￿ectedness and emotion (2006, p. 130).
Ciborra thus points out that in the scholarly translation from be￿ndlich to ‘situated’, crucial dimensions of
meaning were lost that may be bene￿cial to recover. I therefore attempt, within the present work, to include
these dimensions of emotion and a￿ect in both the empirics and analysis.
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aspects of the social theories I mobilise in this study, actor-network theory (ANT) (La-
tour 2005) and Barad’s agential realism (1997, 2003, 2007) and Ihde’s conceptualisaton of
human-technology relations (1990). I then close the chapter by drawing conclusions and
a description of the course this dissertation will take (section 2.4).
Despitemy attempts tomake this chapter as concise as possible, there are a number
of key topics that must be addressed in order to lay a proper foundation for the empirical
chapters to come. One exception to this, however, is found in chapter 6, where I discuss the
extant literature on breakdowns. My reasoning is that this particular theoretical material is
speci￿c to that chapter, however, for continuity, I point out to the reader that this material
can be found in section 6.2.
2.2 Leadership
Despite the current prominence of leadership (Jackson and Parry 2011, p. 2), the literature
on leadership is both exceptionally broad (Palmer and Hardy 2000, p. 230) and highly de-
bated (Ladkin 2010, p. 75; Palmer and Hardy 2000, p. 233). In this section, I engage with
this extant literature on leadership in order to lay out a sense of its historical emergence.
I begin with brief summary of the study of leadership before the twentieth century (sec-
tion 2.2.1). I then summarise the study of leadership up to the present day (section 2.2.2).
I then move on to the question of de￿ning leadership (section 2.2.2.1) and current debates
in the study of leadership (section 2.2.3). Following this, I propose moving beyond such
debates through an approach to studying leadership in situ based on the work of Grint
(2005a) and Kempster et al. (2011) (section 2.2.4).
2.2.1 The Pre–Modern Era
One setting to place the emergence of leadership is at the dawn of recorded history, spe-
ci￿cally, at the appearance of writing. This is a history written primarily by its winners
(Grint 2010a, pp. 33-34) in a historical era when war was central to the practice of leader-
ship. Thus, we ￿nd works such as Kaut.il¯ıya’s Arthaśa¯stra (circa 4th century B.C.E. / 1967),
Sun Zi’s Art of War (circa 2nd century B.C.E. / 2003), Plato’s Republic (circa 380 B.C.E. /
2000), and Machiavelli’s The Prince (1513 / 2008), all of which o￿er perspectives on what
leadership meant to those authors at the time of their writing (Grint 2010a, pp. 33-49).
Much of the leadership literature in this period was written professionally at the
command of powerful state rulers. For example, Grint cites the histories of Alexander and
Julius Caesar as examples of such commissioned works (ibid., p. 33). Grint also points
out that the stories that were documented tend to contain narratives that are considered
‘interesting’, that is, where something important occurs. This suggests that the accounts
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available to us on the study of leadership from the pre-modern era are biased in favour
of the powerful and omit the mundane, and thus place our present-day understandings
of leadership from the earliest times in a relation with Foucault’s concept of discursive
practice, as a:
[B]ody of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and
space that have de￿ned a given period, and for a given social, economic, geo-
graphical, or linguistic area, the conditions of operation of the enunciative
function (1969 / 2002, p. 117).
Thus, while these writings are without doubt the products of societies and their
attendant world view, or Weltanschauung (Staiti 2013, p. 34) in place at the time of their
conception, the pre-modern leadership literature also forms an important basis for our
own modern-day starting points in the study of leadership. These historical texts describe
leadership as authoritarian, almost universally embodied in a man, often involving milit-
ary operations and to this extent, o￿er prescriptive advice on wars and how to win them.
2.2.2 The Modern Era
In the present era, according to Guillén, leadership as a topic of academic enquiry emerged
out of the discipline of sociology and its interest in the phenomenon, as observed in organ-
isations, political parties, and nation-states (2010, p. 223). Within his analysis, sociology
dominated the published study of leadership up until the 1970s, when the disciplines of
business,2 political science, and, most notably, psychology began to produce more lead-
ership studies. To support these claims, Guillén o￿ers a chart, rendered in ￿gure 2.1. To
corroborate these ￿ndings, I produced a chart using the online citation analysis service,
SciVerse Scopus (Elsevier 2012), which, as shown in ￿gure 2.2, reveals a similar pattern of
exponential growth associated with the topic of leadership.
These data underscore two important points. First, they show how young the aca-
demic ￿eld of leadership is in comparison to more established bodies of knowledge such as
philosophy or mathematics. Next, they highlight important academic disciplinary bound-
aries or, as some argue, reveal a disciplinary parochialism in the approach of studying
leadership (March 2005; Boyacigiller and Adler 1991). While each discipline brings par-
ticular approaches to their production of knowledge that both enable and constrain the
types of questions and answers each can o￿er, none are capable of answering all questions
(Packer 2010, pp. 17-41; Giddens 1974, pp. 1-22; Terjesen and Politis 2015, p. 151). It is for
2As established by the professionalisation projects of the late 1800s (Khurana 2010, Part I) and the special-
isation of education that ensued in the twentieth-century (Zurcher 1996).
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Figure 2.1: The Scholarly Literature on Leadership in the Fields of Business, Psychology, and
Sociology (Guillén 2010, p. 224)
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these reasons I argue that the application of a broader spectrum of disciplinary approaches
to the topic of leadership can help to broaden our understanding.
Figure 2.2: Analysis of Scholarly Literature on Leadership: 1872-2010. (Elsevier 2012, custom
search)
Notwithstanding the sheer quantity of publications that can be taken as an in-
dication of the importance leadership holds for researchers and their sponsors, the expo-
nential growth in publications in the 1990s, proximal to the time that the Internet was
commercialised, is a particularly interesting data point. Indeed, while scholars have noted
a marked rise in the academic growth of leadership as a discipline (Brungardt et al. 1998;
Rost and Barker 2000), few have linked this growth of leadership to attendant changes in
computational technology. This is a motivating insight for the present study.
The early twentieth-century work-practice innovations and ideologies of Fayol
(1917), Ford (Gilbert et al. 1992), and Taylor (1903; 1911) were inextricably linked to the
attendant Industrial Age mechanisms available to them (Yates 1993, p. 9). Thus, it fol-
lows that further development of (computational) technologies bring new modes of work
practice innovation and production, as well as a rede￿nition of working roles (Zubo￿ 1988,
p. 16). Some suggest that this material interplay is a fundamental, processual, and ongoing
phenomenon of manifest existence (Barad 2003, p. 822), marking a re￿guring of practices
and objects (Suchman 2005, p. 383), which must also include the practices of leadership.
This leads us to what Barad calls ‘material-discursive practice’ (2007, p. 178), the loca-
tion where both the materiality and meaning of practices are co-constituted.3 I therefore
use this theoretical term interchangeably with the term ‘practice’ throughout this work,
where the term material-discursive practice calls particular attention to the often invisible
material and discursive elements present in the enactment of practice.
3For an elaboration of material-discursive practice, see section 2.3.7.2 beginning on page 66.
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2.2.2.1 What is Leadership?
Given this background, one may well ask, paraphrasing Ladkin (2010, p. 1), ‘What is this
phenomenon associated with the word “leadership”?’ According to Bass, ‘Leadership is
one of the world’s oldest preoccupations’, inscribed in ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics and
mythologised in ancient texts such as the Iliad and Beowulf (1990c, p. 3).4 Meanwhile, Van
Seters and Field describe leadership as a ‘complex and multifaceted phenomena’ that was
conceptualised ‘even before biblical times’ (1990, p. 29).
De￿nitions as Shifting Sands As ancient as the concept of leadership may be, time
has not served to sediment any single de￿nition. The Oxford English Dictionary reports
the word ‘leadership’ was only brought into use in 1821 with the phrase ‘Leadership of the
Opposition’ (OED Editors 2011), that is, in a political context. In 1870, use in a military
context was employed as ‘Nothing is wanted but military leadership and military means’
(ibid.). A legal context makes its appearance in 1885 as ‘the leadership of a great circuit’
(ibid.). But it is not until 1933 that the word ‘leadership’ is related to organisational life as
‘the substitution of morale for discipline and of integration for domination calls for a change
in the quality of leadership in industry’ (ibid.). This etymological progression, according to
the OED editors, is notable on a number of levels, not least of which that political, military,
and legal use preceded and possibly informed the idea of leadership as it is now organisa-
tionally conceived. Further, it highlights the fact that industry-centric organisational life
has itself only recently come into being. Moreover, academic research focusing speci￿c-
ally on the topic only formally commenced in the twentieth-century (Bass 1981 cited in
Van Seters and Field 1990, p. 29). This places the academic study of leadership at a little
more than 100 years old.
On this youthful enterprise, Rost found 221 de￿nitions of leadership found in over
587 ‘books, book chapters, and journal articles which, by title, indicated that they were
primarily concerned with leadership’ (1993, p. 44) from 1900 to 1990.5 His review included
authors from the United States, Canada, Australia, and various European countries, noting
in agreement with Guillén that publications from ‘European countries increased dramat-
ically in the 1970’s and 1980’s’ (ibid.). Note, however, that at the time of Rost’s writing,
publications were in the midst of what, in hindsight, can be seen as the greatest period of
4Across his wide survey of religions and cultures, Campbell has asserted the myth of the hero embeds a
similar narrative structure, represented as the ‘rights of passage: separation - initiation - return: which might
be named the nuclear unit of the monomyth’ (2004, p. 28). This conception of a culturally universal heroic
‘monomyth’ may help to explain why the idea of the leader as hero has appeared at various stages in the
development of the scholarship of leadership, often persisting in the face of ill e￿ects that may attend it (cf.
Padilla et al. 2007; Tourish 2013).
5Rost notes that 366 of the 587 analysed sources (62%) did not de￿ne leadership at all, further adding to




Leadership is ‘the behavior of an individual [. . . ] directing the activities of a group towards a shared goal’
(Hemphill and Coons 1957, p. 7).
∑
Leadership is ‘the influential increment over and above mechanical compliance with the routine directives
of the organization’ (Katz and Kahn 1978, p. 528).
∏
‘Leadership is exercised when persons [. . . ] mobilize [. . . ] institutional, political, psychological, and other
resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers’ (Burns 1978, p. 18).
π
‘Leadership is realized in the process whereby one or more individuals succeed in a￿empting to frame and
define the reality of others’ (Smircich and Morgan 1982, p. 258).
∫
Leadership is ‘the process of influencing the activities of an organized group toward goal achievement.’
(Rauch and Behling 1984, p. 46)
ª
‘Leadership is about articulating visions, embodying values, and creating the environment within which
things can be accomplished’ (Richards and Engle 1986, p. 206).
º
‘Leadership is a process of giving purpose (meaningful direction) to collective e￿ort, and causing willing
e￿ort to be expended to achieve purpose’ (Jacobs and Jacques 1990, p. 281).
Ω
Leadership ‘is the ability to step outside the culture [. . . ] to start evolutionary change processes that are
more adaptive’ (1985 / Schein 2004, p. 2).
æ
‘Leadership is the process of making sense of what people are doing together so that people will understand
and be commi￿ed’ (Drath and Palus 1994, p. 4).
ø
Leadership is ‘the ability of an individual to influence, motivate, and enable others to contribute toward
the e￿ectiveness and success of the organizations of which they are members’ (House, Hanges et al. 1999,
p. 184).
Table 2.1: Ten De￿nitions of Leadership (adapted from Yukl 2009, p. 3)
growth. Moreover, according to the most recent data, as shown in ￿gure 2.2, this growth
shows no sign of abating. To wit, 10 such varied de￿nitions are displayed in table 2.1 as
compiled by Yukl (2009, p. 3). These varied formulations o￿er the reader a sense of the
great variety of perspectives that leadership scholars have adopted in their study of the
phenomenon, for example, associating leadership with in￿uencing others, organisational
change, shaping meaning, and the accomplishment of goals.6
Further, in examining a wide range of surveys and reviews on the study of leader-
ship (Bass and Bass 2008; Bryman et al. 2011; Czarniawska 2008, pp. 65-77; Day, Fleenor et
al. 2014; Dinh et al. 2014; Gibb 1954; Grint 2011; Jackson and Parry 2011; Northouse 2009;
Van Seters and Field 1990; Palmer and Hardy 2000, pp. 228-258; Schwandt and Szabla 2007;
Van Knippenberg, Knippenberg et al. 2004; Yukl 2009), it becomes readily apparent that
di￿erent scholars conceptualise the ￿eld quite di￿erently. Where Yukl’s leadership text
(2009) is ordered by the aspect of leadership studied (e.g., managerial traits in one chapter;
gender, diversity, and cross-cultural leadership in another), the Sage Handbook of Lead-
ership (Bryman et al. 2011) instead groups its material by disciplinary perspectives (e.g.,
sociological perspectives in one section, psychological perspectives in another). These dif-
6Moreover, they do not even begin to step into a larger debate of distinctions between leadership and
management, a debate that is beyond the scope of this dissertation. This study is concerned with practices
that members refer to as leadership. However, for an excellent overview and discussion of extant distinctions,
see Ladkin 2015.
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ferences show that the story of leadership literature can be told in variousways, depending
on the authors’ perspectives and intentions. Moreover, these di￿erences belie ideological
distinctions. Metaphorically, the former signals an objective ideology where leadership
can be likened to an animal that can be dissected and each part individually identi￿ed,
while the latter suggests a pluralist ideology that likens disciplinary perspectives to a set
of coloured glasses that can be donned by the researcher, where leadership then appears
in a form revealed by the glasses. From this vantage point, de￿nitions of leadership are
like shifting sands: nothing can be taken for granted.
My own interests are more aligned with the latter approach, and yet, I must also
concede that the dominant stratagem in the leadership literature tends to organise theor-
etical periods in a linear fashion—presenting the theoretical development itself as a phe-
nomenon that is clear and well marked. As a result, the majority of scholars in my review
have represented the major periods of leadership theorisation in a linear fashion, as per
Palmer and Hardy’s (2000, p. 231) ￿ve broad categories, shown in ￿gure 2.7.
Indeed, even with scholars such as Palmer and Hardy, whose critical work high-
lights key debates in managerial and leadership discourse, while simultaneously display-
ing a sensitivity to complex power and political relations in organisations, chose to rep-
resent leadership as a linear progression (ibid., pp. 228-258). A summary of their analysis
of leadership theory is rendered in table 2.3.
Contra the ￿attened linear, Van Seters and Field’s evolutionary perspective as
shown in ￿gure 2.6 provides a more complex perspective on the development of lead-
ership theory.7 Their analysis of extant theory suggests that 10 eras (each with its own
sub-periods) of leadership theorisation are discernible across four dimensions of Beha-
viour, Personality, In￿uence, and Situation.
Van Seters and Field’s analysis is signi￿cantlymore detailed, both in terms of depth
and breadth than Palmer and Hardy’s suggestion of ￿ve schools of leadership as shown
in table 2.3. In contrast, Van Seters and Field’s nuanced analysis reveals relationships and
linkages between various movements in the development of theory in a way that other
formulations do not.
7My position here is that an evolutionary perspective is neither ‘more’ correct nor true (McKelvey 2003)
than any of the other views that have been put forward by leadership scholars, including framings that em-
phasise philosophical (Ospina and Uhl-Bien 2012), political (Grint 2010a, p. 48), sociological (Guillén 2010),
disciplinary (Bryman et al. 2011), discursive (Western 2007, pp. 80-85), practice theory (PT)-based (Day 2000),
thematic (Nohria and Khurana 2010, p. 7), and quantitative (Hiller et al. 2011; Brutus and Duniewicz 2012)
aspects. These positions co-exist and serve to add useful detail/challenge the more dominant approaches (c.f.
Avolio, Walumbwa et al. 2009; Bass and Bass 2008; Chemers 1997; House and Aditya 1997; Northouse 2009;
Yukl 2009). Indeed, there are as many approaches as scholars themselves. My perspective is that having a
range of diverse perspectives available increases possibilities for broader and deeper understandings (Turkle
and Papert 1992; Mitchell 2004).
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2.2.3 Debates in the Study of Leadership
Given the apparent ‘slipperiness’ (Alvesson and Spicer 2011b) of the term ‘leadership’, I
would like to focus brie￿y on Van Seters and Field’s anti-leadership era, as it brings to the
fore some of the strongest debates within the ￿eld that inform my study.
Van Seters and Field’s Anti-Leadership era is genealogically positioned in their
analysis as descending from the fourth Situation era and the ￿fth Contingency era (1990,
p. 37). It occurs from the late 1970s and extends through the present. Its key in￿uence
within the arc of social theory (see section 2.3) is the move of contextualising the subject,
and there is evidence of a poststructuralist ontology that asserts the discursive production
of the subject and an acknowledgement of the limits of what can be known.
According to Van Seters and Field, in the latter half of the 1970s, while copious
empirical studies had been conducted to test the various theories developed through suc-
cessive eras:
[T]he results were less than conclusive, and a sentiment arose that perhaps
there was no articulable concept called leadership. It seemed as though so
many variables in the leadership equation had been explained that they ex-
plained nothing at all (ibid., p. 36).
Out of these conditions ‘there arose an era of “Anti-Leadership”’ (ibid.). They di-
vide this era into two periods: the Ambiguity period and the Substitute period. The former
looks to situational variables in a novel fashion—introspectively, in that it marks the be-
ginning of an ongoing period of re￿ection and critique of both the concept of leadership
and the methods used to study it. The latter period explores behavioural practices, norm-
ative structures, and artefacts that may displace traditional leadership functions. These
theoretical developments hold important implications for the present research.
Given the import of the choices a researcher makes in how he or she observes
his or her object of research (Seidl and Becker 2009, p. 208; Nohria and Khurana 2010,
p. 19), the former period is vital to consider. Further, given that my research seeks to
explore relationships between computational objects and leadership practices, the latter
period is also important as it sets a precedent for the inclusion of artefacts in the theory
of leadership. Crucially, these periods tend to be overlooked in linear reviews and, if they
are included, it seems mostly in passing. In contrast, Van Seters and Field (1990) appear to
give a broader range of theoretical developments greater representation. This inclusion,
and ostensibly more balanced reporting, is a key factor in my choice to frame my review
through their perspective.
Recounting his own experience of living through this era as a leadership scholar,
Hunt reports that:
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[T]o be active in the ￿eld as I was in the 1970s and 80s was to question its
survival as a serious area of academic interest. A number of us became very
concerned. First we defended it (Hunt and Larson 1975), but as the critical
crescendo continued, we began to have doubts ourselves (1999, p. 130).
Here, Hunt describes an era where leadership scholarship was subjected to an in-
tense critical scrutiny that included itsmembers and threatened the future of the discipline.
Even the proponents, according to Hunt, were driven to reckon their positions.
For during this period, a number of key papers directly challenging the construct
of leadership itself appear, ￿rst among themMiner’s (1975), found in the very same volume
Hunt refers to as his initial defence above. In his critique, Miner suggests that:
[W]e abandon leadership in favor of some other, more fruitful way of cutting
up the theoretical pie (ibid., p. 200).
In this work, Miner radically suggests a theory of control over one of leadership
and o￿ers four types of control (ibid., pp. 201-204) as a starting place.8 This line of ar-
gumentation sits along the well-trodden debate of a distinction between ‘leadership’ and
‘management’ (cf. Bedeian and Hunt 2006; Korica, Nicolini et al. under review; Ladkin
2015; Simonet and Tett 2013). Within this study, I circumvent this issue by focusing ana-
lysis not on what scholars think the di￿erences between these terms might be but by
instead looking to how members endogenously produce a phenomenon they refer to as
‘leadership’ (Szymanski and Whalen 2011a, p. 6).
Also notable here is Miner’s discussion of task control, including the concepts of
‘push’ and ‘pull’, where push is the type of work presented on an assembly line for which
the worker has no control and pull is characterised as being achieved through job enlarge-
ment (1975, p. 204). These concepts signi￿cantly predate lean manufacturing (Cusumano
1985; O¯no 1988), and yet seem to anticipate it.9
Following Miner, Pfe￿er (1977) o￿ered a similar critique, charging that there were
three problems with the concept of leadership:
8These are 1) hierarchical control, 2) professional or ideological control, 3) group control, and 4) task
control. Miner’s claim is that in comparison to leadership, control is more meaningful theoretically and ‘o￿ers
more powerful analytic tools to those who are primarily concerned with the organizational, as opposed to
small-group, level of analysis’ (1975, p. 206).
9The emphasis on pull-based work systems, for example, through the use of ‘Kanban’, is argued to be
central to the just-in-time (JIT) production system (O¯no 1988, p. 29). Kanban is a japanese word meaning
‘sign’ or ‘placard’ (ibid., p. 27). A kanban system is a way of organising work such that the information about
a task that needs to be done is represented on a distinct object such as a paper card that might be tacked to
a (kanban) board. These cards are then on display to a group of workers, and the workers are then free to
choose the cards they want to work on (Poppendieck and Poppendieck 2003, p. 72). Such a system is said to
possess pull, rather than push qualities that ‘create appropriate signaling and commitment mechanisms, so
that teams can ￿gure out for themselves the most productive way to spend their time’(ibid., p. 74).
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1. Ambiguity in de￿nition and measurement;
2. The question of whether leadership has appreciable e￿ects on organisational out-
comes;
3. The selection process for leader succession, which often applies ‘organizationally
irrelevant criteria and which has implications for normative theories of leadership’
(1977, p. 104).
In the face of these concerns, Pfe￿er argues that leadership, rather than being a dis-
crete phenomenon, is a one projected through psychological attribution (Calder 1977) by
people toward objects of perceived leadership. He therefore suggests that a more fruitful
direction for the study of leadership is to investigate the process of how these attribu-
tions are made (Pfe￿er 1977, p. 104). Crucially, he argues that leadership studies aiming
to elucidate the ‘process of attributing leadership’ (ibid.) would be useful contributions to
knowledge. And yet, this is not an approach that has been taken up in any serious way in
the 38 years since it was proposed. For this reason, Pfe￿er’s aim of elaborating the process
of how leadership happens in practice in the ￿rst place is one I take as central to the goals
of the present research. Attribution theory (cf. Calder 1977; Harvey et al. 2014; Martinko et
al. 2007), however, is a psychological concept that places the activity of attribution within
the mind of the individual. This is not a view of cognition I share. Instead, I take a dif-
ferent line towards cognition, following Hutchins (1995a), who convincingly argues that
cognition is a distributed, socio-technical, and performative phenomenon. Speci￿cally,
Hutchins argues that cognition is:
[N]ot determined entirely by the information processing properties of indi-
viduals [. . . nor can it be] inferred from the properties of the individual agents
alone, no matter how detailed the knowledge of the properties of those in-
dividuals may be. [Rather, cognition] is produced by a system that typically
includes [. . . humans] interacting with each other and with a suite of techno-
logical devices (1995b, p. 265).
I ask the reader to note the parallelism with which this argument aligns with
Barad’s view that all phenomena, more generally, are productions of ‘the mutual con-
stitution of entangled agencies’ (2007, p. 33). These ideas will elaborated in section 2.3.7.2.
Returning to Pfe￿er, to further underscore the in￿uence of the move within the
arc of social theory of contextualising the subject (see section 2.3), he asserts that:
[A]nalysis of leadership and leadership processes must be contingent on the
intent of the researcher (Pfe￿er 1977, p. 111).
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Pfe￿er here is signalling that researchers are no longer searching for some given
truth, but rather, they discursively produce it through their intent and subsequent actions.
Concurring with Pfe￿er’s attributional position, Mitchell, in his review of organ-
isational behaviour, notes that paradigmatic shifts in leadership theory suggest that ‘lead-
ership is in the mind of the observer’ and is ‘essentially a perceptual construct’ (1979,
p. 269).
These views, Van Seters and Field (1990) argue, challenged the foundations of lead-
ership scholarship and are indicative of the Ambiguity period as depicted in ￿gure 2.6.
Further, they assert that this period has not been a passing fad; it has persisted and con-
tinued to grow. Van Seters and Field credit this period with fostering the work of Meindl
et al. (1985), who introduced the concept of The Romance of Leadership, where ‘leader-
ship is actually an encompassing term to describe organisational changes that we do not
otherwise understand’ (Van Seters and Field 1990, p. 37).
Another continued stream of research that questions the construct of leadership
has come from scholars identi￿ed with critical management studies (CMS). For example,
Alvesson and Willmot make the case for a critical approach to the study of management
and include leadership under this remit (1996, p. 17). Palmer and Hardy (2000, pp. 228-
258) question whether leadership is a myth or a villain and Berry and Cartwright’s work
(2000) on the critical construction of leadership also falls into a similar category. Later,
Alvesson and Svenningsson suggest that the study of leadership, when closely examined,
disappears, arguing in line with Pfe￿er that:
[L]eaders and leadership can then be seen as organizational symbols, the ori-
entations toward them are then not treated as facts about leadership, as such,
but more as clues to understand organizational cultures (Alvesson and Sven-
ingsson 2003a, p. 365).
While not refuting leadership entirely, Alvesson and Svenningsson suggest that
it may be an altogether di￿erent kind of phenomenon than previously hypothesised. To
explore this possibility, they advise a methodological approach to the study of leadership
that emphasises the:
[E]xploration in depth of what people mean, combined with a considerable
openness for—without a privileging of—incoherence, variation, and fragment-
ation (ibid., p. 378).
For this purpose, they recommend ethnographies. This theme of ‘disappearance’
in leadership is further explored as ‘slipperiness’ (Alvesson and Spicer 2011b) and most
recently, Alvesson and Spicer (2012) have formally suggested the idea ofCritical Leadership
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Studies, presumably a version of critical management studies (CMS) tailored for this study
of leadership and emphasising performative and critical positions.
Also, while not part of the critical stream per se, Ladkin (2010), in alignment with
Alvesson and Svenningsson (2003a), has similarly argued for a reorientation toward the
study of leadership by asking a di￿erent set of questions. For example, she suggests that:
[R]ather than asking ‘What is leadership?’, the question, ‘How might we un-
derstand leadership as a phenomenon?’ is posed (2010, p. 1).
For Ladkin, the approach to study leadership is phenomenological and one that
cannot be separated from the environment in which it naturally occurs. She argues, for
example, that:
If the nature of a thing is such that when removed from the environment in
which it naturally occurs it alters radically, you will not glean an accurate
account of it by examining it within laboratory conditions [. . . ] Understand-
ing the nature of leadership as a phenomenon brings an appreciation of the
landscape in which it occurs, encourages us to consider the air it breathes,
the environment which feeds it, as well as its distinctive occurrence (ibid.,
pp. 14-15).
Thus Ladkin, like Alvesson and Svenningsson (2003a), argues strongly for the
study of leadership in situ in order to better understand how it comes about, how it is
sustained, and what makes its enactment distinctive.
Of late, a number of scholars havemobilised themethodological directionAlvesson
and Svenningsson (ibid.) and Ladkin (2010) point toward under the rubric leadership-as-
practice (LAP) (cf. Carroll et al. 2008; Crevani et al. 2010; Denis, Langley and Rouleau 2010;
Endrissat and Arx 2013; Perillo 2008). This work takes the strategy-as-practice stream
(cf. Chia and MacKay 2007; Jarzabkowski 2005; Jarzabkowski and Spee 2009; Seidl and
Whittington 2014; Tsoukas 2010; Vaara and Whittington 2012) and its reliance on practice
theory (PT) (cf. Nicolini 2012; Orlikowski 2010; Reckwitz 2002; Schatzki 2002; Shove et al.
2012b) as theoretical guides. I adopt such an approach in my orientation to the study of
leadership.
There are also scholars associated with science and technology studies (STS) con-
nected with this stream, as with Grint, who has provocatively explored, among other
things, the social construction of leadership (Grint 2005b), whether leadership is an ‘enemy
of the people’ (Grint 2010b), and whether our relationship with leadership is an addiction
or an allergy (Grint 2010c).
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Kelly (2008), summarises this burgeoning direction in leadership research, citing a
‘growing number of scholars disa￿ected by the research traditions laid down by leadership
psychology’, arguing that there is a turn towards increased ‘interpretive and observational
methods in the search for the practices of leadership in everyday life’ (ibid., p. 763).
Thus, as Ladkin (2010, pp. 3-4) and others have argued, what I suggest is an anti-
essentialist line of argument that is closely related to the STS debate between Kling, Grint
andWoolgar on essentialism (cf. Kling 1991a; Woolgar and Grint 1991; Kling 1991b, 1992a;
Grint and Woolgar 1992; Kling 1992b). Here, Woolhar and Grint argue that the:
[T]ransformation we need to work toward is a transformation of the nature
of social analysis, as a result of which we might transcend the standard ambi-
valences associated with the technical/social divide. We suspect this will en-
tail nothing short of a major reappraisal of ideas about human nature (1991,
p. 376).
Many of the arguments within the Anti-Leadership era seem to share a similar
goal.
From such a perspective, the type of phenomenon that leadership is assumed to be
has already been decided evidenced by/as a function of the methods employed to study it.
The theorists whose work I have reviewed here all call these assumptions into question
and, as a result, suggest alternative methodological approaches. Interestingly enough,
these various theoretical approaches are converging on the same methodological con-
clusions that have, for some time, been the ascendant approach to research in human-
computer interaction (HCI): the study of practice.
Beginning with Suchman’s seminal work (1987), this scholarly approach to the
study of work practice has come to be the dominant approach within HCI for the un-
derstanding, design, and implementation of complex sociotechnical systems (cf. Button
1993; Cefkin 2013; Dourish 2001; Dourish and Bell 2011; Engeström 2008; Engeström
and Middleton 1998; Kaptelinin and Nardi 2006; Nardi 1993, 1996; Sharrock and Button
2003; Suchman 2007; Szymanski and Whalen 2011b; Tomlinson et al. 2013). Moreover,
recent collaborations between those in HCI and organisational studies suggest a recogni-
tion of the need for interdisciplinary collaboration and the inclusion of materialities such
as the computational objects in the analysis of organisational phenomena (Dourish and
Mazmanian 2013; Leonardi et al. 2012). Yet, within the leadership literature, there is scant
attention paid to both leadership practices and the broader ecosystem of humans and ob-
jects that enact the phenomenon of interest.
In parallel to these developments, what are known as practice theory (PT)-based
approaches (Nicolini 2012; Reckwitz 2002; Schatzki 2002; Shove et al. 2012a) are closely
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aligned. Tomlinson et al.’s (2013, p. 24-6) recent summary of the key propositions put
forward in practice theory serve as a useful reference. According to them, these tenets are
the following:
1. Practice is routinised embodied action that forms the basis of an activity, whether
human or not;
2. Material artefacts shape our relationship with the world;
3. Knowledge derives from and exists within acting in the world, not simply mental
representations or symbolic mental categories (ibid., p. 24-6).
Thus, practices, as this study conceives them, are empirically located in embod-
ied action, including those with and between computational objects, forming a traceable
network of transformations that represent an emergent, collective phenomenon (Latour
2010a, p. 16).
Further, in addition to asserting particular theoretical points, PT has also come
to act as a gathering place for a number of related approaches, including activity theory
(Miettinen et al. 2010), ethnomethodology (Larsson and Lundholm 2013), and ethnography
(Anteby 2008). In this sense, the stream of work I have just described as associated with
HCI can just as easily be viewed as PT-based, as its concerns are with the enactment of
practice as the unit of analysis. This, as I mentioned previously, is already a research vector
being taken forward in the leadership-as-practice (LAP) stream of research (cf. Carroll et al.
2008; Crevani et al. 2010; Denis, Langley and Rouleau 2010; Endrissat and Arx 2013; Perillo
2008).
Here, and relating speci￿cally back to leadership, it is also important to mention a
small stream of the leadership literature that goes under the moniker e-leadership (Avolio,
Kahai et al. 2000; Avolio and Kahai 2003; Bell and Kozlowski 2002; Cascio and Shurgailo
2003; Lowe and Gardner 2001, p. 502; Pulley and Sessa 2001; Yoo and Alavi 2004; Zac-
caro and Bader 2003). Proponents of this stream argue that the ‘conditions and special
circumstances of virtual teams require focused studies of leadership’ (Yoo and Alavi 2004,
p. 28). In this manner, this stream of research cordons o￿ a particular context of leadership
as separate and special, whereas I argue that engagement with computational objects are
neither distinct nor special within the organisational contexts this study explores. To this
point, I claim that scholars fail to take into account the pervasive and ubiquitous nature of
computational objects within globalised organisation. Rather than unnecessarily bifurcat-
ing leadership practice into one that involves people face-to-face and another that involves
technological partnership, there remains a need at both a practical and theoretical level
to defragment these views, leading towards a unitary model of leadership. Indeed, more
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recent scholarship on this topic appears to be coming to the very same conclusion (Avolio,
Sosik et al. 2014).
In a tangential but related stream of research, a number of leadership scholars have
looked more generally at a phenomenon that computational platforms enable, leading at
a distance (cf. Bligh and Riggio 2012a; Brown and Lightfoot 2002; Hinds and Kiesler 2002;
Hooijberg et al. 2007; Weisband 2008). These studies explore the ways distancing e￿ects
can be achieved through certain kinds of computationally enabled engagement. Based on
its relevance, the present study draws on this literature.
In sum, I suggest that the aforementioned research developments provide a strong
basis for an approach to the study of leadership that combines both attention to leader-
ship practices and to the computational objects that inhabit, mobilise, and, in many cases,
constitute that practice.
2.2.4 Beyond Debate
Regarding the various (and sometimes hotly debated) perspectives on leadership theory,
Grint suggests that consensus on a de￿nition is ‘forlorn and unnecessary’ (2005a, p. 1), and
instead o￿ers a fourfold typology as a starting point to capture and allow the co-existence
of di￿erent ways of understanding leadership, rendered as ￿gure 2.3.
For Grint, scholarly de￿nitions of leadership frame the questions researchers ask,
positioning them in relations to an object of research, which he asserts to be one or more
of person, result, position, or process. A similar approach is subsequently developed in a
volume edited by Alvesson and Spicer, where leadership is interrogated through a range
of metaphors, including saints, gardeners, commanders, cyborgs, buddies, and bullies
(2011a).
2.2.4.1 Living with Essentially Contested Concepts
Consistent with the pluralist views of leadership o￿ered by Grint (2010a, 2005a, 2001),
Alvesson and Spicer (2011a), and Denis et al. (2012), Rost argues that the concept of lead-
ership has been appropriated in a variety of ways, changing signi￿cantly over time (1993,
p. 53), suggesting that it may be similar in function to other societal constructs such as
‘culture’, ‘strategy’, ‘freedom’, and ‘marriage’, arguing that all of these share a polysemic
quality. To wit, the su￿rage and su￿ragette movements, the abolition of slavery,10 the
10In this case, the idea of ‘master’ as a leader and ‘slave’ as follower has been irrevocably transformed
since the abolition of slavery in Western countries during the 1800’s. This particular example demonstrates
that conceptions of leadership are subject to ongoing respeci￿cation through particular societies’ changing
normative views of what can be legitimately led and under what conditions people should follow. Interest-
ingly, Ruef and Harness have argued that late antebellum writings in journals on slave management are an
important point of origin for modern management ideology (2009).
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Figure 2.3: Grint’s Fourfold Typology for the Ways Leadership Can Be Understood (adapted
from 2005a, p. 18)
feminist movement of the 1970’s, and recent shifts in the legality of inter-racial and ho-
mosexual marriage show that certain terms are subject to changing social norms and,
therefore, are subject to ongoing re-speci￿cation.11
Reed has also applied this notion of the contested terrain toward organisational
theorising as awhole (1999). Here, it is Grint who brings thework of Gallie to our attention
by applying the term essentially contested concept (ECC) to leadership (Gallie cited in Grint
2005a, p. 1).
Gallie claims that what distinguishes an ECC is ￿rst, a disagreement on proper
use. But more importantly, he suggests that:
[W]hen we examine the di￿erent uses of these terms and the characteristic
arguments in which they ￿gure we soon see that there is no one use of any
of them which can be set up as its generally accepted and therefore correct or
standard use (1964, p. 157).
Thus for Gallie, a plurality of positions, as well as the lack of any categorical de￿n-
ition, appears to be crucial to the existence of the ECC. Examples Gallie provides of such
concepts include ‘work of art’, ‘democracy’, and ‘Christian doctrine’ (1956, p. 168). Further,
11Moreover, if one takes Derrida’s arguments regarding logocentrism (e.g., presence/absence) seriously,
then this argument is extended to all communicative forms (1982, p. 261); all languages, texts, and symbols
are subject to ongoing re-speci￿cation.
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Gallie notes that each group supporting a particular de￿nition of a contested concept sees
its interpretation as the correct one and will defend that position with ‘what it claims to
be convincing arguments, evidence and other forms of justi￿cation’ (1964, p. 157). Grint
contends that these conditions apply to the term leadership (2005a, p. 1). In my reading,
this links to Go￿man’s notion of impression management, where any allegiance to a par-
ticular de￿nition can be interpreted as a function of group membership. Go￿man’s precise
words on this point are that:
It seems to be generally felt that public disagreement among the members of
a team not only incapacitates them for united action but also embarrasses the
reality sponsored by the team. To protect this impression of reality, members
of the teammay be required to postpone taking public stands until the position
of the team has been settled; and once the team’s stand has been taken, all
members may be obliged to follow it (1956, p. 53).
According to Go￿man then, we should expect that within particular domains or or-
ganisational stylings, that particular de￿nitions would emerge within those contexts that
might not be seen as valid in others. Thus, the US military de￿nes leadership as ‘the pro-
cess of in￿uencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish
the mission and improve the organization’ (Department of the Army Headquarters 2012,
p. 1-1), while the US Council on Competitiveness portrays leadership as ‘depend[ing] on
consensus, not hierarchy’ with ‘structures [. . . ] more frequently networked than form-
alized’ where ‘players move in and out depending on the issues involved’ (2010, p. 7).
Leadership, it seems, means di￿erent things to di￿erent people. But what aim might these
disparate meanings hold for proponents who argue so vociferously for their position?
Interestingly, in the context of the essentially contested concept (ECC), Gallie
never uses theword ideology. However, Kunda’s de￿nition, as presented earlier on page 13,
provides a useful basis against which to explore why it may be that particular concepts
are contested. Kunda’s notion of ideology helps us to understand that social contexts not
only give rise to particular forms of knowledge, but the products of these are employed
in the persuasion of others. Notably for Kunda, such ideologies can be used not only to
persuade, but to control (2006, p. 12).
Sceptical Constructivism The views of Gallie, Go￿man, and Kunda as reported above
are also consistent with Grint andWoolgar’s programme of sceptical constructivism (1997,
p. 143) that seeks to interrogate truth claims with the goal of understanding how it is
certain views come to be accepted. For Grint and Woolgar, the truth:
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[D]epends on who is describing it, although not every account is equal [. . . it]
depends crucially on the active construction achieved by the audience (1997,
p. 168).
This perspective, in keeping with those described in section 2.2.3 above guides
researchers to ground interpretations of leadership to speci￿c contextual settings and,
instead of looking for a single truth or answer to the question of leadership, suggests
instead that we seek to understand why it is that some accounts become more dominant
than others.
Indeed, this is the point of sceptical constructivism,12 which rests on the premise
that:
[S]ome accounts may be more persuasive than others, but they are still ac-
counts, not de￿nitive, uncontested and undeniable truths that are transferred
in some unmediated fashion (ibid., p. 153).
Here, I lay claim toGrint andWoolgar’s argument, originally applied to technology
and, following Grint in subsequent work (2001, 2005a), directed it towards leadership.
Recapitulation In this section, I have discussed the meaning of leadership in terms
of an ongoing cultural process of changing meaning, or ideology (Marx and Engels 1970,
pp. 39-40; Kunda 1986, p. 54). I have shown howGallie’s ECC, Go￿man’s concept of impres-
sion management, and Grint and Woolgar’s sceptical constructivist position all contribute
towards an understanding of leadership as a changing, contested phenomenon open to
multiple interpretations.
Sceptical constructivism is a particularly suitable philosophical position for un-
packing obscured ideology from a contested de￿nition, as it fosters interpretations that
advance comprehension, not only of the ideologies that may lie behind particular views
of leadership, but also to illuminate what may lie behind an ideology. Based on these ar-
guments, I claim that the pursuit of any single de￿nition of leadership distracts from the
broader question posed by sceptical constructivism of how it is that the particular views
of leadership come to be accepted as valid in particular societies, academic disciplines, and
organisations. Here ideologies can be linked not only to leaders who may enact practices
that align with a particular theory, but also to perspectives adopted by researchers to argue
the existence of that theory within particular disciplines.
12According to Grint andWoolgar, the breadth of such perspectives include ‘pluralism, sociotechnical align-
ments, ANT, constructivism, feminism, social shaping approaches, and anti-essentialism’ (1997, p. 141). These
are all positions I would categorise as falling into themost recent moves of social theory as depicted in table 2.2
on page 45, and thus situate sceptical constructivism as a product of modern social theory.
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In the next and concluding section, I build on the work of Grint (2005a, p. 18) and
Kempster et al. (2011) by combining and extending their models of leadership into a single
￿vefold typology that I propose for the study of leadership in situ.
2.2.5 A Fivefold Typology for Identifying Leadership
Grint’s model as depicted in ￿gure 2.3 addresses the contested terrain of leadership by
o￿ering a fourfold typology as a starting point to capture di￿erent ways of identifying
and understanding leadership. For Grint, this pluralistic device maps existing theories of
leadership.
In response to Grint’s proposed typology, Kempster et al. (2011) o￿er an additional
dimension: purpose. According to them:
Purpose only appears to come to the fore in situations in which leaders have
set goals that project their groups to either ethical and [sic] moral debates.
The widely celebrated and vili￿ed examples of Gandhi and Hitler spring most
readily to mind. I argue that the lack of explicit orientation towards the mani-
festation of purpose is not an oversight (ibid., p. 318).
Thus for Kempster et al., purpose carries an explicitly ethical substrate. However,
perhaps more importantly, they also claim that purpose has also been systematically ig-
nored within the leadership literature.
Figure 2.4: A Synthesised Fivefold Typology Through Which Leadership Can Be Identi￿ed
and Understood (adapted from Grint 2005a, p. 18; Kempster et al. 2011)
32
2.2.6 A Relational Perspective
Kempster et al., by placing ‘emphasis upon leadership as a process: a leader-led relational
process oriented towards sensemaking’ (2011, p. 323), align themselves not only with a
nascent relational conception of leadership (Cunli￿e and Eriksen 2011; Day 2000; Drath,
McCauley et al. 2008; Uhl-Bien and Ospina 2012b; Sveningsson et al. 2012), but also ex-
plicitly with a processual view (Langley, Smallman et al. 2013; Langley and Tsoukas 2010;
Rescher 1996), one that by virtue of the title of their paper is also located in practice. This
perspective is consistent with that of Cunli￿e and Eriksen, who de￿ne relational leader-
ship as a mode of ethical action that:
[R]equires a way of engaging with the world in which the leader holds her-
self/himself as always in relation with, and therefore morally accountable to
others; recognises the inherently polyphonic and heteroglossic nature of life;
and engages in relational dialogue (2011, p. 1425).
I ￿nd this relational perspective particularly compelling, as it closely parallels
Turkle’s conception of the evocative object (2007) as a critical site for human relationship
(1984 / Turkle 2005, p. 1) where the object is ‘a companion in life experience’ (2007, p. 5).
Similar conceptualisations are o￿ered by both Suchman (2005) and Knorr-Cetina (1997).
This, in turn, links closely to my own conception of the computational object as described
in section 1.2.1 and its emphasis on materiality, relationality, and a posthuman perspective
that moves away from human exceptionalism. Thus, the relational perspective, in keep-
ing with its function, not only contributes to the exploration of computational objects and
leadership practices, but the association between them.
2.2.7 Internal Goods
Kempster et al.’s position also relies heavily on the work of MacIntyre (2004, 2007), who:
[D]raws upon the Aristotelian philosophy, speci￿cally the notion of telos, con-
tributing to the good for humankind [. . . ] It is the relationships thatMacIntyre
develops between virtues, practices, goods and telos that are critical to our
understanding of the establishment of a ‘good’ purpose within leadership
(Kempster et al. 2011, p. 321).
MacIntyre’s work is germane to this research in that his post-virtue position in
moral theory is based on the same post-enlightenment premises as Hayles’s posthuman-
ism13 that underlies my de￿nition of the computational object. Further, within his moral
13Compare, for example, MacIntyre 2007, pp. 51-78 and Hayles 1999, p. xix.
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theory, MacIntyre also argues strongly for the role that identity and narrative play in
structuring practice (2004, pp. 254-256), a move I observe recurs in leadership studies.14
Central to Kempster et al’s argument is MacIntyre’s proposition of external and
internal goods, which they interpret as follows:
We can think of external goods aswinning status, obtainingmoney, or gaining
power. External goods are possessed by people—in a sense, extrinsic assets. In
contrast, internal goods are a good for the whole community; examples of this
would be the development of vocational skills, promoting health, preventing
accidents and saving lives. Returning to the notion of telos, it follows that the
greater the virtue (i.e. disposition) towards producing an internal good, the
greater the development of practice excellence in creating internal goods. This
will lead, according to MacIntyre, to a person’s greater sense of ful￿lment and
purposeful achievement. The internal goods are valued by society and thus
seen as being purposeful—good for the human race (2011, pp. 321-322).
Thus, Kempster et al. imply that MacIntyre’s conceptualisation of internal goods
is a useful measure by which to judge their de￿nition of purpose. This view closely aligns
with Khurana’s historiographic analysis of the American business school through a:
[S]ustained quest for social and moral legitimacy—￿nally achieved through
the linkage of management and managerial authority to existing institutions
viewed as dedicated to the common good—thatmanagement successfully de￿ned
its image as a trustworthy steward of the economic resources represented by
the large, publicly held corporation (2007 / 2010, p. 3).
Khurana continues, noting the receding nature such a moral perspective on man-
agement has taken up through the present day:
Once management had successfully pursued its claims to legitimacy and con-
trol over corporations, the awareness that this was neither inevitable nor in-
herent in the nature of things began to vanish—although it has ￿ickered at
the edges of America’s collective consciousness at moments of crisis such as
the Depression (when business leaders were implicated by many in the stock
market crash), the economic crisis of the 1970s (when shareholders began to
14For research that links leadership and identity, see DeRue and Ashford 2010; Hogg and Knippenberg 2003;
Ibarra et al. 2010; Lord and Hall 2005; Mintzberg 1975; Nicholson and Carroll 2013; Reicher et al. 2005; Sven-
ingsson et al. 2012; Van Knippenberg, Knippenberg et al. 2004. For research linking narratives and leadership,
see Boal and Schultz 2007; Gertz 2011; Maclean et al. 2012; Tierney 1996; Weischer et al. 2013.
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rise up against managers held responsible for inadequate corporate perform-
ance), and most recently, the spate of business scandals of the early years of
the twenty-￿rst century (2007 / 2010, p. 4).
Such ethical concerns are crucial at a time when enhancing the capacities of lead-
ership is seen as pivotal to satisfying increasing ‘demands for leadership insights’ and
restoring trust in institutions (Nohria and Khurana 2010, p. 5).
2.2.8 Summary of Grint and Kempster et al.’s Contribution
Together, what Grint (2005a) and Kempster et al. (2011) suggest is that leadership can
be understood in ￿ve ways: person, result, position, process, and purpose. This typology
is rendered as ￿gure 2.4. Through this framework, it is possible to identify dimensions
through which leadership is materialised, often involving overlap of these dimensions
I refer to as intensi￿ers. I employ this theoretical typology as a crucial element in my
research ‘toolkit’ (Nicolini 2012, p. 213). My theoretical perspective thus extends the work
of Grint (2005a) and Kempster et al. (2011) and takes leadership as a citational phenomenon
(1993 / Butler 2011, pp. xxi-xxiv; Derrida 1977, p. 18). Here, I suggest that leadership, rather
than an observable phenomena per se, is instead a signi￿er, ascribed both processually and
performatively (Grint 2010a, p. 11). For these reasons, this is also a perspective that locates
leadership in practice.
In my extension of their work, the thesis I wish to take forward is that leadership
is not simply understood in certain ways, but that practices are understood as leadership
precisely because they are cited as such. I will argue that leadership, following Ailon
and Kunda, acts as a ‘symbolic resource’ (2003), standing for particular values within the
context of a community such as an organisation.15 Thus, I argue that leadership always
stands for something else for which the word ‘leadership’ acts a proxy or container. I insist
that leadership points to an underlying process of categorisation (Bowker and Star 1999;
Zuckerman 1999) of value and worth (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006), which a practice
theory (PT)-based approach (Nicolini 2012; Reckwitz 2002; Szymanski and Whalen 2011a)
helps to reveal.
2.2.9 Applying the Fivefold Typology
To exemplify the application of the proposed framework, I will demonstrate, in what is to
follow, how one might go about extending the ￿vefold typology I have synthesised from
the work of Grint (2005a) and Kempster et al. (2011) to include computational objects.
15In their study, Ailon and Kunda analyse ‘national identity’ (2003) as a symbolic resource.
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This exercise draws discursively on what a leader might accomplish, where she
operates, how she gets things done, and what might be discerned about her motivations.
I will also suggest that when there is a superabundance of material-discursive evidence
across these ￿ve dimensions of leadership that there also arises an intensi￿cation of the
iterative citationality (1993 / Butler 2011, pp. xxi-xxiv; Derrida 1977, p. 18) of leadership
as citations from across various dimensions accumulate.16
Thus, I will argue that any of the ￿ve dimensionsmay be mobilised in a citation of
leadership and moreover, when multiple dimensions are mobilised, I suggest this intensi-
￿es the citation, further substantiating the phenomenon. However, before I proceed with
this example, I will address a critical concern regarding this approach in terms of ‘where’
this citational approach places ‘leadership’.
2.2.9.1 Quo Leadership?
To those who would ask of this citational approach by stating ‘Where is leadership?’, I
answer, following Densten, that leadership is:
[A]n abstract concept invented by people trying to understand their experi-
ences and identity. While leaders, followers, and situations are indeed observ-
able, leadership itself has no physical form and is constructed in the minds of
observers (2008, pp. 93-94).
However, I would amend Densten’s conception slightly. Rather than locating it
in someone’s mind, I suggest that the concept called leadership is located in material-
discursive practices of symbolic citation. Following recent studies that look to discursive-
(cf. Bolden and Gosling 2006; Kuronen and Virtaharju 2015; Larsson and Lundholm 2013;
Larsson and Lundholm 2010; Vine et al. 2008; Wodak et al. 2011) and practice theory (PT)-
based empirics (cf. Endrissat and Arx 2013; Fletcher 2012; Raelin 2011; Styhre 2012) to
locate leadership, I concur with Alvesson and Sveningsson, who argue that:
[L]eadership discourse [makes] managers invest a strong symbolic, even ma-
gical, meaning in mundane acts and talk (2003b, p. 1457).
Furthermore, these approaches are felicitous towards an analysis of identity and
the use of narrative in the constitution of leadership, which forms an established basis for
enquiry (cf. Cunli￿e and Coupland 2012; Korica and Molloy 2010; Stein et al. 2013).
16Here, I acknowledge Barad’s (2007, p. 151) critique of Butler’s use of ‘iterative citationality’ based on what
Barad describes as a lack of attention the material aspects through which di￿erence is created (ibid.). Instead
of ‘iterative citationality’, Barad prefers ‘iterative intra-activity’ as a way to show that citations are not static,
￿xed properties, but that they too are changed by their very usage (ibid.). In my usage of ‘citationality’, I
acknowledge the linked material-discursive aspects involved and see no con￿ict with Barad that citations are
made through material-discursive practice.
36
For such a position, the ￿vefold typology I have presented is a useful framework
enabling a deconstructive analysis that can explain how the symbolic citation of leader-
ship arises in a situationally embedded context (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, pp. 969-970;
Suchman 1987, p. 118). Such an analysis can shed light on how leadership was attributed,
but more importantly, help answer such questions as ‘What kinds of leadership might we
like to establish in future?’
Unfortunately, in their original formulations, neither Grint nor Kempster et al.
speci￿cally address computational objects within their typologies. To address this short-
coming, I present below a brief sketch of how I propose to further extend these dimensions
to include computational objects.
2.2.9.2 Person
To speak of someone or to think of one’s self is to refer to identity, which is based on
the activity of perception (Bamberg 2011). Identity is thus enabled through the appre-
hension of experience and knowledge. Yet inversely, skills are often attributed to identity
(Borgmann 1987, p. 41). For example, when it is said of a leader that she is ‘good with
people’, this suggests that the leader has certain ￿uency around social relations.
Engagements with computational objects also require experience and knowledge,
and furthermore, these have the potential to shape and in￿uence behaviour (Fogg 2009a,b),
augment intellectual capacity (Engelbart 1962; Tversky 2003; Sparrow et al. 2011), and,
completing a critical feedback loop (Wiener 1961, pp. 96-97), forge new identities (Poster
2006; Turkle 2004a,b). Following Turkle, leaders facile with computational objects may
therefore be able to project di￿erent kinds of presence than those who are not (1984 /
2005, p. 5, passim).
As above, this relation also ￿ows inversely. Leaders who enjoy a ￿uency with
computational objects may also be able to perceive aspects within their organisations not
available to them via other means. For example, through a computational object, a leader
may be able to check the status of various subordinates or projects, enabling said leader to
leverage this representation/information to guide prioritisation of face-to-face conversa-
tions. This may lead to a citation of leadership based on a perception of the formal leader
as being ‘on top of things’.
I therefore suggest that the relationships leaders form with computational objects
shape (perceptions of) identity in ways that can lead to attributions of leadership. Given
the rise and ubiquity of the computational object within the corporation (Chandler et al.
2005; Jordan 2012, pp. 39-40), and the degree to which contemporary life is enmeshed with
(computational) technology (Borgmann 1987, p. 235; Grint and Woolgar 1997, p. 1; Knorr
Cetina 1997, p. 7), I posit that the relationship between human and computational object,
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particularly in globalised organisations (where arguably richer infrastructures exist), may
be a fulcrum for such citations.
2.2.9.3 Result
In this dimension, the focus is on outcomes. Take, for example, the ￿gure of Steve Jobs,
named recently by the Harvard Business Review as the all-time top-performing CEO, based
on the ￿nancial return generated by Apple Computer (Hansen et al. 2013). Thus the par-
ticular citation of leadership, as evidenced by Mr Jobs’s position on a particular list, can
also be viewed as an citation of leadership made through the dimension of result.
An additional observation here is that results are increasingly related to computa-
tional objects. For example, a recent pro￿le of Cisco’s CEO credits him for establishing an
environment where:
Cisco citizens are blogging, vlogging, and virtualizing, using social-networking
tools that they’vemade themselves and that, inmany cases, far exceed the cap-
abilities of the commercially availablewikis, YouTubes, and Facebooks created
by the kids up the road in Palo Alto (McGirt 2008).
Here, results are couched in terms of what Cisco employees have accomplished
through computational objects. Their results are employed to retroactively attribute lead-
ership by the author to the CEO.
Furthermore, such results are often accomplished through pragmatic, everyday
practices, enacted through computational objects. To the extent that humans within or-
ganisations look to a computational object in order to know what to do next, I argue that
the computational object is granted and plays the role of leader, reinforcing the various
agential questions of humans, technology, and materiality, as raised in section 2.3.7.17
2.2.9.4 Position
Grint refers to this as the dimension of spatial position within an organisation, normally
associated with a vertical structure of hierarchy, power, or authority (2005a, p. 28). How-
ever, it can also be associated with a horizontal structure as well. Grint refers to this as
‘Leadership-in-Front’ (ibid.) where the leader, such as Steve Jobs, is viewed as a trendsetter.
In applying this dimension to computational objects, I turn to the work of Kahai
(2012), who has argued that in the context of leadership, a number of factors emerging
from computational objects should be considered. These include the rapid dissemination
17See in particular footnotes 22, 23, and 24 on page 54.
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of information, manipulation of communication, and the ability to overcome geograph-
ical separation (2012, p. 75). Here, position may not be physically spatial in the traditional
sense, but I contend that leaders who employ computational objects as a part of their lead-
ership practice may be able to position themselves, and thus attract citations of leadership,
in ways that cannot be achieved without these artefacts.
2.2.9.5 Process
In this dimension, Grint asserts that:
[T]he process approach to leadership is more concerned with how leader-
ship works—the practices through which they lead—their rhetorical skill that
entrances the followers, or their inducing of obedience through coercion or
whatever happens to work (2005a, p. 28).
Here leadership is explicitly associated with practice, which can be (re)articulated
through engagements with computational objects (Iacono and Kling 2001). Thus, I sub-
mit that through relations with computational objects, leadership practices are altered,
sometimes with important new meanings and implications of agency.
2.2.9.6 Purpose
In this dimension, leadership is bound to a moral disposition. A close reading of Kempster
et al. reveals that the dimension of purpose can be observed as part of a research program
of ‘qualitative understanding of managers’ perceptions of purpose’ (2011, p. 330) through
research questions such as the following:
1. ‘Howwidely do such social purposes, as de￿ned by the production of internal goods,
permeate and infuse everyday leadership discourse?’
2. ‘Although company survival (which is an external good) is arguably a “worthy pur-
pose”, how central is it to a good human life?’
3. ‘Can leaders in organizational contexts, through processes of sense-giving, generate
sustainable virtues that deliver internal goods alongside external goods and thus
help followers explore their telos?’ (ibid., pp. 325-326)
The ￿rst question suggests that a focus on MacIntyre’s internal goods by drawing
on discursive evidence is one manner in which to identify purpose. The second question
asks the researcher to explore the relationship that external good production plays with
respect to the production of internal goods in a discursive practice. And ￿nally, the third
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question asks the reader to look at the practice of leaders (and their followers) that may
be bound up with the generation of virtues and delivery of internal goods.
Here, I look to the discursive practice of Apple Computer and its recent claims
through its ‘Our Signature’ ad campaign to make ‘life better’ (Apple Computer, Inc. 2013)
through the design and the subsequent use of its computational objects. An example of one
such advertisement is rendered below as ￿gure 2.5; for full text of the ad, see Appendix C
on page 222.
Within this text, such poetic lines as ‘Until every idea we touch enhances each life
it touches’ employ the rhetorical ￿gure of Antimetabole (McQuarrie and Mick 1996, p. 430)
to lay claims regarding Apple’s commitment to a positive contribution to society as an
internal good. But in such claims, impacts incurred through the manufacture and sales
of their products that may harm society are obscured (cf. Chan and Pun 2010; Litzinger
2013).
The words of Boorstin are particularly appropriate here:
When ‘truth’ has been displaced by ‘believability’ as the test of the statements
which dominate our lives, advertisers’ ingenuity is devoted less to discovering
facts than to inventing statements which can be made to seem true (1961 /
1992, p. 226).
Thus, in seeking to understand purpose in relation to engagements with computa-
tional objects, options include the exploration of outcomes such as social isolation (Hamp-
ton et al. 2009; Turkle 2011), the e￿ects of increased surveillance (Jensen and Dra￿an 2004),
or reduced attention (Jin and Dabbish 2009, p. 1799; Shellenbarger 2013). Further this di-
mension suggests that I focus on engagements where leaders and their followers show
some attention to, or regard for, internal goods through their engagements with compu-
tational objects through some of the themes outlined above. For comparison, I may also
focus on the inverse: situations where no apparent attention is given to internal goods.
2.2.9.7 Recapitulation
In this section, I have attempted to adumbrate, based on the work of Grint (2005a, p. 18)
and Kempster et al. (2011), a theoretical extension to a pluralistic, ￿vefold typology of
leadership that includes computational objects in the analysis of leadership practices. I
have suggested that there are ways to interrogate each dimension as a relation between
human and computational object. In this fashion, I hope to have shown there is a theoret-
ical grounding for the perspective I am developing, one where computational objects are
recognised as an essential component of leadership practice and where leadership prac-
tices can be accurately identi￿ed in my observations.
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Figure 2.5: Print Advertisement fromApple’s Recent ‘Our Signature’ Campaign (Apple Com-
puter, Inc. 2013) (For the full text of the ad, see Appendix C on page 222.)
Here, I align closely with Kahai, who has argued that:
[L]eadership in this new context demands new understanding and new skills
in addition to old understanding and skills. Most organizational leaders have
yet to understand what this new context is and what it means for leadership
(2012, p. 63).
Thus, a primary aim of my research is to articulate through ethnographic enquiry
what Kahai’s ‘new context’ might mean for leadership in the environments where it oc-
curs.
In the next section, I engage with a larger question of the relation between the
theorising that takes place within leadership studies and the social sciences in general.
2.3 The Arc of Social Theory
In considering the overall arc in the development of leadership theories within the extant
literature, many scholars have attempted to tell this story; one such perspective is rendered
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by Van Seters and Field (1990) in ￿gure 2.6, along the lines of a genealogical family tree.
One could also tell the story of this progression in a ￿atter, more linear fashion
by saying that it begins with leadership theories based on an undi￿erentiated quality of
leadership, evidenced for example by Weber’s ‘supernatural gifts’ (1921 / 1946, p. 245).
As outlined in section 2.2, from here we see a shift to trait theories of leadership that
posit speci￿c internal characteristics of individuals. After this period of theorisation there
appeared an ever-increasing number of factors, such as behaviours and the assumptions
behind them (suggesting a rudimentary re￿exivity), contingency theories that add context,
and other theories that followed, such as the inclusion of followers, teams, roles, networks,
distribution, and identity as sites of leadership.
With respect to this theoretical development, my thesis is that leadership studies
have followed the progression or evolution of social theory and draw upon the styles or
paradigms (1962 / Kuhn 2012) of theorising that ￿rst arise within broader social theory.
I refer to this progression as the arc of social theory throughout this work. I begin by
analysing this arc; by considering the overall theoretical movement of the social sciences
from their inception, it is possible to track a progression here as well. A motivating factor
for this approach is Lee’s assertion that:
One would suppose that people who hold the degree of doctor of philosophy
would be familiar with philosophy and receptive to its perspectives (2004,
p. 1).
This provocation suggests that one in my position vying for such a degree should
make it their business to explore the philosophical underpinnings of their study. As a
researcher exploring the social world, such an exploration of the arc of social theory is,
according to Lee, highly desirable.
The position I will take is that the progression of the social sciences centres around
a changing relationship between subject and object (Daston and Galison 2007, p. 10). Un-
der this view, each major period in the development of social scienti￿c theory asserts
a particular ideological stance on what that relationship should be in order to generate
authentic scienti￿c knowledge. Daston and Galison summarise these in their panoramic
study of objectivity as a story of ongoing ‘recon￿guration’ (ibid.) that can be summarised
in ￿ve moves, as shown in table 2.2. In fact, Daston observes the concept of objectivity is
multifaceted, referring:
[A]t once to metaphysics, to methods, and to morals. We slide e￿ortlessly
from statements about the “objective truth” of a scienti￿c claim, to those about
the “objective procedures” that guarantee a ￿nding, to those about the “object-































Figure 2.6: Evolution of Leadership Theory: 1869–1985 (adapted from Van Seters and Field
1990, p. 33)
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In their later work, Daston and Galison argue for a history of objectivity as a ‘sub-
set, albeit an important one, of the much longer and larger history of epistemology (2007,
p. 31). Their aim is to decouple objectivity from its con￿ationwith science and to show that
it is but one segment of a much larger arc of the ‘philosophical examination of obstacles
to knowledge’ (ibid., p. 32). Here, they argue that it is not the case that all philosophical
determinations of error are a result of objectivity. In a move kindred to Gödel and his
incompleteness theorem (1931), they claim there exist errors (and solutions) outside the
system we refer to as objectivity.
In what follows, I will discuss these ￿ve moves, their signi￿cance, and the social
theories that map their relational character. I will argue that the progression of leadership
theories lags behind the general movement of social theory, re￿ecting an ongoing rede￿n-
ition of the relationship between subject and object. Further, rather than each phase being
distinct such that as one ends another begins, there is instead what a variety of comment-
ators describe as pluralism (cf. Fuller and Collier 2004; James 1909; Rescher 1995; Shipilov
et al. 2014; Turkle and Papert 1992), where many theories exist simultaneously and are
employed by di￿erent people in di￿erent contexts for di￿erent purposes. Thus, when
a new theory emerges and is legitimated, the previous position is not necessarily aban-
doned by all.18 Rather, what emerges is a plurality of positions where many are argued
simultaneously (Tor￿ng 1999, p. 10). This idea of pluralism, in its recognition of multiple
viewpoints, helps to elaborate the terrain on which sceptical constructivism (Grint and
Woolgar 1997, p. 143) rests, where the concern is how particular views come to be seen
as ‘the truth’. A pluralist perspective also reminds us that views may continually and
existentially compete with no dominant outcomes.
2.3.1 The Unreliable Subject
Comte’s positivism (1865)was￿rst and foremost a sociological project, claiming that know-
ledge regarding social research could be properly obtained by employing speci￿c empirical
methods. Positivism centres on the notion of objectivity, or more generally, the notion of
a subject who stands in relation to an object of study in a particular fashion. Positivism
questions the reliability of the subject and, like the initial ‘great man’/trait views of leader-
ship (cf. Bowden 1926; 1883 / Durkheim 1973, p. 25; 1921 / Weber 1946, p. 245), proceeded
from this perspective. Yet, as critics of this view have argued, arranging the subject to the
18One possible reason for this is that theoretical positions may function as systems of control, where new
systems are additive rather than substitutive (Kunda 2006, p. 220). How might social theories act as systems
of control? First, they specify to followers of the theory how they should think about reality. Second, to
researchers who ascribe to a theoretical perspective, these often imply speci￿c and normative methodological
steps, such as those involved with establishing construct validity using statistical methods when conducting
research under a positivist theoretical perspective (Bryman 1989, p. 45).
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Durkheim (1893 / 1964; 1897 / 1989)•
Ontology: The social world is•
independent of the individual
knower
Epistemology: The social world can•
be known empirically
Methodology: Proper techniques•
and rational definitions provide
veritable access to social life
Redefine the
object
from 1900 Phenomenology, methodological•
antipositivism, hermeneutics,
interpretivism
Husserl (1900 / 2001b; 1900 / 2001a)•
Weber (1904 / 1930)•
Mead (1934 / 1972)•
Go￿man (1956)•
Gadamer (1960 / 2004)•
Ontology: The salient feature of•
the social world is social action,
constituted through values and
meaning
Epistemology: The values and•












Benjamin (1936 / 1968)•
Horkheimer and Adorno (1944 /•
2002)
Arendt (1951 / 2004; 1958 / 1988)•




Ontology: The social world is•
relational and constituted through
social relations and structures
Epistemology: The social relations•
and structures shaping social
action are knowable
Methodology: Grasping the•
relation between everyday life and
the relational structures that shape







feminist, and queer theory
Lacan (1966 / 2001)•
Derrida (1967 / 1976)•




Ontology: The self is discursively•
produced and the world is not




discursive relations that constitute














Ontology: Reality is locally•
materialised, relational, and
performative
Epistemology: The world is•
dynamically produced through
shi￿ing networks and alliances of
objects, both human and
non-human
Methodology: Follow the actant•
and trace the network
Table 2.2: The Arc of Social Theory in Five Moves (based on Daston and Galison 2007 and
further informed by conversations and lecture materials from former University
of Warwick professor Bob Carter)
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object in a particular fashion does not remove the subject or provide it with a guaranteed
and ultimate view of reality (Derrida 1976, pp. 10-18; Haraway 1988; Harding 1991).
2.3.2 Rede￿ning the Object
Another view of the relationship between subject and object can be found in the inter-
pretivist/hermeneutic/phenomenological traditions that followed positivism. These ap-
proaches emphasise both meaning and subjectivity as the de￿ning features of the social
world and therefore seek to understand relationships between values and actions. By do-
ing so, they rede￿ne the object of study. This is analogous to the moves in leadership
theories of behavioural theories (cf. Blake and Mouton 1964; Fleishman 1953; McGregor
1985) that reinterpret leadership based on qualities or values held by the leader.
2.3.3 Keeping the Subject at Bay
Following this move, there arose the critical and structuralist schools of social theory.
Both are in￿uenced by Marx (1867 / 1976). The former attempts to question dominant
understandings through the method of critique, while the latter enquires into the social
relations, or structures that are seen to be responsible for social outcomes. Marx’s histor-
ical materialism takes this view by positing that social outcomes are a result of economic
structure. This approach to scienti￿c study keeps the subject at bay by placing emphasis
on social relations and structures. Contingency theories of leadership (cf. Fiedler 1963;
House 1971; Vroom and Yetton 1973) apply a similar logic.
2.3.4 Contextualising the Subject
The social theories of poststructuralism19 and postmodernism question the possibility of
knowing altogether, asserting that the world cannot be known in toto and that knowledge
is both situated and partial (Haraway 1988; Harding 1991; Kirby 2011; Suchman 1987).
This view contextualises the subject, asserting that the subject is situationally produced.
Social constructionism (Berger and Luckmann 1966) and the work of Foucault around
power and ethics (1972-1977 / 1980) exemplify this approach. Leadership theories that
explore concepts such as leader-role construction and an emphasis on ethics re￿ect similar
concerns (cf. Burns 1978; Dienesch and Liden 1986; Graen et al. 1982; Greenleaf 1973).
19With respect to my use of the term poststructuralism, Barad cautions against a con￿ation of poststruc-
turalism and postmodernism. For Barad, the former relates to ‘radical critique of individualist ontologies,
especially as found in the notion of the liberal human subject’ (2007, p. 410), whereas the latter is ‘concerned
with a critique of modernism’ (ibid.). In this sense, posthumanism (Braidotti 2013; Halberstam and Livingston
1995; Hayles 1999; Wolfe 2010), is therefore a poststructuralist project, one with which the present study is
closely aligned.
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2.3.5 Unifying Subject and Object
Themost recent move attempts to unify subject and object, asserting that all such relation-
ships between them are in relation to a materiality that is empirically observable. These
theories stress processual, relational, and performative dimensions. Under such a view,
observers or subjects are also themselves material objects. Such theories also question the
very notion of a distinct subject and object. For example, Miller attempts to erase their
distinctive signi￿cance altogether when he refers to subjects and objects processually as:
[A]ppearances that we see emerging in the wake of the process of objecti￿c-
ation as it proceeds as a historical process (2005, p. 10).
A number of in￿uential processual perspectives (cf. Langley, Smallman et al. 2013;
Langley and Tsoukas 2010; Rescher 1996) fall under this movement in social theory. Under
this ontological perspective:
[E]ntities (such as organizations and structures) are no more than tempor-
ary instantiations of ongoing processes, continually in a state of becoming
(Tsoukas & Chia quoted in Langley, Smallman et al. 2013, p. 5).
Thus, within a processual perspective, subjects and objects are uni￿ed in a per-
petual state of ongoing ‘becoming’ and are merely ‘temporary instantiations’ as that pro-
cess progresses.
Latour’s actor-network theory (ANT) is processual, relational, and performative.
For example, in a central tenet it asserts that the use of the word ‘social’ is often misused to
attribute an explanatory quality to the object it is being used to describe when, according
to Latour, the word actually denotes ‘a movement during a process of assembling’ (2005,
p. 12) that can only be revealed by tracing its relations. Karen Barad’s agential realism
(1997, 2003, 2007) also falls into this category, as does Graham Harman’s object-oriented
philosophical perspective (2011), both of which assert that reality arises through the in-
teraction of objects.20 All of these theories are also said to be posthuman (Braidotti 2013;
Halberstam and Livingston 1995; Hayles 1999; Wolfe 2010) in that they claim to no longer
uphold the traditional position of the human as being the zenith of all knowing and being.
They attempt, instead, to explore how the human, among other objects, shares a place in
reality. Such approaches, according to Plotinsky, represent:
20In Barad’s case, in order to stress the entanglements and agential shifts that arise through interaction for
which she argues, she deploys the term intra-action to signify ‘the mutual constitution of entangled agencies’
(2007, p. 33).
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[T]he most radical theories to date—the theories transforming most radically
the spectrum of theoretical possibilities available to us, both in their critical
or deconstructive and constructive or theory-building potential (1994, p. 2).
In leadership theory, the move to notions of adaptive leadership (cf. Heifetz et
al. 2009a; Useem 2010b; Yukl and Mahsud 2010), distributed leadership (cf. Bolden 2011;
Gronn 2002; Spillane 2006), and to a lesser extent, identity-based leadership (cf. Ford 2006;
Hogg and Knippenberg 2003; Ladkin 2013; Sveningsson et al. 2012; Van Knippenberg and
Hogg 2003) all share a similar processual, relational, and performative perspective. Re-
search is mounting in this direction, as evidenced by an recent special issue of the journal
Leadership exploring ‘the materiality of leadership’ (Pullen and Vachhani 2013) and the
present study, which explores material entanglements of leadership practice and compu-
tational objects.
2.3.6 Comparing the Moves in Social Theory and Leadership
Palmer and Hardy (2000, p. 231) have produced an analysis of the various schools of lead-
ership. As with the arc of social theory (see table 2.2), they present their analysis in ￿ve
moves. An overview of their classi￿cation of leadership theories is presented in ￿gure 2.7.
In contrast to Van Seters and Field’s (1990) genealogical analysis as depicted in
￿gure 2.6, Palmer andHardy presents a linear and ￿attened view of the study of leadership.
I have summarised the details of Palmer and Hardy’s analysis in table 2.3, which includes
the assumptions of each classi￿cation and its main criticisms.
Against the background of Palmer andHardy’s analysis, I suggest that the trait the-
ories, like the ￿rst move in the social sciences, places a special quality within the subject.
In the former case, it is the power to lead, while in the latter, it is the power to know un-
der ‘objective’ conditions. Similarly, style theories add on qualities to the original model
in a parallel fashion to the second move in social science theory to rede￿ne the object.
Following these, contingency theories of leadership, which begin to take the environment
into account, follow the queue of structuralism by looking to the environment as a force
that structures leadership over and above the individual. Then, in the next phase there are
the transactional and transformational theories, which, according to Van Seters and Field,
suggest that leadership is located:
[N]ot only in the person or the situation, but also and rather more in role
di￿erentiation and social interaction (ibid., p. 35).
In other words, transactional and transformational theories of leadership emphas-
ise the discursive production of leadership, one that is both situated and relative, corres-







Figure 2.7: A Linear View of the Progression of Leadership Theory (adapted from Palmer and
Hardy 2000, p. 231)
.
Finally, the distributed theories of leadership follow the same dictum that the ￿fth
move in social science theory takes; namely to blur the distinction between subject and
object by asserting that leadership ￿ows across such ‘boundaries’.
Chronologically, by then comparing the corresponding moves in social theory and
leadership, what becomes apparent is that there is a time lag where, ￿rst, styles of social
theorising become established and following this, leadership scholars appear to mobilise
the previous move in their work. I have rendered such a comparison in table 2.4. It shows
that in the ￿rst move the time lag is approximately 50 years, that it subsequently decreases
10 years for each subsequent move, arriving at a lag of approximately 10 years for the ￿fth.
Thus, my analysis reveals a trend of a closing time lag between the generation of
styles of social theorising and leadership theories that employ those styles. This lag is
perhaps a consequence of the constellation of technologies around printing, publishing,
and writing (McLuhan 1962) that, 50 years ago, were primarily print/paper based, but
have now shifted to digital media and layered modular architectures (Yoo, Henfridsson
et al. 2010, p. 724), which, together, enable increased transmission and dissemination of
such material (Coyne 1995, p. 1).
Yet, while the analysis shows that the gap is closing and may already be at a stage
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School Period Assumptions Criticisms
Trait Up to 1940s Leaders have physical traits,•




importance of cited traits
Style 1940s to 1960s Shi￿ from focus on traits to•
behaviours
Emphasis on training of leaders•
rather than on the selection of
leaders
Two behaviour styles: consideration•
for subordinates leads to high
morale, but lower performance;
initiating style tells subordinates
what to do and how to do it leads
to poor morale, but higher
performance
Later studies argue that be￿er•
leaders were high on both styles
Inconsistent results•
Lack of a￿ention to impact of•
situation on leadership
e￿ectiveness
Di￿icult to establish causal•
interpretations
Overly focused on formal leaders•
rather than informal leadership
processes
Problems of measurement•




Leadership a￿ributes are related to•
personality
Therefore, to increase leadership•
e￿ectiveness, the work situation
must change to fit the leader
rather than the reverse
Writers unconvinced about•
measurement of leadership using
‘least preferred co-worker’ (LPC)
scale
Dispute about validity of•
measuring ‘situation’





1980s+ Leaders as managers of meaning –•
leaders as transformational,
charismatic, and visionary
Excessive focus on top leaders;•
overemphasis on successful leaders
Li￿le focus on informal leadership•
processes
Li￿le a￿ention paid to situational•
factors
Problems of assumed causality•
Distributed
Leadership
1990s+ Leadership neither ‘heroic’ nor the•
domain of formally designated
leaders but a widely dispersed
activity
Nurture leadership capacity in•
others




leadership skills, e.g., organising,
networking
￿estion of whether distributed•
leadership–and its implications of
responsibility and
empowerment–is a political
technique for achieving greater
employee control/output
Table 2.3: Leadership Theories: Past and Present (adapted from Palmer and Hardy 2000,
p. 231)
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Move Social Science Leadership Time Lag
First Up to 1900 Up to 1940s Appx. 50 years
Second Up to the mid-1930s 1940s to 1960s Appx. 40 years
Third Up to the mid-1960s Late 1960s to early 1980s Appx. 30 years
Fourth Up to the mid-1980s 1980s+ Appx. 20 years
Fi￿h Mid-1980s and onwards 1990s+ Appx. 10 years
Table 2.4: Chronological Comparison of the Five Moves in Social Science and Leadership
where theoretical development in both social theory and leadership appears to occur in-
step; even in this case, I argue that leadership theorists as specialists within the social
sciences will continue to draw on broader disciplines such as the social sciences and philo-
sophy to inform their work, just as I am doing here.
2.3.7 An Invitation to Theorise
If it is the case that the development of leadership theory follows social theory, then it
would be prudent for this investigation to take up with the more recent developments
within social theory as a starting place for the generation of novel and richer leadership
theorisation. To this end, I will be mobilising social theories emerging in the ￿fth move,
including aspects of Latour’s actor-network theory (ANT) (2005) and Barad’s agential real-
ism (1997, 2003, 2007). Moreover, to address the aspect of how humans relate to techno-
logy, I will mobilise Ihde’s conceptualisaton of human-technology relations (1990). At this
suggestion of combining various aspects of di￿erent theories, I point the reader to Law’s
acute observation that ANT is a banner around which a number of scholars gather but
also the site of a diaspora where:
It has spread, and as it has spread it has translated itself into something new,
indeed into many things that are new and di￿erent from one another. It has
converted itself into a range of di￿erent practices which (for this is the point of
talking of translation) have also absorbed and re￿ected other points of origin:
from cultural studies; social geography; organizational analysis; feminist STS.
So actor-network theory is diasporic. Its parts are di￿erent from one another.
But they are also (here is the point) partially connected. And this, of course,
is another way of talking of the problem of naming, the problem of trying to
discern or impose the ‘ANT’-ness of ANT. Or, indeed, any of the single-line
versions of actor-network theory, the ‘have theory, will travels’ which have
proliferated.
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The point, then, is both practical and theoretical. For these attempts to con-
vert actor-network theory into a ￿xed point, a speci￿c series of claims, of
rules, a creed, or a territory with ￿xed attributes also strain to turn it into a
single location. Into a strongpoint, a fortress, which has achieved the double
satisfactions of clarity and self-identity. But all of this is a nonsense for, to the
extent that it is actually alive, to the extent that it does work, to the extent to
which it is inserted in intellectual practice, this thing we call actor-network
theory also transforms itself. This means that there is no credo. Only dead
theories and dead practices celebrate their self-identity. Only dead theories
and dead practices hang on to their names, insist upon their perfect repro-
duction. Only dead theories and dead practices seek to re￿ect, in every detail,
the practices which came before (italics in original, 1999, p. 10).
In this, Law describes a continuum between theoretical positions that are ‘dead’
and those that are vitally ‘alive’, those which seek to defend themselves from change and
those which embrace it, those which seek strict de￿nition and those which allow broad
and ongoing interpretation. He argues for the latter, the inclusive, the plural, the proces-
sual, and the dynamic. Moreover, in publishing the edited volume Actor Network Theory
and After (Law and Hassard 1999), he and his co-authors, including Callon, Latour, Mol,
Strathern, and others explicitly invite the reader to take theory forward, to alter it in useful
ways, and to allow the theoretical perspective to grow and develop. This is an invitation
I accept and, I would suggest, is a necessary one in the furtherance of knowledge. Thus, I
pick out and in some cases combine di￿erent aspects of ANT and agential realism into a
toolkit (Nicolini 2012, p. 213) guided by the speci￿city of my enquiry into the relationship
between leadership practices and computational objects. Perhaps the best way to explain
this is to brie￿y sketch each of these theoretical terrains as I have read them, pointing out
the aspects of these perspectives I believe will be helpful to the present study.
In the next three sections I therefore present necessarily simpli￿ed forms of these
theoretical positions in order to highlight the conceptual elements I intend to operation-
alise in this study. This is followed by a short section introducing Ihde’s ideas of human-
technology relations (1990) that will be mobilised later to theorise about the roles compu-
tational objects play with respect to leadership practice.
2.3.7.1 Actor-Network Theory
Blok describes ANT as a ‘collective’ set of perspectives that attempt to move beyond the
traditional ‘divides’ in social theory: ‘agency/structure, micro/macro, subject/object, cul-
ture/nature’ (2013, p. 9). In this stance, ANT is an anti-essentialist project, denying a priori
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properties to relations between knowledge and artefacts. Law explains that ANT accom-
plishes this by treating:
[E]verything in the social and natural worlds as a continuously generated
e￿ect of the webs of relations within which they are located. It assumes
that nothing has reality or form outside the enactment of those relations. Its
studies explore and characterize the webs and the practices that carry them.
Like other material-semiotic approaches, the actor network approach thus
describes the enactment of materially and discursively heterogeneous rela-
tions that produce and reshu￿e all kinds of actors including objects, subjects,
human beings, machines, animals, ‘nature’, ideas, organizations, inequalities,
scale and sizes, and geographical arrangements (2009, p. 142).
These ends can in fact be advanced in a number of ways, from Callon and Latour’s
unpacking of black boxes (1981, p. 285), to Law’s material semiotics (2009, p. 142), through
Mol’s ontological politics (1999, p. 74). However, it is also crucial to recognise that ANT
is a posthuman approach in that it seeks to replace humanism and its anthropocentricity
with what is described as heterogeneity (Callon 1986b, p. 28; Latour 2010b, p. 474; Law
1991, p. 3). That is to say that ANT seeks to ‘return locutions of “the social” to their
wider planetary and cultural contexts’ (Munro 2009, p. 125). Below I outline the following




• Circulation of Reference
Symmetry One of the central arguments of ANT is that any distinction between ‘the
social’ and that which is material (‘the world’) is arbitrary and therefore asymmetric. ANT
seeks to address this by asking that both human and non-human actants be considered
symmetrically in studies (Latour 1987, p. 144).
Unfortunately, this concept of symmetry within ANT is often misread and there-
fore misapplied. Pickering, for example, has written that ANT’s symmetry:
[I]nsists there is no di￿erence between human and non-human agents: human
and non-human agency can be continuously transformed into one another
(1993, p. 565).
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Pickering is not alone in this reading of ANT, where symmetry is understood as
a lack of distinction between the human and non-human. Amsterdamska concurs in this
reading, charging that:
Latour entreats us to consider science and technology as a heterogeneous net-
work and to abandon all distinctions between humans and nonhumans (1990,
p. 499).
Collins and Yearly similarly read ANT’s symmetric aims to treat:
[A]ll actants that are party to the scienti￿c enterprise in the same manner
(Collins and Yearley 1992, p. 322).
Thus, a number of scholars claim that ANT’s tenet of symmetry is a means to
￿atten distinctions between various kinds of objects.21 This is not, however, my reading of
ANT’s symmetry, for according to Latour himself:
ANT is not, I repeat is not, the establishment of some absurd ‘symmetry
between humans and non-humans’. To be symmetric, for us, simply means
not to impose a priori some spurious asymmetry among human intentional
action and a material world of causal relations (2005, p. 76).
Here, Latour asserts explicitly that to read symmetry as Pickering, Amsterdamska,
and Collins & Yearly have is ‘absurd’ (ibid.). He clari￿es that the purpose of ANT’s sym-
metry is to correct for the asymmetry between human intentionality and general material
causality where the former is observed to be privileged in a preponderance of studies,
thus closing o￿ avenues of analysis before they start. He emphasises that symmetry in
ANT has nothing to do with ￿attening distinctions between various objects, rather it is an
entreaty to include various kinds of objects in causal analyses that might otherwise not.
In so arguing, Latour decentres the concept of human agency. Rather than priv-
ileging human agency over material causality as would a humanist, Latour suggests a
posthuman perspective where agencies are symmetrically considered in relation to how
speci￿c phenomena are materialised. This position raises compelling questions of hu-
man22 and computational23 agency, as well as what might lie in between.24
Thus, the call of symmetry is simply to:
21More generally, such debates have raged aroundANT since its inception. See chapters 10-13 in Pickering’s
edited volume (1992) for one such exchange.
22For positions on a human conception of agency, see Taylor 1985, pp. 15-44; Emirbayer and Mische 1998.
23For positions on computational agency, see Agre 1995; Kallinikos 2011; Noth 2009.
24For positions that assert a materialist ontology of agency, see Barad 2003; Haraway 1988; Harman 2011;
Miller 2005; Law 1992, 1994; Latour 2005; Leonardi 2011; Orlikowski and Scott 2008; Pickering 1995; Suchman
2007.
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[C]onsider symmetrically the e￿orts to enrol and control human and non-
human resources (italics in original, Latour 1987, p. 144).
This view is supported by reference works, such as Crawford’s entry for ANT in
Ritzer’s Encyclopedia of Social Theory (2004) which describes as a principle of ANT, a:
[G]eneralized symmetry, employing a single explanatory frame when inter-
preting actants, human and nonhuman (Crawford 2004, p. 2).
My point then is to clarify how symmetry in ANT is positioned within the liter-
ature, and according to Latour, involves the consideration of agency. In contrast to these
positions, we see that Pickering and others’ con￿ation of agency with the notion of sym-
metrywithin ANT ismisinformedwhen compared to Latour’s and encyclopædic reference
points.
Taking Latour and Crawford’s interpretation of symmetry as my interpretation,
the concept of symmetry becomes useful in this study if I am to adequately interrogate
relations between leadership practices and computational objects. Such relations already
imply a network where the established literature has virtually and asymmetrically ignored
the latter. By focusing more on the network of production, and the artefacts and practices
involved, the concept of symmetry guidesme to guard against a priori distinctions between
human intentionality and causal relations, and instead to trace networks of people and
objects to better understand the relational emergence of particular phenomena (Latour
1999, p. 24). This leads to questions of what precisely the researcher should trace when
following such networks. Translation helps to address this question.
Translation According to Latour, translation is a:
[T]erm that crisscrosses the modernist settlement. In its linguistic and mater-
ial connotations, it refers to all the displacements through other actors whose
mediation is indispensable for any action to occur. In place of a rigid oppos-
ition between context and content, chains of translation refer to the work
through which actors modify, displace, and translate their various and con-
tradictory interests (ibid., p. 311).25
Translation has been operationalised in a number of ways in ANT studies. For
example, when hotel keys have heavy weights added to them, they are translated into
artefacts that inscribe a message to its user to return them (Akrich and Latour 1992; La-
tour 1992). Similarly, as human door porters are replaced with machines that close doors
25This de￿nition comes from a particularly helpful glossary found within Pandora’s Hope (Latour 1999,
pp. 303-311), which I found to be a tremendous utility for unpacking ANT terminology.
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automatically, a translation has also taken place (Latour 1992, pp. 229-234). Such transla-
tions involve decomposing a common object into its assemblage, where, in the case of the
hotel key, the weighted keyring added to the key forms an assemblage of objects users refer
to singularly as ‘key’. An analysis of the various components and their functions within
an assemblage is what, in ANT, is referred to as opening a black box (1981, p. 285). Thus,
through the opening of black boxes, translation can be understood as a change in prac-
tice and attendant meanings, when a way of doing something is transformed by changing
artefacts and/or methods.
However, translation is not always successful. As Callon (1986a) clearly shows,
experiments involving sea scallops, which researchers study by enrolling them to lay their
larvae on collecting devices, failed to produce results. When evidence of these exper-
iments was reviewed, it was found that the scallops had not used the collectors to lay
their larvae and, as a result, no data could be collected. Callon describes these scallops
as ‘dissidents’ who ‘refuse to enter the collectors’ (ibid., p. 212). It is not, however, that
Callon is ascribing intentionality to the scallops; rather, he is amplifying the agential fact
that without the scallops entering the collectors and placing their larvae, ‘representivity
is brought into question’ (ibid.). Here, translation fails to happen but, importantly, in its
absence it highlights that translation does not just mean changing one physical artefact (a
human door porter) for another (a door-closing machine); it also suggests ways that in its
represention, what data is said to represent has already undergone a translation. That is,
the use of reference is a form of translation-in-action.
Circulation of Reference Nowhere does this concept of the translation of reference
comemore to the fore than in Latour’s study of the Brazilian savannah entitled Circulating
Reference (1999, pp. 24-79).
Latour deploys this term to refer to the way in which objects and meanings are
altered through various translations. Through various practices Latour describes in detail,
actors construct meanings through chains of translations. As translations progress, what
is local, particular, and material becomes a compatible and standardised reference that can
be more easily ampli￿ed. Latour’s example of this follows (among other things) a leaf in
the Brazilian savannah that is ultimately translated, through a multitude of activities into
a data point in a report. This report can then be circulated by post, fax, or email. The
report (which is itself a reference) and the references contained therein are thus said to
be circulated. Circulating reference, according to Latour, is one of the ways knowledge
is produced, and is a ‘trade-o￿ between what is gained (ampli￿cation) and what is lost
(reduction) at each information-producing step’ (ibid., p. 71). By revealing the various
stages that the leaf goes through to achieve this rei￿ed referential state, Latour exposes
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a hidden aspect of scienti￿c practice whereby ‘successive stages link us to an aligned,
transformed, constructed world’ (1999, p. 79).
Thus, the concept of circulating reference involves a symmetric study of people and
objects, traces these relational networks looking for evidence of translations of interest,
and understands that these translations show up in a variety of ways, from physical arte-
facts to materially inscribed references. This movement, if you will, from originary object
of interest to ultimate reference is critical to an understanding of ANT, as the successive
translations produce qualitative distinctions in the production and transmission of mean-
ings in the movement from orginary object to distant reference. This culminating dynamic
is illustrated in ￿gure 2.8.
Figure 2.8: Latour’s Transformation of Reference (1999, p. 71)
Figure 2.8 depicts the changing agencies that are observed in association with ob-
jects as they are translated. On the left of the diagram, objects are local, particular, and
distinctively material. For example, the leaf collected by a botanist in Latour’s study was
part of a particular plant in a particular location in a Brazilian savannah. When it was taken
from the plant and attached to a piece or paper where particular characteristics were noted
(e.g., identifying number, colour, or location), these practices mark a transformation from
originary object to translated reference. As the referential object then moves back to the
lab along with the scientists, it is catalogued and placed in a special ￿ling system, which
in turn enables it to be located in the future; and another translation has taken place. Ulti-
mately, in Latour’s study, the leaf is referenced in a report that is sent by fax from Brazil to
Paris. This is yet another transformation, where, if you will, a reference of a reference of
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a reference (and so on. . . ) of the leaf is mobilised and translated by the scientists to meet
their needs.
However, in following this trajectory from originary object (the leaf) to successive
reference (the reference to leaf in a report), Latour notes that the object is both reduced
and ampli￿ed. As this movement progresses, the qualities of compatibility, standardisa-
tion, textuality, calculation, and circulation become increasingly salient. These properties
emerge from the particular translations that Latour observed, in this case, during the hu-
man scienti￿c practices of botany that involve the production of scienti￿c reports.
This theoretical framing allows for a range of important interpretations, including
agency and power, decentring the human in society, associations and their ‘e￿ects’, and
action at a distance, all of which may be useful in this study. It also asks us to question
traditional distinctions between relations of objects, thereby sensitising the researcher to
the manner in which networks and their various enactments alter boundaries, produce
variations, and both establish and isolate relations.
Actor-Network Theory in Sum Taken together, these central concepts from ANT
(symmetry, translation, and circulating reference) reveal a posthuman and processual per-
spectives that emphasise practices, how practices change, and how networks of people and
objects are imbricated in the production of phenomena. I believe these ideas hold prac-
tical utility for the present study. There is much I have not said, and for this, I refer the
reader to many of the sources cited in this review. In the next section I will continue by
describing agential realism in a similar fashion, showing how ANT and agential realism
are similar and, in particular, highlight aspects of agential realism that further sharpen the
theoretical foundations of this research.
2.3.7.2 Agential Realism
The ‘onto-ethico-epistemology and philosophy-physics’ (Van der Tuin 2011, p. 31) of Barad’s
Agential realism is complementary to actor-network theory (ANT) inmany respects. Sound-
ing remarkably like Law’s description of ANT in section 2.3.7.1 on page 53, Barad describes
the proposition of agential realism as:
[A]n epistemological-ontological-ethical framework that provides an under-
standing of the role of human and nonhuman, material and discursive, and
natural and cultural factors in scienti￿c and other social-material practices,
thereby moving such considerations beyond the well-worn debates that pit
constructivism against realism, agency against structure, and idealism against
materialism. Indeed, the new philosophical framework that I propose entails
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a rethinking of fundamental concepts that support such binary thinking, in-
cluding the notions of matter, discourse, causality, agency, power, identity,
embodiment, objectivity, space, and time (italics in original, 2007, p. 26).
Like ANT, agential realism is anti-essentialist and takes a processual stance with
respect to the emergence of phenomena. Both are also closely concerned with practices.
Thus, where Latour analyses as an ‘assemblage of human and non-human elements’ (La-
tour 1999, p. 159), Barad explores ‘material-discursive practice’ (2007, p. 178), but both of
these concepts are mobilised to argue the same point: that materialities and meanings of
practices are not only co-constituted but inseparable.
However, agential realism is distinctive from ANT in important ways. They arise
through di￿erent genealogies. Whereas ANT arises out of the mileu of social construc-
tionism and appears to draw on the method of bricolage (Lévi-Strauss 1966, p. 17) in bring-
ing together in￿uences from ethnomethodology, semiotics, and sociology (Latour 2003),
agential realism emerges instead from a hybrid of feminist technoscience (Haraway 1997;
Harding 1991; Suchman 2002) di￿racted through the quantum physics-philosophy of Niels
Bohr (1934 / 2011, 1958, 1963; 1937 / 1998). By taking such a di￿erent route, agential real-
ismmoves beyond many other ‘newmaterialisms’ (Dolphijn and Van der Tuin 2012, p. 48),
purposefully disrupting and undermining our understandings of ‘the substance of matter
as we know it’ (Kleinman 2014, p. 76). Moreover, in grounding its assumptions in quantum
￿eld theory, agential realism grounds itself between positivist and interpretive approaches
(Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013, p. 910).
My outline will sketch out the distinctive features of agential realism, explaining
how and why they add to the theoretical framework I employ to interrogate the relations





Indeterminacy Barad’s agential realism is a framework spanning ontological, ethical,
epistemological, and philosophical boundaries (Van der Tuin 2011, p. 31) built on the im-
plications of quantum ￿eld theory. Based on these, it makes certain claims about know-
ledge and reality (2007, pp. 97-131). Barad is not the ￿rst to deploy quantum ￿eld theory as
26For those who may wish to explore the terrain agential realism in greater depth, in addition to the work
of Barad, see Davis 2009; Dolphijn and Van der Tuin 2012, pp. 48-70; Kirby 2011; Kleinman 2014; Rouse 2004;
Žižek 2012, pp. 905-961.
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a means to ground such understandings. Indeed, many scholars have linked work located
in the poststructural move within the arc of social theory as described in section 2.3.4 to
ideas brought forward within quantum ￿eld theory (cf. Abbott 2001, pp. 185-186; Argyros
1990; Brink 2007; Lord, Dinh et al. 2015; Murphy 1998; Norris 2000; Kirby 2011; Plot-
nitsky 1994; Protevi 2001). Such moves are also often strongly resisted, as exempli￿ed by
Sokal’s hoax/experiment (Sokal 1996; Swoyer 2003), the subsequent media coverage emer-
ging from it (Scott 1996), and the manner in which the academic interchange following it
revealed:
[T]he overall hostile and unprofessional—and, onemight indeed say, unscienti￿c—
attitude towards the work of Derrida and other ￿gures on the part of the sci-
entists involved (Plotnitsky 1997, p. 12).
Thus, it is not possible to discuss quantum ￿eld theory and social theory in the
same sentence without acknowledging that the juncture of these two conceptual frames
is also an essentially contested concept (ECC) (Gallie 1964). I previously raised the concept
of the ECC in section 2.2.4.1, providing examples of changing views on gender equality,
racial slavery, interracial and same-sex marriage, and a number of other combinations
of socio-material elements that have undergone dramatic normative change in Western
culture over the past few centuries. I suggest here that the highly contested juncture
between quantum ￿eld theory and social theory may be a conceptual viewpoint whose
value may come to be better understood and accepted over time, like how the Ptolemaic
view of the Earth’s position in the universe gave way to the Copernican.
Given this history, combining quantum ￿eld theory with social theory is poten-
tially incendiary—and not to be taken lightly. However, agential realism exhorts:
First and foremost, as Haraway suggests, a di￿ractive methodology27 is a crit-
ical practice for making a di￿erence in the world. It is a commitment to un-
derstanding which di￿erences matter, how they matter, and for whom (Barad
2007, p. 90).
Thus, a di￿ractive methodological approach is one whose aim is to make visible
distinctions that may otherwise go unnoticed. It is on this basis that I engage with inde-
terminacy within quantum ￿eld theory, as I will argue along with Barad that an under-
standing of the mechanics of indeterminacy has a profound impact for our understanding
of both knowledge and reality, with particular emphasis around the concept of agency.
Given the questions of agency this study raises by asking what role(s) computational ob-
jects play in leadership practice, such a perspective is of consequence.
27I elaborate on a di￿ractive methodology in much greater depth in section 3.1.2.
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The approach I take in explaining indeterminacy in quantum ￿eld theory is the
opposite from that which Barad takes. Instead of starting with the theoretical claims of
agential realism and working backwards to indeterminacy within quantum ￿eld theory, I
do the reverse. In doing so, I hope to o￿er the reader an alternative understanding, not
only of agential realism’s distinctive basis but of its value. Thus, I will engage with the
‘discontinuity at the heart of matter itself’ (Barad 2010, pp. 248-249), which quantum ￿eld
theory attempts to explain.
Fortunately, we do not have to be quantum physicists ourselves to appreciate,
as Grint notes in his study of leadership, the ongoing presence of indeterminacy (2001,
pp. 413-419). In that study he argues we must recognise that a common fallacy of lead-
ership involves a promise of certainty. Thus, indeterminacy already ￿nds its way into
leadership studies; a better understanding of its basis, I argue, is therefore useful.
So then, what is the principal feature of quantum ￿eld theory that foregrounds
indeterminacy? This is located in Planck’s constant, ‘h’ (1906). ‘h’ represents a value for
the minimum possible energy unit known for matter to emit as it changes state. It is ‘the
“quantum of action” or the “element of action”’ (Planck quoted in Kuhn 1978, p. 130).
‘h’ is important in this discussion because it marks a theoretical move from a view
of the universe that is precise and deterministic to one that is probabilistic and indeterm-
inate. Previously, Newtonian physics held a deterministic view of physical reality made
clear through its laws, and as part of this conception, assumed that matter could take on
any continuous value. Planck’s constant ‘h’ and its subsequent acceptance by the scienti￿c
community demonstrates that a shift in thinking that diverges from the Newtonian has
occurred (Kuhn 1978). Moreover, viewed di￿ractively from the social sciences, such ob-
servations regarding indeterminacy suggest that what is noticed about ourselves, as in the
case of Grint (2001, pp. 413-419), is consistent with what is also noticed about the universe
itself in the case of Planck. Here, it must be acknowledged that a possible cause for this
relation is that ‘we’ and ‘the universe’ are composed of the same materiality. One possible
line of thought here is that as members of the universe, and thus being based in matter
ourselves, we, like all other matter, are also subject to/productions of matter’s manifest
potential. Thus, it is not ‘we’ who are uniquely endowed with agency and capability, but
rather than ‘we’ are part of a universe that expresses agency across a range of manifest-
ations. This is a posthuman perspective, one that seeks to explore alternative views that
displace a ‘Ptolemaic’ human exceptionalism, o￿ering instead:
[A]n ontology where humans are no longer monarchs of being but are instead
among beings, entangled in beings, and implicated in other beings (italics in
original, Bryant 2011, p. 40).
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Therefore, in contrast to a Newtonian view, in quantum ￿eld theory, matter is
shown to change states in discrete units. One way to think about this shift in conceptual
perspective is moving from a view of reality as unfolding seamlessly to one where reality
unfolds rather like the stop-motion movement by which a movie projector produces the
appearance of movement. Planck’s discovery of ‘h’ is seen to be the initial ￿nding that
launched research and resulted in the body of knowledge that, little more than a century
later, is now called quantum ￿eld theory (Kuhn 1978, pp. 72-91).
Barad describes the implications of indeterminacy in quantum ￿eld theory by de-
tailing the ￿ndings of research experiments in this domain. For example, she explains
from a quantum ￿eld theory perspective the change in energy state of a hydrogen atom
when one of its electrons moves to a di￿erent orbital:
Quantum leaps aren’t jumps (large or small) through space and time. An elec-
tron that ‘leaps’ from one orbital to another does not travel along some con-
tinuous trajectory from here-now to there-then. Indeed, at no time does the
electron occupy any spatial point in between the two orbitals. But this is not
what makes this event really queer. What makes a quantum leap unlike any
other is that there is no determinate answer to the question of where and when
they happen [. . .This phenomenonmarks] the intra-play of continuity and dis-
continuity, determinacy and indeterminacy, possibility and impossibility that
constitutes the di￿erential spacetimematterings of the world (my emphasis,
2007, p. 182).
Thus, quantum ￿eld theory problematises classical views of physics by illuminating
disjunctures in what was previously understood as continuous time and space. Barad’s
use of the specialised term spacetimematterings is the deployment of one of Haraway’s
techniques, the implosion (Barad 2012b, p. 50), where words previously understood to be
separate and bounded entities are problematised by joining them together. In this case,
the implosion denotes that from the perspective of quantum ￿eld theory, space and time
are phenomena that arise out of the intra-action of matter. Note also that matter in this
construction becomes the gerund matterings. In this form, matter, rather than a noun,
becomes a verb form, an object of action. It thus is marked as possessing an agency of its
own.
To recapitulate, when a hydrogen atom changes energy state, rather than an elec-
tron moving along a smooth, linear trajectory in space and time from one orbital to an-
other, what experiments in quantum ￿eld theory tell us is that it does so in a non-linear
and non-deterministic fashion. In so doing, it bypasses time and space. Thus, during state
change, electrons are understood to dematerialise from time and space and materialise
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elsewhere—instantaneously. This is the so-called quantum leap, which Barad rightly notes
is not a leap at all (2012b, p. 39), but rather a window into the indeterminacy on which our
very existence arises in relation to, moment to moment.
Hence, Barad describes the universe as a recursive and iterative performance of
intra-action where:
Materiality itself is a factor in materialization. The dynamics of mattering are
nonlinear: the speci￿c nature of the material con￿gurations of the apparat-
uses of bodily production, which are themselves phenomena in the process
of materializing, matters to the materalization of the speci￿c phenomena of
which they are a part, which matters to the ongoing materialization of the
world in its intra-active becoming, and so on; that is, matter is enfolded into
itself in its ongoing materialization (2007, p. 180).
In this fashion, Barad underscores the central role matter and its ongoing inde-
terminate state changes play in the (re)con￿guration of the emergent phenomena of time
and space. To wit, ￿ndings from quantum ￿eld theory show that forces like gravity are
seen to disrupt the very continuity of time (Müller et al. 2010) and o￿er experimental
evidence that time is an emergent property, or what can be thought of as a side-e￿ect, of
quantum entanglement (Moreva et al. 2014). As a result, within a quantum ￿eld theoretical
perspective, space and time are rede￿ned. They become what Barad would call phenom-
ena, or ‘basic units of reality’ (2007, p. 33) produced by intra-actions which signify ‘the
mutual constitution of entangled agencies’ (ibid.) and which can always be traced back to
‘speci￿c material arrangements’ (ibid., p. 54).
Thus, under agential realism:
[P]roperties are only determinate given the existence of particular material
arrangements that give de￿nition to the corresponding concept in question.
(ibid., p. 261)
In other words, a given materialisation—and all it ‘contains’—does not pre-exist
its own indeterminate appearance. However, this is not to say, as some have inferred,
that there is no past or that agential realism ‘ignores the role of time’ (Mutch 2013, p. 32).
Rather, Barad o￿ers the explicit proviso that agential realism:
[P]oses an altogether di￿erent way of thinking about temporality, spatiality,
and possibility. Intra-actions always entail particular exclusions, and exclu-
sions foreclose the possibility of determinism, providing the condition of an
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open future [. . . ] Possibilities aren’t narrowed in their realization; new possib-
ilities open up as others that might have been possible are now excluded: pos-
sibilities are recon￿gured and recon￿guring [. . . ] The notion of intra-actions
reformulates the traditional notions of causality and agency in an ongoing
recon￿guring of both the real and the possible (2007, p. 177).
Taking these two quotes together, my reading of Barad is that within the space of
any ‘now’, speci￿c possibilities exist for state change or ‘future’ while other possibilities
are foreclosed. Thus, given a state change from T0 to T1, the possibilities available to be
materialised in T1 arise out of the arrangements in place at T0. In such amodel, possibilities
for the T1 are enabled and constrained by the state of a￿airs at T0. Thus, agential realism
recognises that time and space are phenomena arising from the intra-actions of matter,
and thus, view time in a di￿erent light than scholars, like Mutch (2013), may be familiar
with. Instead of focusing on ‘time’ and ‘history’, and any relationship these might have
to ‘structure’, agential realism looks instead towards the iterative, processual, ongoing
emergence and withdrawal of phenomena as enabled and constrained by successive states
of mattering. This is why Barad asserts that:
Matter is always already an ongoing historicity (2007, p. 151).
Moreover, drawing on the work of Von Neumann (1932 / 1955), Stapp asserts that
perception under quantum ￿eld theory no longer involves an objective account of what is
‘out there’. Instead, perception is a process involving:
[A] large continuous collection of perceivable worlds. In each individual em-
pirical instance some processmust pick out the perception that actually occurs
from the continuous mixture of possibilities generated by the Schrödinger
equation (2012, p. 604).
In other words, from a quantum ￿eld theoretical perspective, the world ‘out there’
is nothing more than an indeterminate, probabilistic set for some perceptual agency to
determine, in each empirical materialisation, from that set. In such a view, objects and
boundaries do not pre-exist their materialisation, where such materialisation necessarily
includes the discursive process of perception. This determination involves not only an
observer (or observers) but also ‘a choice on the part of nature’ (Dirac quoted in ibid.,
p. 603), that is, agential factors beyond the observer alone that also determine perception.
Under such views, quantum ￿eld theory can be likened to post-structural social theory as
embodied in work of Derrida when he asserted that:
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There is no support to be found and no depth to be had for this bottomless
chessboard where being is set in play (1982, p. 296).
In this quote, Derrida uses the metaphor of the chessboard on which the game
of ‘being’ is played, but tells us that the taken-for-granted solidity of the chessboard is
without either support or depth. Invoking in￿nity, he tells us that the reality which we
take to be a chessboard is actually ‘bottomless’. This is an anti-essentialist stance, and
thus, the game is made-up, the rules are not given but imagined, and yet, paradoxically,
the game is ongoing, never-ending, and thus, ‘bottomless’. Derrida is, in my reading, using
this metaphor to speak for the ongoing, never-ending possibility for the interpretation and
re-interpretation of text, where meaning conjuncts with being. The possibility for such
ongoing interpretation is precisely what indeterminacy a￿ords within agential realism.
Indeed, analogical comparisons between disciplines as far a￿eld as post-structuralist
theory, as embodied in Derrida, and in mathematics, as embodied in Gödel (1931), have
been noted by commentators (Plotnitsky 1994, p. 2). In this sense, the in￿uence I argued
for with respect to the arc of social theory on leadership in section 2.3 may be signi￿cantly
wider than encompassing only that particular relation. Viewed through this perspective,
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem (1931), the advent of quantum ￿eld theory, and the ￿fth
move in social theory as described in section 2.3.5 can be aggregately conceptualised as
deriving from parallel observations of indeterminacy and discontinuity. It is this growing
awareness of indeterminacy that is a principal legacy of twentieth-century science.
Thus, when di￿racted through these views of quantum ￿eld theory, Grint’s as-
sertion that ‘leadership is an indeterminate skill that masquerades as a determinate skill’
(2001, p. 419) takes on an entirely new meaning, since, according to a quantum ￿eld the-
ory view, everything that is materialised is masquerading as something determinate. Grint
then is simply applying what quantum ￿eld theory tells us about reality to the understand-
ing of leadership.
Such views on space, time, matter, or, as Barad problematises it, spacetimematter-
ings, have implications for our understanding of knowledge and reality. First among these
implications is the manner in which quantum ￿eld theory announces:
[T]he irreducible incompleteness of knowledge (as classically understood)
(Plotnitsky 1994, p. 5).
This claim has standing independent from quantum ￿eld theory. For example,
within organisational theory, and under a process studies ontology of change and becom-
ing (Langley, Smallman et al. 2013, p. 4), the:
[S]emantics of knowledge representation in an organization are intrinsically
unstable (Tsoukas and Chia 2002, p. 573).
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So, given that social theory already speaks of indeterminacy, what does a quantum
￿eld theory perspective add to this argument? In my view, it o￿ers a crucial source of
empirical evidence that suggests the instability that Tsoukas and Chia (Tsoukas and Chia
2002) refer to is present not only in the specialised context of the organisation but in the
workings of the universe itself. The quantum ￿eld theory perspective impresses on one
just how pervasive and how present indeterminacy is in relation to what shows up as
determinate. One might even go as far as saying that indeterminacy is fundamental to
materialisation.
However, this is not an essentialist claim that indeterminacy is some ‘essential’
quality of universe; quite the opposite. Rather:
The sense in which this discontinuity is an ‘essential’ one is not that nature
has a ￿xed essence, but that nature’s lack of a ￿xed essence is essential to
what it is (my emphasis, Barad 2007, p. 422).
In other words it is the lack of any essential nature, made possible by a destabilising
indeterminacy through and through, that characterises Barad’s view of the universe and
the attendant possibilities that may arise from its current and future (re)con￿gurations.
Further:
Changes do not follow in continuous fashion from a given prior state or ori-
gin, nor do they follow some teleological trajectory—there are no trajectories
(ibid., p. 181).
So, in a Baradian world, like that of Grint’s, there is an anti-essentialism. How-
ever, in place of determinism and continuity, Barad o￿ers the indeterminacy observed in
quantum ￿eld theory experiments as a means to argue for a much broader view of agency,
opening the door to a posthuman perspective. It is for these reasons that I suggest that
indeterminacy is a crucial concept in agential realism and one that adds depth to the con-
sideration of the research questions this study raises.
Material-Discursive Practice Material-discursive practice is a site (Schatzki 2002, p. xi)
where materiality and meanings are (re)con￿gured and co-constituted. I elaborate here on
this central concept within agential realism.
Recall that in discussing indeterminacy above, I referred to ￿ndings from quantum
￿eld theory studies demonstrating that phenomena, such as time and space, are emergent
(Moreva et al. 2014; Müller et al. 2010). In terms of agential realism, these phenomena
materialise and de-materialise through ongoing, agential intra-actions (Barad 2007, p. 180).
Such phenomena are the ‘basic units of reality’ (ibid., p. 33) that can be traced back to
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speci￿c material-discursive practices (Barad 2007, p. 54). Taken together, this leads to a
processual view of the simultaneous materialisation of both meaning and matter through
material-discursive practice.
In order to better understand material-discursive practice within agential realism,
it is helpful to build up that understanding from its constituent terms of agency, practice,
apparatuses, matter, performativity, and meaning, all of which agential realism signi￿c-
antly respeci￿es. Moreover, as I will explain, these terms also mark the overall process of
agential intra-action.
In line with both Einstein’s theory of relativity, which expresses the equivalence
relation between matter and energy (1916 / 2013), and the move in social sciences to unify
subject and object as described in section 2.3.5, the terms agency, practice, apparatuses,
matter, performativity, and meaning all describe di￿erent aspects of the ongoing process
of agential intra-action. They ￿ow through one another, as ice melts to water, and water
becomes cloud, which, in turn, can form rain or snow. Thus, within agential realismmatter
is a ‘congealing of agency’ (Barad 2007, p. 151); the agency is within its materialisation. All
of these terms, in fact, morph into one another, producing and withdrawing phenomena
through speci￿c material-discursive practices, that is, empirically identi￿able and describ-
able cases of intra-action. This processual set of relations of material-discursive practice
is depicted in ￿gure 2.9.
Figure 2.9 is purposefully presented in a manner similar to an atomic model to re-
mind the reader that the claims of agential realism are based not on supposition but rather
built up from actual experimental ￿ndings in quantum ￿eld theory, many of which centre
on behaviours at an atomic level. That level, as distant as it may seem to humans and,
according to scienti￿c ￿ndings, as minute as the strange quantum e￿ects they describe
may be, remain at the basis of our existence; for we and the world we inhabit are built of
the same atoms that quantum ￿eld theory investigates. The fundamental indeterminacy
that quantum ￿eld theory reveals is therefore within the atoms that form us and the world
as we know it. Given these conditions, it is productive to deploy a theoretical perspective
that brings greater attention to the ground we ￿guratively and literally stand upon.
The various nodes in ￿gure 2.9 surround and touch/merge with a nucleus of phe-
nomena at its centre, phenomena which Barad asserts as ‘the primary ontological unit’
(ibid., p. 139). Elsewhere, Barad states that ‘phenomena are the ontological inseparability of
agentially intra-acting ‘components’ (italics in original, ibid., pp. 308-309). These compon-
ents are the nodes depicted around the phenomena in ￿gure 2.9 and, according to Barad,
are ontologically inseparable from the phenomena produced and withdrawn and, as I will
also explain, also interpenetrate one another in important ways. In order to indicate their
component-like relation to phenomena, a ring of the intra-active elements agency, prac-
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Figure 2.9: The Material-Discursive Practice of Intra-Action (based on Barad 2007)
tice, apparatuses, matter, performativity, and meaning surround the very phenomena they
produce and withdraw, representing a material-discursive practice.
With respect to the ￿rst node, agency, Barad argues that:
[A]gency is a matter of intra-acting; it is an enactment, not something that
someone or something has. It cannot be designated as an attribute of subjects
or objects [. . . ] It is not an attribute whatsoever. Agency is ‘doing’ or ‘being’ in
its intra-activity. It is the enactment of iterative changes to particular practices
(italics in original, 2007, p. 178).
This claim regarding agency is far-reaching, going well-beyond the ANT claim
of a distributed form of agency spanning human and non-human; instead agential real-
ism suggests that agency be reconceptualised as enactment-in-practice. Hence, in agential
realism, agency is evidenced by materialisation itself. Or, put di￿erently, any materialisa-
tion is accomplished through practices of agential intra-action, resulting in the di￿erential
expression of phenomena.
Moreover, any notion of ‘practice’ in agential realism is markedly posthuman.
Barad explains that practices are not:
[A]nthropomorphic placeholders for the projected agency of individual sub-
jects, culture, or language. Indeed, they are not [limited to] human-based
practices. On the contrary, agential realism’s posthumanist account [. . . ] does
not ￿x the boundary between human and nonhuman before the analysis ever
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gets o￿ the ground, but rather allows for the possibility of a geneological ana-
lysis of the material-discursive emergence of the human (Barad 2007, p. 150).
Consequently, in contrast to Schatzki’s de￿nition of practice as ‘bodily doings and
sayings’ (2002, p. 72), marking them as distinctively human, agential realism views such
human practices as a subset of the broader practices of the universe agentially intra-acting
with itself.
To indicate and unpack speci￿c agencies enacted in practice, Barad speaks of ‘prac-
tices or apparatuses of bodily production’ (2007, p. 140). Note here the con￿ation of practice
and apparatus. This is not a sleight of hand, nor is it an error. Rather, a posthuman view of
practice as articulated by agential realism is consistent with the claim that practice can be
enacted by apparatuses, such as the computational objects which are focal to the present
study. This brings us back to agency, which Barad reconceptualises as a ‘doing’ (italics
in original, ibid., p. 178). Thus, within agential realism the concepts of agency, practice,
and apparatuses all ￿ow into one another in relation to phenomenal materialisation and
its withdrawal.
While the trope ‘apparatuses of bodily production’ (ibid., p. 140) originates in the
work of Haraway (1991b, pp. 352-370), it is also clear that in the work of Barad, the term
‘apparatus’ is also taken from Bohr (see Barad 2007, p. 19), speci￿cally, within the Copen-
hagen interpretation of quantum ￿eld theory, which describes a methodology for con-
ducting scienti￿c experiments (Stapp 2012, p. 602). Yet, agential realism does not limit
its claims to experimental conditions involving laboratory apparatus. While the underly-
ing assumptions of agential realism are drawn from laboratory experiments in quantum
￿eld theory, its overall argument attempts to productively generalise those ￿ndings to the
universe as we know it. Accordingly, the addition of ‘bodily production’ (2007, p. 140)
in my reading, broadens what is meant in agential realism by apparatuses. It suggests a
materiality and attendant individuation, simultaneously indicating that apparatuses can
be scienti￿c measuring devices in a laboratory as well as human beings on a picnic.
The concept of apparatuses is also elaborated in agential realism through the idea
of ‘material arrangements’ (ibid., p. 142); that is, the material objects such as laboratory
equipment and humans thatmight be arranged in speci￿cways in order tomeasure certain
phenomena in a scienti￿c experiment. However, of these arrangements, Barad asserts:
[T]hat the apparatuses of bodily production (which are themselves phenom-
ena) are (also) part of the phenomena they produce (2003, p. 826).
Here we see that while apparatuses can be analytically identi￿ed (e.g., an electron
gun and a screen), Barad reminds us that all materialisations are also phenomena. Indeed,
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within agential realism that which materialises is both a phenomenon and agential. This
seemingly circular reference is not a contradiction of any sort; rather, it elaborates on
the ‘discontinuity at the heart of matter itself’ (Barad 2010, pp. 248-249) where determin-
ate phenomena arise through intra-actions in an ontologically-indeterminate universe. In
other words, apparatuses deployed in scienti￿c experiments are also entangled in/part of
the production of the phenomena they seek to measure. These phenomena, in turn, are
agential, as ‘agency is a matter of changes in the apparatuses of bodily production’ (2003,
p. 826).
And matter, too, within agential realism is not simply the ‘stu￿’ in the world, but
viewed as another ongoing step, or di￿erent vantage point, in the process of ongoing
intra-action. It is thus respeci￿ed as:
[N]ot a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency [. . . ] ‘Matter’ does not refer to
an inherent, ￿xed property of abstract, independently existing objects; rather,
‘matter’ refers to phenomena in their ongoing materialization (italics in original
Barad 2007, p. 151).
This idea thatmatter as a ‘congealing’ suggests that matter is agency slowed down,
an entanglement of agency in form, as well as the indeterminate possibilities for its be-
coming, including withdrawal. Or, put di￿erently, where agency is enactment-in-practice,
matter is phenomena-in-materialisation. Matter always implies a speci￿c material ar-
rangement that can be further speci￿ed as an arrangement of apparatuses, all the while,
remaining a phenomenon. Accordingly, in agential realism,matter is the agential ￿eld out
of which phenomena are materialised. It is based on this reasoning that Barad claims:
[P]henomena are not the mere result of laboratory exercises engineered by
human subjects; rather phenomena are di￿erential patterns of mattering (‘dif-
fraction patterns’) (italics in original, ibid., p. 140).28
Like the phenomenon of movement produced by the motion picture ￿lm, and its
apparatuses of projector, ￿lm, screen, and viewer(s), matter becomes the location within
where the phenomenon we understand as being is iteratively (re)produced.
As with agency, practice, apparatuses, and matter, performativity is also reconcep-
tualised within agential realism. Critical of Butler’s (1993 / 2011) conceptualisation of
performatvity, Barad claims that Butler:
[S]eems to assume that it is ultimately derived (yet again) from the agency of
language or culture. She fails to recognise matter’s dynamism (Barad 2007,
p. 64).
28See also section 3.1.2 for an elaboration of di￿raction.
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Barad argues that Butler’s concerns are limited to a humanist frame, that is, the
production of gendered, human bodies, and thus limits agency to humans (Barad 2007,
p. 145). In the stead of a humanist, speech-act-centric (Austin 1975) account of perform-
ativity, Barad argues deconstructively that:
Performativity properly construed, is not an invitation to turn everything (in-
cluding material bodies) into words; on the contrary, performativity is pre-
cisely a contestation of the excessive power granted to language to determine
what is real. Hence, in ironic contrast to the misconception that would equate
performativity with a form of linguistic monism that takes language to be the
stu￿ of reality, performativity properly understood is a contestation of the
unexamined habits of mind that grant language and other forms of repres-
entation more power in determining our ontologies than they deserve (2007,
p. 133).
Here Barad objects to what she sees as an unwarranted emphasis on representa-
tionalism through the use of human language. For this reason, agential realism’s concep-
tion of perfomativity is decidedly posthuman. This is a view that:
[C]alls into question the givenness of di￿erential categories of human and
nonhuman, examining practices through which these di￿erential boundaries
are stabilized and destabilized (ibid., p. 66).
According to this view, performativity requires a critical assessment of how prac-
tices produce and withdraw certain phenomena:
[It] challenges the positioning of materiality as either a given or a mere e￿ect
of human agency [. . . and therefore proposes] a rethinking of the notions of
discursive practices and material phenomena and the relationship between
them (ibid., p. 183).
Thus for Barad, performativity is a provocation to challenge humanist and repres-
entationlist perspectives. This leads to one of agential realism’s most distinctive claims:
that the discursive practices of producing meaning are always already material. Con-
sequently, Barad submits variously that:
The world is an ongoing open process of mattering through which ‘matter-
ing’ itself acquires meaning and form in the realization of di￿erent agential
possibilities (2003, p. 817).
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Mattering is about the (contingent and temporary) becoming-determinate (and
becoming-indeterminate) ofmatter and meaning, without ￿xity, without clos-
ure (2010, p. 254).
In other words, materiality is discursive (i.e., material phenomena are insep-
arable from the apparatuses of bodily production; matter emerges out of, and
includes as part of its being, the ongoing recon￿guring of boundaries), just
as discursive practices are always already material (i.e., they are ongoing ma-
terial [re]con￿gurings of the world). Discursive practices and material phe-
nomena do not stand in a relationship of externality to each other; rather, the
material and the discursive are mutually implicated in the dynamics of intra-
activity. The relationship between the material and the discursive is one of
mutual entailment. Neither discursive practices nor material phenomena are
ontologically or epistemologically prior. Neither can be explained in terms
of the other. Neither is reducible to the other. Neither has privileged status
in determining the other. Neither is articulated or articulable in the absence
of the other; matter and meaning are mutually articulated (italics in original,
2007, pp. 151-152).
In this capstone relation, meaning is bound to the other components of agen-
tial intra-action and for this reason within agential realism, the neologism of material-
discursive is employed.
Material-Discursive Practice Summarised All of these various respeci￿cations of
agency, practice, apparatuses, matter, performativity, and meaning I have outlined are en-
capsulated within the term material-discursive practice where:
[P]henomena are not the mere result of laboratory exercises engineered by
human subjects; rather phenomena are di￿erential patterns of mattering (‘dif-
fraction patterns’) produced through complex agential intra-actions of mul-
tiple material-discursive practices or apparatuses of bodily production where
apparatuses are notmerely observing instruments but boundary-drawing practices—
speci￿c material (re)con￿gurings of the world—which come to matter. These
causal intra-actions need not involve humans. Indeed, it is through such prac-
tices that the di￿erential boundaries between humans and nonhumans, cul-
ture and nature, science and the social are constituted (italics in original, ibid.,
p. 140).
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Thus, material-discursive practices are speci￿c enactments that can also be de-
scribed as agencies, practices, apparatuses, matter, performativity, and meanings, all of
which result in the ongoing production and withdrawal of phenomena.
Based on this complex set of relations, I suggest that the radical insights argued
by agential realism which I have outlined here and which are encapsulated in the trope of
material-discursive practice provide a basis for very di￿erent interpretations than what is
provided by ANT. Yet, my interpretation is that the transformations of objects and mean-
ings Latour writes of (Latour 1999, pp. 24-79) remain empirically compatible with Barad’s
construct ofmaterial-discursive practice, the linchpinwithin agential realismwheremean-
ings and matter are perpetually (re)con￿gured (2007, pp. 148-149).
Agential Cuts The ￿nal piece of agential realism I would like to present here is the
conceptual idea of the agential cut, which Barad explains is the enactment of:
[A] local resolution within the phenomenon of the inherent ontological inde-
terminacy (2003, p. 815).
In other words, the agential cut is a material-discursive practice where the bound-
aries of the entangled phenomena within spacetimemattering are remade. It is where one
state moves into another, as in the description of the electron’s atom described on page 62.
For just as its electron moves from ‘here’ to ‘there’ outside of time and space in a single
move, so, what the atom was and what it will be are locally determined through an inde-
terminate agential cut—for the time being.
The ‘cut’ therefore has signi￿cant implications; namely what is included in the
‘cut’ and what is excluded, as these are the key factors that produce di￿erence, the central
concern of agential realism. Moreover, according to Barad, this ‘cut’ has two parts which
are enacted in a single move, analogous to the ‘here’ to ‘there’ of the quantum leap; that
which is ‘cut away’ and that which is ‘cut together’, where:
Scenes never rest but are recon￿gured within and are dispersed and threaded
through one another. Multiple entanglements, di￿erences, cutting through
and re-splicing one another (2010, pp. 244-245).
Crucially, in my reading, the agential cut is not something that humans can in
any way engineer, although, as agential apparatuses themselves, humans certainly play
a part. Instead, I ￿nd it helpful to think of the agential cut as what Dirac refers to as ‘a
choice on the part of nature’ (Dirac quoted in Stapp 2012, p. 603) of the possibilities for
outcome arising from a particular material-discursive arrangement. According to Stapp,
von Neumann, in his interpretation of quantum mechanics, pushes the cut ‘all the way
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up’ (Stapp 2012, p. 602) so that the ‘observed’ system contains all things that, according to
classical ideas, are physical things, including the bodies and brains of all observers. These
‘physical’ things are all described in quantum mechanical terms. The classically described
features of our perceptions become, then, aspects of the observing mental side of reality
(ibid.).
In my reading, this perspective is crucial to understanding the agential cut; ac-
cording to this view, our ‘minds’ are part and parcel of what is ‘cut’. We are not ‘outside’
anything. We are at the e￿ect of the cut and it is the universe that does the cutting, al-
though we, like any other apparatus, have an impact on how the cut is made. But to come
at the cut ‘as if’ we could ‘control’ it is, in my view, a misunderstanding of the whole
point of how ‘determinate’ state comes to be. To take an example here, we enter into an
‘experiment’ to see if members accept whether what a computational object is doing is
‘leadership’; we may convince the members, but we may not convince our peers. The cut,
in this case lies in the (re)con￿guration of the boundary between ‘peers’ and ‘informants’,
but any attempt to intentionally position the boundary will always include a broader set
of material-discursive agencies rather than a set of human intentions and, as such, cannot
be determined in advance.
Agential Realism in Sum The three key concepts I have covered in this outline of
agential realism of a) indeterminacy, b) material-discursive practice, and c) agential cuts
reformulate traditional approaches towards subjects and objects, agency, knowledge, and
the way reality is produced. In so doing, agential realism opens thinking and subsequent
analysis to include non-humans in a way that may lead to signi￿cant insights. Further,
given the topic of this study, leadership practices and the role of computational objects,
such a theoretical position is particularly inclusive of the phenomena I wish to study.
This approach can therefore be utilised to build a leadership theory that more precisely
explains what actually happens in these heretofore poorly understood congeries of man
and machine (Kahai 2012, p. 63) when leadership is said to have been enacted.
2.3.7.3 Human-Technology Relations
The phenomenon of relationships between humans and computers is relatively recent.
This, notwithstanding that computers are also artefacts and the ‘ancientness of all such ex-
istential relations’ (Ihde 1990, p. 110) as a category associatedwith the verymeaning/origin
of ‘human’ (Allenby et al. 2011), such an artefactual scope is far too broad for the topic at
hand. Here, Ihde has made the topic of the relation between human and technology his
primary focus at the level of philosophy for more than 25 years (Ihde 1990, 1998, 2002,
2009, 2010). Ihde’s work builds on the phenomenological tradition, however he identi-
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Relation Description Category
Embodiment relation In this relation, the technology becomes transparent; humans thus experience the world
through the technology.
Focal
Hermeneutic relation In the relation, humans actively interpret the technology in order to make use of it,
however, they may do so without realising their own interpretative practices.
Focal
Alterity relation In this relation, distinctive qualities of the technology come to the fore in what Ihde
describes as ‘technological intentionalities’ (1990, p. 103).
Focal
Background relation This relation is located in spaces where the technology is experienced as a field.
Although it may be in the background, Ihde argues that the transformational e￿ects of
this relation are equally as potent.
Field
Table 2.5: Ihde’s Conceptualisation of Human-Technology Relations (1990)
￿es his own work as ‘postphenomenological’, attempting to build on phenomenology to
address twentieth-century realities through a speci￿c focus on ‘technologies in their par-
ticularities’ (2009, p. 22). For these reasons, it is therefore highly compatible with the other
theoretical lenses being deployed.
Ihde develops a perspective in Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth
(1990) asserting four general dimensions of being along a continuum of possible human-
technology relationships. These are: a) Embodiment relations, b) Hermeneutic relations,
c) Alterity relations, and d) Background relations. These four relations are summarised in
table 2.5.
Embodiment relations can be understood as the application of Heidegger’s famous
tool-being argument about a hammer being subsumed into the phenomenological exper-
ience of hammering through zuhandenheit (1927 / Heidegger 1996, pp. 64-67). Here Ihde
o￿ers the example of eyeglasses that are worn, thus embodied by the human and in so do-
ing, become perceptually ‘transparent’ (Ihde 1990, p. 47). Another example Ihde provides
is of a user looking into a telescope and seeing the Moon through it. Thus, the user ex-
periences not ‘telescope’ but instead ‘Moon’. The telescope, like Heidegger’s hammer,
phenomenologically falls away in use. In Ihde’s formulation, such an Embodiment relation
possesses a quality of transparency that, for him, implies a ‘symbiosis of artifact and user
within a human action’ (ibid., p. 74).
According to Ihde, Hermeneutic relations go beyond Embodiment relations to a
mode of being where the user makes an interpretation about the technology, perhaps
without even realising it. As an example here, Ihde provides the thermometer, which has
various numbers that must be read by the user in order for a result to be produced. Such
readings, when well-practiced by users in a given scale such as Celsius, become experi-
ences of ‘constituted immediacy’ (ibid., p. 85).
The third human-technology relation is an Alterity relation where the human ex-
periences ‘technology-as-other’ (ibid., p. 98). Here Ihde proposes the comparison of a
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‘spirited horse and a spirited sports car’ (1990, p. 99). Ihde suggests that the user of both
horse and car experience the technology-as-other; however, a horse, being a living animal
can resist the user in ways that a sports car cannot. While the former may disobey, the
latter can only malfunction. For this reason, Ihde labels the particular quality of otherness
possible in relation to technology as a ‘quasi-otherness, stronger than mere objectness but
weaker than the otherness found within the animal kingdom or the human one’ (ibid.).
Notably, through this particular relation, Ihde notes a quality he refers to as ‘technolo-
gical intentionalities’ (ibid., p. 103) that are, e￿ectively, the unique characteristics pro-
duced through the technology in its enactment. Here Ihde o￿ers the example of a sound
recording robot that is placed in a lecture hall at the front of the room and records a lec-
ture. He contrasts this to a human sitting at the back of the lecture hall who cannot hear
the lecture very well. Were this user to play back the robot’s recording, the user would
be able to take advantage of what Ihde refers as its ‘technological intentionality’ and hear
the lecture. Simply put, the initially unique capabilties of technologies may at ￿rst appear
as ‘other’ but when engaged with often enough, become normalised, leaving particular
‘capabilities’ or ‘technological intentionalities’ as the marker for the quasi-otherness for
which Ihde argues (ibid.).
These ￿rst three relations can also be categorised of a general type which Ihde
describes as focal, that is, they ‘stand within the very core of praxis’ through a human in
relation to some technology with ‘implicated self-awareness’ (ibid., p. 108). However, for
Ihde, there is a fourth relation, Background relations that enables the charting of ‘fringe
or background phenomena that are no more neutral than those of the foreground (ibid.).
This reveals a category distinction between focal and ￿eld phenomena, both of which,
Ihde argues, have signi￿cant e￿ect.29
Thus, background relations are those which are characterised by a shift from a focal
to a ￿eld role. In other words, where the ￿rst three relations all involve some sort of act-
ive and present relation with the technology, this fourth dimension is instead concerned
with the ways that technologies ‘texture environments’ (ibid., p. 112) with particular con-
sequences for human practice. According the Ihde, breakdowns are one site to understand
this relation.30 Here, he describes the 1985 Hurricane Gloria disaster which disrupted elec-
tric power on Long Island for up to two weeks. This disruption had myriad impacts on
human practice, where, for example, ‘with the failure of refrigeration, eating habits had to
change temporarily’ (ibid., p. 111). Thus, Ihde argues that while the contextual aspect of
this relation is quite di￿erent than the others, its transformational characteristics are no
29There is also an interesting correspondence here between Ihde’s conception of focal and ￿eld and the
quantum ￿eld theory basis of Barad’s agential realism which foregrounds the phenomenon of wave/particle
duality.
30See section 6.2 for a review of the literature on breakdowns.
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less potent (Ihde 1990, p. 112).
In sum, I suggest that Ihde’s conceptualisation provides a useful starting point to
begin theorising about the roles of computational objects and any relation they may have
to leadership practice.
2.3.8 Recapituation
I have argued here that the progression of leadership theories appear to take their lead
from ongoing developments arising out of social theory. These changes are re￿ected in an
ongoing re-speci￿cation of the concept ‘leadership’ that exploits, chronologically, many of
themoves found in social theory. Further, I have argued, following awide range of scholars
writing on pluralism (cf. Fuller and Collier 2004; James 1909; Rescher 1995; Shipilov et al.
2014; Turkle and Papert 1992), that the current state of leadership theory is an existential
pluralism, wheremany theories exist simultaneously and are employed by di￿erent people
in di￿erent contexts for di￿erent purposes. Such a state is, for some, a useful, distributed
project to build a rich tapestry of knowledge. In keeping with these understandings and
for the purpose of this study, I have outlined key aspects of actor-network theory (ANT),
agential realism, and Ihde’s human-technology relations, three philosophical frameworks
from the post-structuralist move in social theory which re￿ect the most recent thinking
in social theory, and are therefore likely to support novel theorising.
2.4 Conclusions and Direction of This Dissertation
In this chapter, I have engaged with a wide range of literatures in order to outline the
theoretical grounding for the present study. I ￿rst presented a brief overview of the broad
and essentially contested terrain (Gallie 1956) that is the study of leadership, showing that
the story of leadership is told by di￿erent scholars in di￿erent ways, which reinforced my
claim that leadership scholars have paid computational objects scant attention. Through
an examination of the history of leadership I have con￿rmed that there is a space where
there is an obvious lack of attention. This is the space where computational object may
play some role in the enactment of leadership practice and is the central concern of this
dissertation.
Here, I invoked the ontological position of sceptical constructivism (Grint and
Woolgar 1997, p. 143) that encourages multiple interpretations of meaning. Following
Grint (2005a, p. 1), I have argued that the pursuit of any single de￿nition of leadership
distracts from the broader question posed by sceptical constructivism: How is it that the
particular views/ideologies of leadership come to be accepted as valid in particular so-
cieties, academic disciplines, and organisations? Here such ideologies apply not only to
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leaders who may enact practices that align with a particular theory, but also to methods
used by researchers to argue the existence of that theory within particular disciplines.
In line with Grint, I have argued that consensus on a de￿nition is ‘forlorn and
unnecessary’ (2005a, p. 1). Instead of a single de￿nition, I synthesised a ￿vefold framework
based on the work of Grint (ibid., p. 18) and Kempster et al. (2011) to study leadership in
situ and followed this with examples of how I extended this framework to address the
observation of leadership practices in relation to computational objects.
In a broader sense, I have framed the study of leadership as a range of ideological
positions based in social theory. To make this argument, I presented a summary of Daston
and Galison’s (2007) panoramic study of objectivity as representative of the arc of social
theory in ￿ve moves, as shown in table 2.2. Based on this, I made the claim that the de-
velopment of leadership theory draws, post hoc, against the major developments in social
theory. To illustrate this, I presented a range of leadership theories based on Palmer and
Hardy’s review of the various schools of leadership, also summarised in ￿ve moves and
rendered as table 2.3. I then compared these moves temporally, noting that the moves in
leadership lag behind the moves in social theory. This analysis is summarised in table 2.4.
In keeping with this argument, I suggested that the most recent move in social theory, that
of attempting to unify subject and object, o￿ers a range of theories that may prove helpful
to develop a theory of leadership that includes both humans and computational objects.
Thus, the working hypothesis of this dissertation is that the future of leadership
theorising lies in following the arc of social theory. This suggests that there are resources
and approaches that can be mobilised which hold the possibility to reveal to us something
about leadership that extant approaches have not. To this end, I explained key aspects
of Latour’s ANT (Latour 1994, 1999, 2005), Barad’s agential realism (Barad 2003, 2007)
and Ihde’s conceptualisaton of human-technology relations (1990), which I mobilise in
this study. In so doing, this dissertation seeks to expand extant debates in leadership into
areas not commonly considered within current theorising.
I also touched on how developments in the disciplines of human-computer inter-
action (HCI), information systems (IS), organisational studies (OS), and science and tech-
nology studies (STS) help to frame and analyse relationships between leadership practices
and computational objects. Here I claimed that many of the studies that have been under-
taken in these domains converge on a useful set of theoretical bases around the rubric of
practice theory (PT) (Nicolini 2012; Reckwitz 2002; Schatzki 2002; Shove et al. 2012a). I
have noted that PT-based approaches have been constructively applied in a wide range of
￿elds and have noted their particular attention to relations between people and computa-
tional objects. For these reasons, I have argued that this theoretical approach provides an
appropriate theoretical lens to study the phenomenon of interest to the present study: the
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relationship between leadership practice and computational objects.
The results from the preliminary investigation I have presented in this chapter
show that a) there exists a lack of research on computational object and how their in-
volvement with leadership practice and b) that in addressing this, it would be prudent to
take advantage of recent developments in the social sciences that leadership has not yet
incorporated. This is the area of my research.
Within this scope, the research will explore the following questions:
1. What roles do computational objects play in the enactments of leadership practices?
2. How do informants’ perceptions and use of computational objects align with respect
to the constitution, (re)production, and articulation of leadership practice?
3. How is ‘leadership’ produced and recognised qua ‘leadership’ in practice?
I will therefore attend to the practices enacted in partnership with computational
objects in order to gain an understanding of the roles these objects play. I will explore how
informants perceive the computational objects they work with and compare these to the
enactments of material-discursive practice that are observed. To accomplish these goals I
will trace networks (Latour 1999, p. 24), unpack material-discursive practices (Barad 2007,
p. 54) and explore phenomena through a lens of human-technology relations (Ihde 1990).
Through this enquiry, I seek to gain a deep understanding of how the phenomenon of
‘leadership’ is produced in enactments with computational object. In particular, I view
agential realism as having a central role here in this theorising as it frames ‘leadership’
as a materially-discursive phenomenon that can only be understood in relation to various
practices and arrangements of apparatuses. By following this approach, I seek to make
a contribution to the leadership-as-practice (LAP) literature by applying agential realism
in the study of leadership, including computational objects as actants in the production
of LAP, and thereby extending the boundaries of this stream of research in signi￿cant
ways. However, in order to accomplish this, I must mobilise a coherent methodological
approach.
Therefore, in the next chapter, in order to re￿ne the research topic, questions, and
ways to approach them, I turn to the details of the methodology deployed in this study as




Measurements are agential practices, which are not simply revelatory but per-
formative: they help constitute and are a constitutive part of what is being meas-
ured. In other words, measurements are intra-actions (not interactions): the
agencies of observation are inseparable from that which is observed. Measure-
ments are world-making: matter and meaning do not pre-exist, but rather are
co-constituted via measurement intra-actions [. . . ] Measurements are material-
discursive practices of mattering (Barad 2012a, pp. 6-7).
I￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, I ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ an account of my methodological choices byoutlining those employed in this study. As indicated by the epigraph above, I takethese choices and the enactment of the research itself as a ‘world-making’ activ-
ity that produces di￿erences that matter. This chapter serves to disclose as much of this
understanding as possible. The order of the chapter is as follows: First I discuss the under-
lying strategy of my choice of methodology (section 3.1) as well as the approach and its
limitations (section 3.1.1). I then discuss two overarchingmethodological choices, re￿exiv-
ity and di￿raction (section 3.1.2). After this, I furnish speci￿c details about data collection
(section 3.1.3), and data analysis and interpretation (section 3.1.4). These are followed by
ethical considerations (section 3.2). The chapter concludes with information about the
sites and informants (section 3.3).
3.1 Methods (and Madness)
Despite my overall optimism in suggesting the potential bene￿ts of an ethnographic study
that features observational ￿eldwork, it is no secret that this is an approach fraught with
di￿culties. Van Maanen and Kolb, for example, locate this di￿culty in the interpretive
act of giving voice, not to the researcher’s understanding, but ‘of those that populate the
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studied places and times’ (1982, p. 6). Czarniawska points to the potential emotional stress
of ￿eldwork (2007, p. 53), while Atkinson and Hammersley point to arduous conditions at
virtually every front, including research design, site access, ongoing ￿eld relations, inter-
viewing, recording and organising data, analysis, writing, and ethics (2007, p. vii). They
tell us succinctly:
[F]ieldwork is a very demanding activity, and the processing of data is equally
time-consuming (ibid., p. 160).
This, however, is not to suggest that other methodological approaches are without
di￿culty. Rather, it is to surface the inherent di￿culties of the methodological approach I
have selected.
In sum, an ethnographic approach involves methods that can be likened unto a
form of what Heath calls ‘madness’ (1993, p. 256). Given these preconditions, I o￿er the
reader to an account of how I managed both these methods and their attendant ‘madness’.
3.1.1 Research Approach and Limitations
The approach I have adopted is shaped by calls from a body of scholars to undertake re-
search exploring the role of technology and leadership through a qualitative approach
(Avolio, Kahai et al. 2000; Avolio, Walumbwa et al. 2009; Gronn 2002). As a poorly under-
stood area (Lowe and Gardner 2001), the study of the relation between leadership practices
and computational objects aligns with a ‘nascent archetype’ (Edmondson and McManus
2007, p. 1158), which is driven through open-ended research questions, qualitative data,
interviews, and observations, leading towards a suggestive theory (ibid., p. 1160) that in-
cludes the role of computational objects in leadership practice. Further, following the
guidance of Nicolini, I take a ‘toolkit approach’ (2012, p. 213) towards methods, allowing
for a dialectic of ‘zooming in and zooming out’ (ibid., pp. 219-239) between theory and
data, where I allow for a ‘switching between theoretical lenses’ (ibid., p. 213) based on an
iterative, interpretive model.
As a study designed to understand human behaviour and practice, it follows an
ethnographic tradition. Here, Van Maanen observes:
[F]ieldwork is one answer—some say the best—to the question of how the
understanding of others, close or distant, is achieved (1988, p. 2).
Consequently, the researchmethodology I have selected for the study draws on the
interpretive paradigm, and as such, seeks to make visible in the mundane what is often
taken for granted (Suchman 1995).
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The study therefore carries the responsibilities and limitations of employing the
researcher as an instrument (Van Maanen 1988, p. 14) that, like all humans, can only ‘see
the world through the forms we construct to grasp it’ (Taylor 1989, p. 472). Following
Czarniawska, I claim not that the methodology I have assembled is the ‘right approach to
￿eld studies in modern societies; I do claim, however, to have joined the search for such
approaches’ (2007, p. 17).
It is also important to understand that the sites studied in this research were self-
selecting and this willingness to allow a researcher to observe normally hidden details
of their work may be a form of selection bias. In contrast to organisations where I was
ultimately given access, there were also cases where I was initially given a positive in-
dication, but ultimately declined. Outside the organisations I was granted access to, the
￿ndings in this study may not apply. This is an important limitation of the study and its
methodological approach. For more on site selection and access, see section 3.1.3.1.
3.1.2 Re￿exivity and Di￿raction
The concept of re￿exivity has, for many qualitative researchers, become de rigueur as
a means to reduce bias (Becker 1967), to focus attention on the components of practice
(Llewellyn and Spence 2010, p. 1421), or to clarify ‘taken-for-granted assumptions and
blind spots’ (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009, p. 9). In my own thinking, I have tended to
associate re￿exivity with Alvesson and Kärreman’s description of it, where it is seen as
part of an apparatus:
[T]hat encourages alternative constructions and the self-critical interpreta-
tions of one’s own paradigmatic, political, theoretical, methodological, and
social predispositions (Alvesson and Kärreman 2007, p. 1269).
Re￿exivity is also associated with sceptical constructivism, an anti-essentialist
stance that brings together relativism, constructivism, and re￿exivity as its primary ele-
ments (Grint and Woolgar 1997, p. 5). Thus, like the term leadership,1 re￿exivity means
di￿erent things to di￿erent people in di￿erent contexts.
Woolgar o￿ers a spectrumof possible re￿exivities, ranging from radical constitutive
re￿exivity to benign introspection (1988, p. 21). He describes the former as being closely
linked to Gar￿nkel’s (1986) ethnomethodological programme with the suggestion that:
[I]n any act of representation, there is an intimate interdependence between
the surface appearance (document) and the associated underlying reality (ob-
ject) (Woolgar 1988, p. 21).
1See section 2.2.2.1 for a discussion of various meanings of leadership found in the literature.
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As concerns the latter ‘reality’, Woolgar contends that re￿exivity entails loose in-
junctions to ‘think about what we are doing’ (1988, p. 22). Thus on one end of Woolgar’s
spectrum, radical constitutive re￿exivity calls us to learn to see through surfaces to an ‘un-
derlying’ reality, whereas, at the other end of the spectrum, benign introspection calls us
to critically look upon ourselves. O￿ering a possible explanation for this range of under-
standings, Woolgar further suggests this:
[V]ariation in reactions to re￿exivity is also indicative of tensions at the heart
of social science over the relationship between observation (image), observer
and observed (subject/object) (ibid., p. 31).
Indeed, Barad con￿rms as part of these tensions, re￿exivity has been trenchantly
critiqued by a range of scholars on two key points. First, she claims that science studies
have ignored ‘crucial social factors such as gender, race, class, sexuality, ethnicity, religion,
and nationality’ (2007, p. 87). Moreover, she links this omission to a lack of appreciation
of the ‘mutual constitution of the “social” and the “scienti￿c”’ (ibid.), pointing out that the
supposed distinction between these has been:
[C]hallenged vigourously on multiple grounds by feminist, poststructuralist,
postcolonialist, queer, and other critical social theorists, and that attending to
the issues they raise is an integral part of questioning the constitution of the
nature-culture dichotomy and the work it does: not only that it matters, but
how it matters and for whom (ibid.).
Second, according to Barad, re￿exivity presupposes that what is represented re-
￿ects ‘(social or natural) reality’ (emphasis added, ibid.), directly challenging theGar￿nkelian
assumption of an ‘underlying’ reality inWoolgar’s radical constitutive re￿exivity. In Barad’s
view, such a position ignores the possibility that practices of representation may them-
selves impact the objects of investigation. It also suggests that re￿exivity implicitly priv-
ileges itself with a quality of knowing that is somehow better/di￿erent than other forms
of knowing. Pointing to a precondition this position implies, she argues that:
[R]epresentation raised to the nth power does not disrupt the geometry that
holds object and subject at a distance as the very condition for knowledge’s
possibility (ibid., p. 88).
In other words, Barad argues that knowledge only arises out of relations; know-
ledge is relational and arises through apparatuses of material-discursive practices (ibid.,
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p. 146); and that it is an error to rely too heavily on re￿exive knowledge.2
Thus, Barad argues for recognising the limitations of re￿exivity as an optical meta-
phor that biases towards re￿ection and, in the words of Haraway, ‘only displaces the same
elsewhere, setting up worries about copy and original and the search for the authentic and
really real’ (1997, p. 16).
In response to these concerns, Barad o￿ers di￿raction as an alternative metaphor,
based on patterns that are formed by wave energy as various waves additively combine.
Such patterns are part of everyday life if one knows how to look for them. For example,
in ￿gure 3.1, an aerial photograph of the surface of the ocean displays various di￿raction
patterns as ocean waves combine, forming new patterns in the water as evidence of this
di￿erential process.
Figure 3.1: Di￿raction Patterns on the Ocean Surface
2The reader may also observe that Barad includes in this argument a critique on representationalism; this
argument turns on the point that what is represented does not necessarily re￿ect a ‘social’ or ‘natural’ reality
(2007, p. 87), and is the basis for her alternative to representationalism: performativity.
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According to Barad (2007), and Nicolini and Roe (2014), the metaphor of di￿raction
can also be extended methodologically. To approach one’s research through a di￿ractive
methodology means not ￿xing the identities of subjects and objects in advance (Barad
2007, p. 30), which enables the researcher to read ‘insights through one another in ways
that help illuminate di￿erences as they emerge’ (ibid.), including those from ‘one area of
study through another’ (ibid.). Barad credits Haraway for the inspiration of this approach,
however, Bateson also points towards similar concerns with his remark that:
[W]hat we mean by information—the elementary unit of information—is a
di￿erence whichmakes a di￿erence (original italics, 1972 / Bateson 1987, p. 470).
Moreover, the methodological approach of di￿raction is aligned with the toolkit
approach (Nicolini 2012, p. 213) discussed in section 3.1.1 in its insistence to develop theory
iteratively and dynamically. Given this study’s reach across the HCI, IS, OS, and leadership
literatures, di￿raction provides a crucial methodological support for establishing linkages
among them.
Prior to reading Barad (2007), I had not considered how the optical metaphor of the
term re￿exivity might in￿uence what I might do with it methodologically. Alvesson and
Kärreman’s (2007) formulation falls more towardsWoolgar’s radical constitutive re￿exivity
(1988, p. 21), so it may not generate insights that are re￿ective in the way Barad argues
against. However, irrespective of whether re￿exivity has made a useful di￿erence in my
past thinking or not, Barad makes an important point, one that helps to more carefully dir-
ect the researcher’s gaze to di￿erence and understandings that can arise from identifying
emergent relations.
Practically, re￿exivity involves allowing time to think and re￿ect on ideas and al-
lowing that thought process to surface unquestioned assumptions. Di￿raction, however,
involves actively trying out di￿erent combinations, for example, linking data to extant
theory and then assembling various theoretical perspectives from a range of disciplines
which appear to describe the same phenomenon. Simply put, di￿raction is methodolo-
gically employed as a means for drawing new distinctions through extant data. This dif-
fraction method is employed in the analyses carried out in of each of the three empirical
chapters 4, 5, and 6. The results of these are then further re￿ected upon and di￿racted in
the ￿nal chapter 7.
In conclusion, re￿exivity, within this study, invokes sceptical constructivism, in-
cludes questioning assumptions, the generation of multiple explanations for the phenom-
ena of interest, and attention towards to the various cultural frames through which I see.
All of this is useful, but so is being attentive to di￿raction; that is, noticing di￿erence and
attempting to understand how di￿erence comes into being.
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Throughout this study, both re￿exivity and di￿raction are constant companions
in my thinking as methodological anchors. For this reason, I take the re￿exive position
that my physical presence and thinking are themselves important apparatuses that shape
this work in particular ways, hopefully enabling me to see through ‘surfaces’ towards
what may lie ‘underneath’, to look critically upon myself as an instrument of research,
and to be more aware of my own blind spots. Moreover, I take the di￿ractive position by
not assuming that the objects of human and computational object are ￿xed in enactments
of leadership practice, by paying close attention to di￿erences (both empirical and those
found in the literature), overlaying them, and reading them through one another, feasibly
generating novel insights on this basis.
3.1.3 Data Collection
Within this section, I describe the data collection methods I have employed in the study.
The majority of the empirical data collected for the study has been derived through ob-
servational ￿eldwork with organisations at their o￿ces in London and Silicon Valley.
These observations were primarily based on shadowing (Czarniawska 2007; Nicolini 2012)
formal leaders and ‘tracing the associations between human and non-human elements and
studying the e￿ects that the resulting arrangements make in the world’ (Nicolini 2010,
p. 1394). The research is further enriched by extensive interviews (Whyte and Whyte
1984, pp. 97-111; Alvesson 2011a) as well as a variety of virtual methods (Boellstor￿ et al.
2012). Through this array of data collection methods, the research provides a grounded
empirical base from which analysis of processual relations between leadership practices
and computational objects can be undertaken.
3.1.3.1 Sites and Access
At various points in my professional career, I have been involved with business sales op-
erations, where the notion of keeping a sales pipeline ￿lled is crucial to the ongoing goal
of accomplishing sales (Cefkin 2007). For this reason, when I made the decision to con-
duct observation in this study, I also identi￿ed the negotiation of access as isomorphic to
the process of managing a sales pipeline. I therefore began cultivating ‘prospects’, that is,
potential informants (and their sites) three months into my doctoral programme. Having
an established career in industry and a well-established professional network to tap into
perhaps made this challenging process somewhat easier. Even so, granting permission to
see what is happening in a company for weeks or months on end is something that many
companies simply decline.
For this reason, site selection and the negotiation of access was viewed as concom-
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itant in this study, where site selection tends to occur towards the beginning of a study and
access is part of an ongoing, relational process that continues throughout (Feldman et al.
2004, p. x). The former was informed by Zubo￿’s primary site selection criterion: that po-
tential sites must demonstrate interest in ‘learn[ing] something from the new knowledge
that would be produced’ (1988, p. 425) by the study. I took such a demonstration to be a
tangible expression of how the research ￿ts into the potential site’s strategic goals or hu-
man resource learning and development plans. I found with some surprise that Zubo￿’s
criterion supported consistent development of amutually productive relationship between
researcher and organisation.3 Additional criteria for selection included the following:
1. Global organisations;
2. Sites where new projects, tasks, management, teams, or systems are being deployed
are preferred–these align with the research questions that point towards what is
new and di￿erent and help identify environments where leadership practice has
undergone, or is going through, practical change.
To identify sites, I undertook as a preliminary step a set of interviews aimed to
develop sensitising concepts, providing a ‘general sense of reference and guidelines in
approaching empirical instances’ (Blumer 1954, p. 7). These are described in section 3.1.3.3.
To identify potential informants, I began enlisting professional colleagues in my
personal network for support and introductions to their colleagues. Through this practice I
was able to identify and conduct a series of interviewswith senior executives, ranging from
senior vice-presidents to C-level executives across a wide range of global organisations
including government, internet and technology, management consulting, manufacturing,
media and broadcasting, public relations, retail, and venture capital.
Viewing access as a relational process helped me to keep access in mind when in-
teracting with anyone. Thus, when an interviewee expressed interest in the research at
the end of an interview, or asked how else they might participate, I took this as a match for
Zubo￿’s criterion and continued discussions with them on the possibility of observation.
Access, then, was produced in part through my ongoing persistence and focus on devel-
oping relationships with others (Daniel-Echols 2004, pp. 106-109). I describe additonal
empirical details of site selection in section 3.1.3.3 on page 95.
Through the access I was granted, irrespective of what I was allowed to see and
what I was not allowed to see, how this varied across sites, and how, even in cases where
3I took such a criterion as a licence to care about and engage with the goals that the potential sites shared
with me. After nine interviews, I had received two unsolicited requests from informants that their site be
included in the observational phase of the study. I took this as evidence that Zubo￿’s method was indeed
e￿ective.
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the broadest access was allowed, limits of all sorts were present. The idea therefore was
not to see everything, but within the contexts I was given access, to be faithful to an
ethnographic sensibility and attend to the mundane, the overlooked, and the details of
habituated practice (Alvesson and Sveningsson 2003b; Chia and MacKay 2007; Star 1999).
With some companies, I was also required to sign a non-disclosure agreement as
a pre-condition for access. In these cases, I reviewed and suggested modi￿cations to the
non-disclosure agreement that de￿ned the scope of my research project and explicitly
listed research outputs as objects for which I was granted the right of publication with
the provision that these would be provided to the site for review before publishing. Here,
review was a courtesy; these agreements granted the hosting organisation no editorial
rights. These modi￿cations were accepted in all cases.
In some organisations, I was permitted only to conduct cursory interviews, while
in others, I was granted much broader access to their physical premises and permitted
to observe in a variety of organisational settings in the form of shadowing (Czarniawska
2007), where the researcher follows the informant in the enactment of their practices.
Through shadowed activities, I observed, among others, client presentations, collaborative
work sessions, company events, individual work sessions, interviews, meetings, telephone
calls, and shared meals in situ. I describe this in detail in section 3.1.3.2.
Not everything, however, went according to plan. For example, I had a site set
up for observation with the US military for April 2013 and had arranged my travel and
accommodations for this ￿eld visit. Then, just a few weeks before it was scheduled to
begin, the informant contacted me and said that his commander’s commander, the o￿cer
in charge of the base, did not want any researchers on site and was blocking approval,
although I had previously been told approval was granted. The informant was extremely
apologetic and attributed this decision to the base commander’s impending retirement
coupled with political aspirations (Interview 1011, 17 April 2013). Fortunately, I had also
set up site observations at another site in the same city, and so was able to recover from
this change in plans without much disruption.
The next three sections describe further details of the methods deployed whilst in
the ￿eld.
3.1.3.2 Observation, Shadowing, and Fieldnotes
Forms of ￿eldwork that involve direct observation are intrinsic to ethnographic study
(Silverman 2011, pp. 113-160; Van Maanen 1988, p. 48). However, the particular variant
of shadowing is a methodological approach which McDonald claims is generally ‘neither
discussed as a distinct research method nor examined methodologically’ (2005, p. 455). In
one of the few detailed de￿nitions found in the literature, McDonald de￿nes shadowing
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as:
[A] research technique which involves a researcher closely following a mem-
ber of an organization over an extended period of time. When the person
being shadowed goes to another department, the researcher follows them.
When they have a project meeting or meet with a customer, the researcher
sits in. If they have co￿ee with friends who are colleagues from another site,
the researcher goes too. The researcher ‘shadows’ the target individual from
the moment they begin their working day until they leave for home. This
can include hours of stationary observation while the person being shadowed
writes at his or her desk, running between buildings for a series of meetings
or attending dinners held for clients. Shadowing activity will be as various
and complex as the job of the individual the shadower is investigating. Shad-
owing can be done over consecutive or non-consecutive days for anything
from a single day or shift up to a whole month. Studies can be focused on a
single role (such as new recruit or purchasing manager) in several companies
or on a number of roles within the same company (2005, p. 456).
I o￿er this lengthy quote because it describes the method of shadowing in a way
that actually describes key details of what is involved. These include the aspect of follow-
ing a person throughout their daily work as a ‘shadow’. Here, the researcher immerses
herself in the context of the informant, seen from a vantage point that is proximal to the
informant. In contrast to McDonald, Nicolini de￿nes the method much more succinctly,
as:
[F]ollowing people, wherever they are, whatever they are doing (2012, p. 302).
This quote, like McDonald’s, tells us what the researcher does when shadowing,
but omits much of the detail that may be useful to someone unfamiliar with the concept.
Once acquainted with the idea, however, Nicolini’s description becomes a useful handle
to what makes the method stand apart from other observational approaches.
According to Czarniawska, the distinctive approach of shadowing also o￿ers unique
empirical opportunities for
[A] mutual observation, an establishing of similarities and di￿erences; then
there is a focus created by the movements of the person shadowed, and the
double perception as it were—the researcher guesses (and asks about) percep-
tions of the events being perceived as well [. . . ] The bonus lies in the extra
self-knowledge that the researchers can gain. The main compensation is a
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problematized picture of social reality that carries the possibility of liberation
for those who su￿er from the reality they were led to construct, and a promise
of a non-trivial story for the researcher (2007, p. 56).
The ‘bonus’ Czarniawska describes is a phenomenon I can personally attest to; I
did ￿nd myself asking my informants about what they were doing and was surprised in
many cases to ￿nd that the answer was ‘I never thought about that before’ (￿eld diary 13
November 2012), a response that stands in direct opposition to how people in leadership
positions are normally thought to operate. Thus, shadowing has away of revealing aspects
of practice related to an individual and their relationship to the world that is particularly
focused and which may not come to the fore through other methodological approaches.
In this way, Nicolini reports that through shadowing, the researcher is able to
[A]ttain an insider’s view of the patterns of relationship, the di￿erent per-
spectives among co-participants—who is who and who knows what—the in-
terests at stake, and how these di￿erent perspectives, usually sustained by
speci￿c discourses, are worked together, aligned, or played against each other,
so creating di￿erential power positions in the ￿eld. By the same token, re-
searchers can also identify who occupies the di￿erent positions made avail-
able by the activity, and appreciate the expectations and privileges that come
with them (2012, p. 222).
Shadowing, in my use of the method, o￿ered precisely this kind of ‘insider’ in-
formation, and thus enabled me to e￿ectively follow Alvesson’s strategy of situational
focus (1996, pp. 201-206), where the researcher employs the knowledge gained through
immersion in the context to be able to discern precisely what possible areas for further
observation may ‘re￿ect[s] signi￿cant elements of organizational life’ (ibid., p. 201) within
the site.
Moreover, according to Nicolini, shadowing does not have to include only people,
but can also include objects:
The investigation can follow a compositional or decompositional strategy: fol-
lowing the actors can thus literally mean shadowing human or non-humans
actors, and observing their daily activity of weaving connections (Czarni-
awska 2007), or alternatively, it may mean retracing the steps, strategies,
and events that led to the emergence, stabilization or failure of speci￿c as-
semblages using historical methods (Latour 2005). My tenet here, based on
the principle that practice theory and actor-network theory also share a num-
ber of family resemblances, is that these concepts and methodological recom-
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mendations can be equally employed to investigate the connectedness of prac-
tices (Nicolini 2012, pp. 231-232).
Thus, in my shadowing of an o￿ce director ‘doing email’, I not only paid attention
to what the human did, but also to what the computational object did and the particular
ways engagements between the human and the computational object occurred. This in-
cluded, for example, noting the enabling and constraining aspects of the software that was
invoked through the computational object. How, for instance, was the email system being
utilised? Were labels4 involved? Did the user archive5 their mail? How did they search
for mail? Did they use instant messaging (IM) in tandem with email? Did their keyboard
and mouse actions reveal an understanding of keyboard commands and features in a way
that helped place the user’s level of ￿uency and comfort with the computational object?
In other words, how did their actions describe their relationship (1984 / Turkle 2005, p. 1)
with the given computational object?
In this manner, the shadowing of formal and informal leaders allowed me to tra-
verse the network of people and objects throughwhich ‘leadership’ was seen to have taken
place by members. One of my tasks, then, was to account for how these assessments of
leadership came into being in practice.
All observations were noted in an electronic ￿eld diary in situ and in real-time.
These included taking verbatim notes on what was said and discussed and by whom, as
well as on the overall setting and atmosphere, the way people were seated, and other
non-verbal clues.
Then, at the end of a day of shadowing, I would leave the site and return to my
domicile to re-type the ￿eld notes, expanding as much as I could based on the notes made
that day. In the majority of cases, I would then send the notes back to the informant for
them to review with the possibility for them to o￿er additional feedback. In some cases
this occurred after initial coding had occurred (see section 3.1.4). This practice led, in
every case, to greater trust o￿ered to me by the informant. Moreover, there were cases
where my providing them my notes prompted them to show me particular things on the
next shadowing occasion because they then better understood what I saw as interesting
in their practice.
A total of 30 days of shadowing were conducted over a 15-month period from
October 2012 through December 2013. This was across three di￿erent companies and
focused on 14 distinctive informants in total. A complete listing of shadowing activities
are detailed in appendix D.
4For more information on labelling email, see https://support.google.com/mail/answer/118708.
5For more information on archiving email, see https://support.google.com/mail/answer/6576.
91
To further broaden and enrich the data collection, interviews were also conducted,
as described below.
3.1.3.3 Interviews
While interviewing is a ubiquitous data collectionmethod across a broad range of research,
like all methods, it presents a number of potential pitfalls (Potter andHepburn 2005, p. 300).
These issues arise, according to Fontana and Frey, because interviewing is:
[I]nextricably and unavoidably historically, politically, and contextually bound.
This boundedness refutes the whole tradition of the interview of gathering
objective data to be used neutrally for scienti￿c purposes (2005, p. 695).
Thus for Fontana and Frey, not only are there potential problems with the inter-
view itself, it is also fundamentally ￿awed if conceived as a means to ‘neutrally’ gather
data. Alvesson summarises this problem rather neatly by characterising:
[T]he interview as a complex social situation [that] may bear the imprints
of a multitude of social logics, mechanisms or social forces that need to be
theorized and assessed [. . . ] A key question is how this can be handled (2011a,
p. 75).
His answer to this question has been helpful tomy consideration of interviews (and
other forms of engagement with informants) in this study. Through eight metaphors, each
of which presents a ‘central problem’ (ibid.) for the research(er) to ‘solve’ (ibid.), rendered
as table 3.1, I have attempted to be aware of and address these in various ways.
Alvessonmaps out three paradigmatic responses to each of thesemetaphors, based
on a tripartite schema of neo-positivism, romanticism, and localism.6 The￿rst, neo-positivism,
corresponds to a view that is in search of a ‘context-free truth about what is really “out
there”’ (Alvesson 2011a, p. 11). Romanticism denotes a position that wants to come closer
to the respondent to capture the ‘real self’ (ibid., pp. 13-14). And the third, localism ‘em-
phasizes that interview statements must be seen in their local situation-speci￿c context’
(ibid., p. 19). Of these three, the present study aligns most closely with the third paradigm.
Using these three paradigmatic positions, Alvesson ￿eshes out a range of responses
to the problem of interviewing. Ultimately, what he argues is that there is no correct an-
swer. What is key, however, according Alvesson, is that the paradigm from which one
views the problem inherently shapes a range of possible responses and limitations. On
6This structure corresponds to Silverman’s use of positivism, emotionalism, and constructivism (2011,




Local accomplishment: The social problem of coping with an interpersonal relation
and complex interaction in a non-routine situation;
∑
Establishing and perpetuating a storyline: The cognitive problem of ￿nding out
what it is all about (beyond the level of the espoused);
∏
Identity work: The identity problem of adapting a self-position which is contextually
relevant (and / or comfortable for the interviewee (see also Bamberg 2011);
π
Cultural script application: The ‘institutional’ problem of adapting to normative
pressure and cognitive uncertainty through mimicking standard forms of expression;
∫
Moral storytelling: The problem (or option) of maintaining and increasing self-
esteem that emerges in any situation involving examination and calling for a perform-
ance (or allowing esteem-enhancement to ￿ourish in the situation);
ª
Political action: The motivation problem of developing an interest or rationale for
active participation in the interview;
º
Construction work: The representation / construction problem of how to account for
complex phenomena through language;
Ω
A play of the powers of discourse: The ‘autonomy / determinism’ ‘problem’ of a
powerful macro-discourse operating behind and on the interview subject.
Table 3.1: Eight Metaphors as Central Problems in Interviews (adapted from Alvesson 2011a,
p. 76)
this reading, interviews are then ‘the conceptual articulation of pre-theoretical Weltan-
schauung that are inextricably related to the historical, psychological, and cultural condi-
tions of individual’ (Staiti 2013, p. 34).
Given this instability within the interview, I am comforted by Czarniawska’s as-
sertion that:
It is impossible to imagine an entire organization staging a coherent perform-
ance for the bene￿t of one researcher (2007, p. 80).
Czarniawska’s insight suggests that with systematic application of method, many
concerns around it can be ameliorated. Given these limitations, and following Byrne, I
view interviews as extremely useful:
[F]or accessing individuals’ attitudes and values—things that cannot neces-
sarily be observed or accommodated in a formal questionnaire (Byrne cited
in Silverman 2011, p. 167).
Another useful way of putting this is that interviews are a way of collecting and
enabling the rigorous examinination of narrative accounts of social worlds (Miller and
Gassner 2004, p. 137). Within this study, interviews were thus deployed as support to
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direct observation in this study, often as a means to compare (Ragin 1989) what is said
(in an interview) to what is observed in situ, highlighting concordances and dissonances
between idealisation (Taylor 2004, p. 23) and observed practice. Comprehensively, a grand
total of 59 interviews across 19 companies and 44 informants were conducted as part of
this study. These are enumerated in appendix E.
Sensitising Interviews However, before ever setting foot in the ￿eld, I began by draw-
ing on Blumer’s notion of the sentitising concept (1969, p. 148) with what I refer to as
sensitising interviews. These interviews, which preceded ￿eldwork, helped to develop an
understanding based on empirical data of what might be important to look at with respect
to leadership practices and computational objects in the ￿eld. In undertaking these sens-
itising interviews, an important set of assumptions I adopted, following Sproull et al., is
that computing can be interpreted as a culture (1984, p. 46), and, by my own extension,
that leadership could also be fruitfully explored in this fashion. That is to say, I wondered
di￿ractively, if practices of both computing and leadership were:
[I]n￿uenced by the social order surrounding computing [and leadership]: by
the attitudes and behaviors of people who are good at it, by the management
of computing [and leadership] resources, and by the general perceived import-
ance of computing [and leadership] in society and the organization (ibid.).
Based on this speculation, I constructed thematic questions for an open-ended
interview (Alvesson 2011a, p. 79) to explore these general topic areas. These were the
following:
1. How the informant came to be conscious of the concept of leadership and a chro-
nological history of the development of this concept in their experience, including
key milestones in their experience of how they became a ‘leader’;
2. How the informant came to be aware of computational technology and a chronolo-
gical history of how this awareness was embodied in their experience;
3. A discussion of the key practices that, in their view, constitute their leadership prac-
tice.
These interviews began before I initiated any ￿eldwork and lasted between a 30
and 90 minutes. I conducted a total of 33 such interviews with senior executives from
a broad range of companies in Europe and the US, across a wide variety of sectors, in-
cluding broadcast media, consumer products, computer hardware manufacture, computer
software development, government/military, insurance, management consulting, public
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relations, retail, and venture capital. These were conducted with informants categorised
as leaders based on a title at C-level, Director, Principal, Vice-President, or a military title
greater than sergeant. This categorisation implicitly reproduces Grint’s notion of leader
understood as position (see ￿gure 2.3 on page 29) but can be seen as the researcher en-
gaging with/drawing on the citationality of leadership arising from this category, as a
case of gathering data from those who have experienced such roles, or both. To further
enhance this, I also undertook similar sensitising interviews with managers, executive as-
sistants (EAs), and non-managerial persons who may be seen as a follower, or perhaps, an
informal leader. The purpose of these interviews, in keeping with Blumer’s perspective,
was to provide an empirical basis that would ‘suggest directions along which to look’ and
provide an empirical basis for a ‘general sense of what is relevant’ (1969, p. 148). These
sensitising interviews, along with all others, are enumerated in appendix E.
While conducting these interviews, the discussion of leadership would evoke re-
sponses that touched on technology and/or leadership practices such that a topic would
not need to be evoked explicitly but came up as a matter of course.
These sensitising interviews also served as a means to introduce this research to
the informants and as an initial step towards including their organisation as an observa-
tional site in the study. Thus, some of these informants were later observed and particip-
ated in multiple sequential interviews, enabling the researcher to ‘correct earlier errors
and omissions and to construct a denser, more complex analysis’ (Charmaz 2003, p. 318).
A number of important themes emerged in these early interviews which shaped my site
selection within the study.
The Choice to Emphasise Technology Companies Going into the study, my think-
ing had been that based on my existing experience in internet and technology companies,
while I presumed such organisations would be potentially useful sites, a less biased choice
might be to observe sites not in an area where I already had a great deal of familiarity.
However, once I began analysing the narratives (Silverman 2011, p. 91) of the sensitising
interviews, a pattern emerged that changed my mind.
In particular, I found a consistent pattern in the narratives of early interviews
around material di￿erences in leadership practices between organisations describing high
levels of technological engagement compared to organisations with moderate levels of
technological engagement. This pattern split such that the leaders at internet and tech-
nology companies fell into the ‘higher engagement’ camp while the non-technology com-
panies more often fell into the lower levels of engagement, often actively resistant.
The companies with narratives of lower engagement and higher resistance often
conveyed these in stories of (often compounded) errors in data leading to a mistrust of the
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system (Interview 1002, 23 Jan 2013; Interview 1005, 26 Mar 2012) or the position that ‘our
systems don’t talk to each other’ (Interview 1002, 23 Jan 2013).
In contrast, many of the technology companies conveyed quite a di￿erent set of
narratives, about technology being positively ‘embedded’ in their daily experience (In-
terview 1012, 17 May 2012), about a willingness to try new things with computational
systems (Interview 1009, 06 Apr 2012) and, perhaps, most importantly, an ability to com-
petently enact evolutionary changes to systems as learning occurred (Interview 1004, 28
Mar 2012).
Based on this pattern, I focused observations more towards the internet and tech-
nology companies as a likely location for the invention of novel leadership practices en-
acted through computational objects. Given that, even in environments where such in-
novation might be present, there would likely be problems as well, I reversed my previous
decision and focused on securing internet and technology companies as sites.
In summary, I saw interviews as an example ofwhat Yanow et. al refer to as ‘talking
to people’ (2012, p. 351), and thus, while the questions above provide thematic structure
to the conversations, I allowed ￿exibility in following ‘departures from the initial area of
interest’ (Alvesson 2011a, p. 9).
Recording andTranscription Each interviewwas recorded and then fully transcribed.
During the spring of 2012, I had several interviews scheduled very close together and
began to have di￿culty keeping up with the transcriptions. To alleviate this as a potential
block in my work￿ow, I engaged a transcription company I had worked with previously
and knew to provide high-quality transcriptions based on my requirements. More spe-
ci￿cally, the transcription company signed a non-disclosure agreement with me for all
transcription work and provided me with time-code information within each transcript
so that when I reviewed the ￿les, if any errors were present, I was then able to easily
locate these in the original recording and ensure each transcript was accurate as possible.
Following transcription, I reviewed each transcript for errors, making corrections
where necessary, and added these to NVivo™ for pattern-coding (Miles and Huberman
1994b, p. 69). The coding process is described in greater detail in section 3.1.4 below.
3.1.3.4 Virtual, Electronic, and Archival Data
In a modern organisation, Barley and Kunda argue that purely observational methods are
insu￿cient by raising the question of:
[H]ow to study work that entails few physical or interpersonal acts, or work
whose physical traces are ephemeral. Consider, for instance, the act of work-
ing on a computer, where traces of activity appear and disappear in amatter of
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seconds. Traditional forms of observation are inadequate for such situations
simply because events happen too quickly for observers to register and record.
Because there is reason to believe that a signi￿cant portion of post-industrial
work is computer mediated, researchers may need to devise and adopt ways
of augmenting their observational capacities via technological means (2001,
p. 85).
Thus, Barley and Kunda ￿ag the critical issue of how to observe practices in en-
vironments where the practices of interest are not necessarily visible through physical
presence.
In response to such concerns, I sought out and was granted additional access at
some of my sites to computational data sources which provided access to a material-
discursive record of a particular virtual space (Boellstor￿ et al. 2012, pp. 118-120). I also
found that through publically available social media systems (Minocha and Petre 2012,
pp. 41-50), some of my informants engaged with one another in ways that produced ana-
logues of face-to-face engagements. And ￿nally, through being granted limited permis-
sions at some sites to record audio and video (Heath et al. 2010, pp. 15-17), I was able to
record engagements with and between people and computational objects in a way that
made visible many aspects of practice that would not have been observable through tra-
ditional approaches.
In addition to these, the following data sources were actively tapped in a variety
of forms throughout the data collection process:
1. BoardEx™






As with other forms of data, these were also ingested into NVivo™ and coded per
transcribed data.
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3.1.4 Episode Selection, Data Analysis, and Interpretation
Using a ‘within family’ (Barley and Kunda 2001, pp. 85-86) comparative design, the em-
pirical data generated from the ￿eldwork was then analysed to highlight the relationships
between leadership practices and their outcomes, noting also where and how computa-
tional objects play signi￿cant roles. To accomplish this, a critical case study approach was
mobilised where particular attention was paid to data where outliers and novel practices
emerged, as these are understood to support the generation of new theory (Flyvbjerg 2011,
p. 307). The aim of such an approach is to delineate a territory not well understood (Kahai
2012, p. 102; Eisenhardt 1989, p. 532).
The methodology employed for coding empirical material was initially Miles and
Huberman’s pattern-coding, an approach that ‘pull[s] together a lot of material into more
meaningful and parsimonious units of analysis’ (1994a, p. 69). Drawing also on their con-
tact summary form (ibid., p. 54), interviews were also tagged with pertinent metadata in
order to further facilitate selective analysis. Once this stage had been reached, ￿ve key
themes were abstracted from the data as follows:
1. Various Modes of Dealing with (Computational) Interruption—from Freezing up to Im-
provisation: In a number of observations at which I was present, various factors
interrupt computationally enacted communication between formal leaders. These
include power outages, network failures, and system crashes. As a communication
technology, computers allow people to cross boundaries of time and space, but this
comes at a cost of brittleness for those connections it enables. The tension between
what technology enables (the ability to transcend boundaries of time and space)
and what it constrains (a connection that could drop at any moment) is ongoing
in the engagements I observed. Crucially, the way that di￿erent people respond
to the brittleness is di￿erent, even within the same organisation. In my observa-
tions, I have seen some leaders respond by freezing up; taking up to 15 minutes
to develop a clear plan of action after a disconnection. This is contrasted with the
other extreme, where I observed a formal leader on a Skype™ call in the middle of
a PowerPoint™ presentation when his computer crashed. Within 15 seconds, he
had dialled up the other party through his mobile phone, carrying on as if nothing
untoward had happened.
2. The Practice of Pair Programming as Decision-Making and Resource Allocation: In a
number of my observations, I was able to observe pairs of programmers doing their
work of solving engineering problems by writing programmatic code. In all cases,
at least one of the members of the dyad was considered a formal team leader at
a given point in time. There were a number of very interesting aspects to what I
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observed here, including the high level of conversation between the pair, where the
member ‘driving’ (typing) exhibits the practice of stating their thoughts out loud as
they type and the other may respond to these thoughts, critiquing them, or o￿ering
a di￿erent approach. It was fascinating to observe what is considered to be such a
technical practice as an ongoing and externalised conversation.
Within pair programming I found a repeatable practice of externalising thought and
turning what normally happens inside one person’s head into a conversation or on-
going debate in which joint decisions are made. These in turn result in lines of code
that are written and committed as resources in a code base. Many de￿nitions of
leadership link practices of decision-making (Useem 2010a) and resource allocation
(Yukl 2009, pp. 8-9), so what I found of greatest interest here is that under these
de￿nitions from the literature, what I observed meets established criteria for ‘lead-
ership’. However, in my observations, this ‘leadership’ is distributed between two
people (the pair), as well as a larger computational system of source control, build
veri￿cation, and code reviews.
3. Pair Emailing versus Emailing Alone at Night: Following the notion of pair program-
ming, at one of my sites I shadowed a chief operating o￿cer (COO) and his exec-
utive assistant (EA) at length and was fascinated by their approach to the COO’s
email. On the surface, the interesting factor was the COO’s strategy of a ‘zero in-
box’ (Mann 2006), where the working information strategy is de￿ned as having zero
emails in one’s inbox, and thus, no communication backlog. However, as I observed
this practice in depth, I found that the COO and EA had developed, over the course
of nine months, a particular way of working together that in many ways mirrored
the pair programming environment, with the EA coming into the COO’s o￿ce with
her computer several times per week for at least one hour and sometimes for more
than two, and the two of them sitting side-by-side working on the COO’s inbox
and pending draft emails. However, with the COO and EA, instead of discussing
code, they discussed emails: how to respond to them, what details were needed,
sometimes with the EA taking this information and crafting a response in situ while
the COO continued working on another inbox item. Many of these emails were
company-level announcements that involved the senior executive team, and thus,
the EA showed me evidence of emails that were being sent to her instead of the
COO from members of the executive team who were in the early stages of craft-
ing company-wide messages about policies, initiatives, and other decisions that had
been taken but were ultimately intended to come from the COO. Thus, a distributed
system of computational objects, senior executives, the EA, and the COO were ac-
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tually producing many of the emails that are projected to the company as coming
from the COO directly.
This stands in stark contrast to another chief executive o￿cer (CEO) I interviewed
who told me that she never did any email when she was at the workplace because
she valued face-to-face engagements as a much more important indicator of what
was really happening at the company. In explaining her position, she told me that:
I can’t be sitting behind the computer getting every email returned im-
mediately so I’m always trying to ￿gure that [laughter] out but I spent
all weekend this morning—all weekend—because I have probably three
weeks of emails that I glance at them, I look at ‘em, I takemy iPhone™ out,
is this urgent, you know? I mean I try triage the emails but I mean in
terms of processing all of them, that doesn’t really happen very much at
the o￿ce. It happens on planes. It happens from home. It happens early
in the morning, late at night so it still becomes a big part of how I do
anything and all the reporting that I get so I would say I’m very involved
in technology however it comes to me through other people, through
how they do their work, you know, probably more so than just me as one
individual (Interview 1005 26 March 2012).
For this CEO, a three-week backlog is her expected email queue and something that,
despite the fact that her EA has access to her email, is something she thinks about in
terms of personally giving her attention to. It is a solitary task, one that is practised
in what I would call ‘in-between’ hours, such as weekends, mornings before work,
on airplanes, and at home.
What is stark in this contrast are the choices and the underlying assumptions each
executive has made about their email and the impact these choices have, not only
on the individual, but on a range of agents and outcomes within the organisation.
4. (Unconscious) Distancing in Remote Interviews: I observed two pair programming
interviews conducted by a formal leader for prospective employees. All of these
were conducted by Skype™, which, in itself, is an interesting data point. Each in-
terview had a similar ￿ow with the following stages: 1) greeting and introduction
2) programming interview 3) discussion. What was interesting about these inter-
views is the way in which the interviewer employed various aspects of the audio,
screen sharing, and video capabilities of Skype™ throughout the interview. Spe-
ci￿cally, in stage one, the interviewer employed only audio, such that the interview
was essentially equivalent to a phone call. During this stage, the interviewer would
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introduce himself and then introduce what would be happening during the inter-
view. In stage two, the interviewer shared his screen with the interviewee, so that in
addition to the audio, the interviewee now saw the interviewer’s screen, on which
a development environment was displayed and which the interviewer typed but the
interviewee was expected to engage in a pair programming conversation such that
the interviewer would type for the pair. In stage 3, after the test, the interviewer
stopped the screen sharing and shared his video, revealing his visual likeness for
the ￿rst time. This was recapitulated by the interviewee.
I had presumed that the choices about what to reveal and when to reveal were delib-
erate on the part of the leader as a mechanism to create distance (Bligh and Riggio
2012a; Nardi and Whittaker 2002; Weisband 2008), however, on speaking with him
further, he told me that he had not even thought about it. Moreover, on further
questioning, this leader professed to know nothing about what has been uncovered
in academic research regarding media richness theory and communication studies
(Huang, Kahai et al. 2010; Kirkman et al. 2013; Stephens et al. 2008). These elisions
suggest that such information may be something that is missing from contemporary
leadership curriculum.
5. Engaging Simultaneously in Multiple Communication Channels: At all of my obser-
vations, formal leaders, informal leaders, and followers all exhibited a high level
of engagement with a variety of communication channels. One of my informants,
during shadowing tells me:
I use a lot of Yahoo™ Instant Messaging (YIM), email , Mercury [a pro-
prietary social networking platform], face-to-face, and phone. Our team
also implemented our own chat environment, Iris [a commercial social
networking product], that they seem to like a lot (items in italics an-
onymised, Interview 1033 30 May 2013).
This range of communication channels is something each individual has to then
monitor in terms of incoming messages, as well as making decisions about in terms
of deciding which channel is appropriate for particular kinds of communication.
This includes a number of nuanced uses of chat, email, document, and calendaring
applications, often simultaneously as part of various kinds of conversations. A short
extract from my ￿eld diary whilst shadowing a team leader who was commenting
on a subordinate’s code that was enacted through a computational system for code
reviews, demonstrates the degree to which some of these communications are ￿nely
tuned:
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Ellen appears to struggle to some degree with how to word her com-
ment. ‘Don’t,’ she begins, and then erases that. Starting again, she writes
‘Shouldn’t, and then erases that too. On the third attempt, she writes
‘Wasn’t this doing the right thing initially?’ And then, having articu-
lated her concern, she also adds a comment to the line above: ‘Maybe
check the length too (not only a null check)’ (￿eld diary 20 May 2013).
Examples like these show how Ellen goes to signi￿cant lengths to communicate her
comments in a way that will be perceived as helpful by the recipient and not simply
a criticism. She consistently makes suggestions to the author about what they might
try, often including missing code or o￿ering speci￿c ideas.
I also foundwith a number of the formal leaders, whom I shadowed at amanagement
level across a number of technology companies, that the practice of using index
cards to track personal calendar or to-do items was very common, as evidenced in
this ￿eld diary extract:
‘There is something about writing something down’, he says, that makes
it perceptually faster and easier in many contexts than using a compu-
tational device to log and manage the list. He tells me he also makes an
index card with the schedule for the day and that the practice of writing
this down and carrying the card has helped him remember important
meetings (￿eld diary 30 May 2013).
But the use of the index card does not stop here. It is also used as a rhetorical device
in meetings, as evidenced in this ￿eld diary extract:
Tom [a subordinate] points out that ‘We do have an issue with the ex-
isting consulting sta￿. We also have an opportunity for messaging with
new sta￿.’ What Tom is pointing to here is the distinction between exist-
ing sta￿who have already been given onemessage versus an opportunity
to improve the messaging for future sta￿.
Connor [the leader] says something about dealing with this to avoid the
phenomena of it ‘drop[ping] like a bomb at a standup.’ Here, he writes a
note on one of his index cards (￿eld diary 29 May 2015).
In this extract, the act of writing is a publicly visible event, one that rhetorically
communicates to the participant that the leader has heard them and plans to take
action in some way.
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After assessing the analytical requirements of these themes, and also consider-
ing the maximum length for this dissertation as dictated by the University, I came to the
conclusion that by selecting three of the ￿ve themes, I would be presenting an adequate
coverage of the dynamics represented in each of the themes from a range of perspectives
(Eisenhardt 1989, p. 538). Speci￿cally, all of the themes located leadership within human
and computational practices; however, some found it where there was no formal leader,
some in traditional role relations, and others in the relation between a non-working com-
putational object and a formal leader. The decision was then taken to present at least one
case for each of these three distinctive perspectives for a total of three, and this is how the
subject matter for the three empirical chapters 4, 5, and 6 were selected for inclusion in
this study. The remaining themes will be developed in future work.
Subsequent analysis of these selected themes then proceeded informed byAlvesson
and Kärreman’s writings on creative theory development where they argue such an ap-
proach establishes a platform from which to o￿er solutions that go beyond critical ques-
tioning, providing a basis for the contribution of knowledge (2011). In keeping with the
critical case study approach (Flyvbjerg 2011, p. 307), data were selected for each empirical
chapter based on their interpretation as an outlier or novel practice in comparison to other
data collected in the study. As regards the role of the data itself, they posit that ‘empir-
ical material may be mobilized as a critical dialogue partner—not a judge or a mirror—that
problematizes a signi￿cant form of understanding, thus encouraging problematization and
theoretical insights’ (2011, p. 1266). For Alvesson and Kärreman, the development of the-
ory is thus a highly disciplined, yet creative, process.




[E]thicality is part of the fabric of the world; the call to respond and be re-
sponsible is part of what is. Questions of responsibility and accountability
present themselves with every possibility; each moment is alive with di￿er-
ent possibilities for the world’s becoming and di￿erent recon￿gurings of what
may yet be possible. (2007, p. 182)
Framed in this fashion and echoing Adorno’s epithet ‘intelligence is a moral cater-
gory’ (1974 / 2005, p. 197), ethics cannot be decoupled from any enactment. According to
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Barad, ethics permeates all aspects of the world, including the present research.7 Accord-
ingly, within this research, ethics is not an afterthought but rather a primary methodolo-
gical consideration that calls for accountability of my own views and for what the world
might become through my actions. This consideration is perhaps foremost in my mind
as I enact method through the ‘doing’ of research. Following Alvesson, I have therefore
attempted to be attentive that:
[I]n practice there may always be complications and dilemmas and life, in-
cluding research life, is full of ethical compromise. (2011a, p. 147)
The awareness that there is no perfect or absolutely correct way of enacting ethics
in no way reduces my responsibility towards its consideration.
3.2.1 Anonymity and Trust
The data policy (see appendix F) for this project is based on the promise of anonymity
to the individuals and companies participating in it. To this end, I briefed all potential
informants about the research, its purpose, and how the data was to be used. In all cases,
I verbally reviewed an informed consent form with them before asking if they had any
questions or misgivings. If they did not, and indicated they still wished to proceed, I asked
them to sign the informed consent before including them in the study.
All data was anonymised in terms of names, context, location, and, where appro-
priate, images, based on the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) guidelines
(Clark 2006). Speci￿cally, all organisations were given pseudonyms (from the Greek alpha-
bet) and each informant was assigned a numeric four-digit code as a means of identifying
them in either ￿eld notes or interviews. When writing ￿eld notes, real names were not
used. A pseudonym name table was established for each organisation whereby each code
was assigned a human-readable name that was not their own.
Additional steps have been taken to ensure that the promise of anonymity is hon-
oured. These include redaction of company documents and the storage of all data on en-
crypted drives employing a multi-staged/multi-location backup system (also employing
encrypted drives), to further secure the data (Sanjek 1990, p. 38).
As the nature of this study involves gaining and maintaining the trust of others
(Feldman et al. 2004, pp. 35-36) to gain access to sensitive organisational data, I took this
trust very seriously. The research led me into situations where I was granted access to
informants’ private lives in some fashion that had no bearing whatsoever on the research.
I therefore had to undergo some degree of discomfort when, in some situations, what I was
7A related point is made by Dourish regarding the implicit philosophy of computer science. 2001, p. vii–
viii. While not foregrounded, it is there nonetheless.
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there to see was their work practice but what I ended up seeing was, in my view, not meant
for me or this research. I therefore took to the practice of not recording such observations
in my ￿eld notes and when I felt it was important to do so, I would also tell my informant
about such a decision. My experience is that such activities further engendered trust and
generally positive relationships.
3.3 About the Sites
In this section, I o￿er the reader additional details on the sites pro￿ledwithin this study and
some additional information regarding the choices that were made to focus on particular
kinds of organisations for study.
3.3.1 About Eta
Eta is the pseudonym for a global provider of agile software development and tools. The
company maintains o￿ces in the US and Europe. They hold an esteemed position based
on a number of successful engagements with high-pro￿le technology companies. All of
these feature as a central practice, pair programming, said to result in rapid, high-quality,
sustainable, iterative development capabilities.
My contact with Eta commenced inMay 2012 and, among other locations,8 I began
observations at its HQ o￿ce in the US fromMarch–June 2013. A second round of observa-
tion was conducted at this o￿ce from October–December 2013. Thus, the total duration
for study with this site extended over a 18-month year period.
3.3.1.1 About ‘Sebastian’ (Informant 1019)
Sebastian, a pseudonym for informant 1019, is the COO of Eta. He is calm, articulate,
and inventive. Promoted from within over a sustained period, and therefore an embodi-
ment of the Eta culture (Kunda 2006, p. 232), Sebastian worked at Eta ￿rst as a software
developer and later as a Principal with responsibility for leading client engagements. In
2008, he was promoted to vice-president and oversaw the company’s expansion through
several new o￿ces. This was the role Sebastian held when I ￿rst met him. He was sub-
sequently promoted to COO in September 2012. He became involved with Eta in 2000 as
a software developer and practitioner of its evolving methods, which, as described above,
centre around the core practice of pair programming. Professionally evolving from the
position of consumer of such methods to producer, he is now seen to have had a found-
ational role in de￿ning the company’s development process and methodologies. With an
8Observations were carried out at three di￿erent physical locations within Eta; two in the US and one in
Europe.
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educational background in mathematics, he began programming as a pragmatic step to
earn a living. In describing this transition, he told me that ‘I think I just showed such an
interest and ability that I was just in, in terms of being an actual engineer’ (Interview 1019,
25 Jun 2012). He met the founder of Eta, Alex in 2000 when he was working at another
company whom Eta was consulting to, describing what he calls a ‘seminal’ moment:
I wasworking under Alex from 2000 on, because he had free rein to implement
his practices at this company, and that company actually was a bit of a seminal
moment. It was just after Kent Beck’s ￿rst Extreme Programming book (2000)
came out—literally a few months later, I believe, and Kent Beck was actually
on the project team, and Alex and his kind of band of comrades was [sic] there,
all very familiar with this style, and he managed to get, or someone managed
to get the CEO to buy in to try out what was then this ‘extreme programming’,
with really no reason other than it sounded good and there was a book.
That, I would say, was my—-I had only been coding professionally for a year
and a half, but we were doing it with such discipline that I was just forced to
try it, and I had the usual reactions, which were: “Pair programming, crazy;
test-driven, crazy: emergent design, crazy; engineers not making up require-
ments, crazy”—all the usual reactions. But because we were just simply forced
to do it, and I was, obviously, junior, we just did it, and that’s how I still preach
is the best way to try it, where you just really suspend disbelief, or get forced
to do it (Interview 1019, 25 Jun 2012).
Sebastian’s technical expertise is well-regarded in the ￿rm as are the results he has
achieved, both of which, according to Grint, give rise to the moniker of leadership (2005a,
p. 18). This, and the formal appointment of the titular position of COO (ibid.), mutually
support the claim that Sebastian wields leadership within Eta.
3.3.1.2 About ‘Ruby’ (Informant 1036)
Ruby, a pseudonym of informant 1036, is the executive assistant (EA) to Sebastian. She is
centred, soft-spoken, yet ￿rm. She assumed this role in September 2012 when Sebastian
was made COO.
Prior to this, she was an EA to a CEO at another company. She explained to me
that in that role, her previous CEO would call her up on the weekend saying he wants
to go to Tokyo—“make it happen”. In her view, the previous company grew too fast to
sustain itself and, in the process, did not add administrative sta￿ as they grew. Only the
programmers were valued. In contrast, she viewed Sebastian as thoughtful and said that
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shewas treatedwithmuchmore respect at Eta. She found the job through a friendwhowas
a programmer at Eta. Later, Sebastian said something to the programmer about wanting
to look for someone and her friend recommended her (￿eld diary 01 May 2013). Ruby,
like some of the other EA’s I followed, had a background in a customer-facing role in the
hospitality industry, suggesting synergies between these kinds of roles.
While not a formal leader, there are aspects of Ruby’s work practice that lay claim
to leadership. In keeping with Palen and Grudin’s research, the COO’s electronic calendar
is used as a communication tool (2003, p. 163), there is an open acknowledgement by
Sebastian that Ruby controls his calendar. For instance, when asked by a report if he has
time available to meet in the future, Sebastian responded, gesturing to Ruby, ‘You’ll have
to ask my boss.’ (￿eld diary 25 Nov 2013). While perhaps joking, Sebastian is nonetheless
reinforcing through humour (Meyer 1997, p. 202) what I had previously observed; that
Ruby is responsible for—and therefore in charge of—Sebastian’s calendar. Put another
way, she is the leader of Sebastian’s calendar and, in this exchange, Sebastian makes clear
he knows this.
In assessing Ruby, Sebastian mentioned to me that she ‘could be doing much more
than being an assistant, but she does not want the responsibility’ (￿eld diary 03 May 2013),
suggesting that he sees her as a highly capable person who could easily have an executive
role if that was her desire. In my observations, Sebastian treated Ruby as a peer rather
than a subordinate to whom one issues directives.
3.3.1.3 About Walt (Informant 1030)
Walt, a pseudonym for informant 1030, is a senior programmer for Eta. He works in a
city where Eta have no formal o￿ces and he works from home, which is where I observed
him in May 2012. While not a formal leader, there are aspects of Walt’s character, as
it is perceived by the company and the role he plays with respect to managing client
relationships, that suggest implicit leadership practices are involved with his work. This
is exempli￿ed, for example, by the fact that he is one of Eta’s only employees who does
not regularly work in an Eta o￿ce but instead does all of his pair programming remotely
through an array of computational objects.
Walt’s technical expertise is highly respected in the ￿rm as are the results he has
achieved, both of which, are aspects of the ￿vefold typology presented in ￿gure 2.4 on
page 32. Indeed, Walt and others at Eta explained to me that these qualities are the basis
on which he is granted the autonomy to operate his own virtual o￿ce. As a result of Eta’s
emphasis on pair programming, Walt has developed a number of novel practices around
remote pair programming.
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3.3.1.4 About Ari (Informant 1018)
Ari, a pseudonym for informant 1018, is the director of the European o￿ce for Eta. I began
interviews with Eta before the European o￿ce was opened, and thus, had the opportunity
to speak with Ari a number of times before he relocated to Europe to open the o￿ce in the
autumn of 2012. My observations with Ari span from September 2012 through February
2014.
One of the fascinating aspects of shadowing Ari over this period is that I was able
to observe how a seasoned member of the leadership team goes about establishing a new
o￿ce in a new location. Part of what I observed therefore includes a process whereby an
intangible idea (a European o￿ce) is brought into existence through a process whereby
a set of practices are established such as regular weekly meetings, the development of
relationships, relocation of current sta￿, hiring of new sta￿, and solicitation of potential
clients, resulting in client contracts, tangible projects, and a physical o￿ce.
3.3.2 About Epsilon
Epsilon is the pseudonym for a privately held clothing manufacturing company. Its reven-
ues are said to be in the $250 million per annum range. The company has one headquarters
based in the US. No shadowing was conducted at Epsilon; data collected at this site was
limited to documentary evidence and interviews of its CEO and top management sta￿ that
included its chief ￿nancial o￿cer (CFO) aswell as vice-presidents of sales, operations, mar-
keting, and product development, carried out betweenMarch 2010-2012. These interviews
are enumerated as part of appendix E. I also had an opportunity to conduct a number of
site visits at Epsilon as part of an earlier consulting project that completed approximately
nine months before the commencement of this research. These visits allowed for on-site
observation and engagements with senior executives of the company, including the CEO,
that further inform the data set. Under the separate terms of the agreement executed
for that body of work, these data can be used within this study as long as anonymity is
protected.
3.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I have presented the methodology deployed to conduct this study. I have
explained the research approach and limitations, the inclusion of re￿exivity and di￿raction
as constant companions inmy research, data collection, analysis, and interpretation. I have
also presented the ethical considerations at play in this study and information about the
sites and key informants included in this study.
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The next chapter commences the empirical presentation of data by exploring lead-




Infrastructure is both relational and ecological—it means di￿erent things to dif-
ferent groups and it is part of the balance of action, tools, and the built environ-
ment, inseparable from them (Star 1999, p. 377).
4.1 Introduction
A￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿, focusing on a material-discursive practice called pair program-ming (Beck 1999; Williams 2001; Williams and Kessler 2003) might seem arather odd perspective from which to explore leadership, as within this human
dyad of the ‘pair’ there are no formal leaders. Yet, it provides an ideal location to interrog-
ate the construct ‘leadership’, for as I will demonstrate, it provides a compelling account of
how leadership is enacted through material-discursive practice even in cases where there
is no o￿cial ‘leader’, a position to which little attention has been given; one that harkens
back to Bion (1946) and the more recent emergence of the Tavistock school (Mumford
2003). The data for this case was selected based on Flyvberg’s critical case approach (2011,
p. 307), as described in greater depth in section 3.1.3.4 on page 96.
This empirical focus provides a rather illuminating perspective on leadership—
leadership in a human dyad enacted through computational objects. While this may not
be a traditional ‘place’ to locate leadership, it nonetheless builds the foundation for one
of the principal arguments I wish to put forward in this work: leadership shows up in the
smallest possible groups and within the most mundane human engagements and, further-
more, is increasingly enacted through computational objects. In this fashion, the empir-
ical case serves to support the claim that once leadership is viewed through its relation
to computational objects, what ‘leadership’ is changes dramatically. Indeed, as I will ad-
duce, sometimes these pairs of humans who program together are not even physically in
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the same location, further reinforcing the role of the computational object in constituting
their practice.
Moreover, many of the senior executives at the pseudonymous Eta, the site where
these observations were recorded, asserted their views that pair programming is a central
and crucial leadership practice within the organisation. This framing supports yet an-
other strand of my argument: leadership acts as a symbolic resource (Ailon-Souday and
Kunda 2003) or repository for values. That is, it points to an underlying process of human
categorisation (Bowker and Star 1999) of value and worth (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006;
Mailhot et al. 2014).
For example, the COO of Eta explains that programmers who ‘pair’ together:
[A]re actually doing a leadership practice because they’re having discussion
[and making decisions] about what lines of code to allocate as resources (In-
terview 1013, May 10, 2013).
Here, the COO evokes Useem’s argument that one location of leadership is found
in decision-making regarding a ‘discrete, tangible, and realistic opportunity to commit
enterprise resources to one course or another on behalf of the ￿rm’s objectives’ (2010a,
p. 510).
From Useem’s perspective then, two programmers working together as a pair
through one or more computational objects, making decisions about each line of code
that gets committed as an asset to a larger enterprise system, quali￿es as an enactment of
leadership.
In sum, I argue that the practice of pair programming is a central feature of Eta’s
ideology (Kunda 1986, p. 54), is highly valued within the organisation, and through these
various mechanisms, is cited as ‘leadership’.
4.2 What is Pair Programming?
In 1996, Kent Beck developed a revolutionary approach to software development known
as extreme programming (XP) (2000) in response to the complex problems involved with
a large-scale software project to redesign DaimlerChrysler’s payroll system (Beck 1999;
Garzaniti et al. 1997). The approach emphasises ‘sustainable developer oriented practices’
(Larman and Basili 2003, p. 54), and was the ￿rst to formalise the practice of pair pro-
gramming. In his 1999 paper, Beck sets out 13 practices as part of XP and describes pair
programming simply as a process whereby ‘all production code is written by two people at
one screen/keyboard/mouse’ (1999, p. 71). Beck’s credibility in proposing his novel prac-
tices was based on the results (as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32) achieved whilst at
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DaimlerChrysler and this is perhaps one of the main reasons his paper was so in￿uential.
It can thus be interpreted as a form of leadership.
In the above-quoted paper, Beck explains that one of the rationales behind pair
programming is to enable programmers to better test their code as they write it (1999,
p. 74), testing being a process that was previously temporally separated. Indeed, within XP,
testing is ‘at the heart’ (ibid., p. 73) of the approach. Through XP, another novel practice
was introduced whereby code was tested as it was written. That is, rather than being
an instrument applied to code after it has been written, what XP proposed is that tests
themselves be mobilised as a development/writing tool in the programming process. Beck
explains that in XP:
Programmerswrite their own tests and theywrite these tests before they code.
If programming is about learning, and learning is about getting lots of feed-
back as quickly as possible, then you can learn much from tests written by
someone else days or weeks after the code. XP primarily addresses the accep-
ted wisdom that programmers can’t possibly test their own code by having
you write code in pairs (ibid.).
In this fashion, pair programming is o￿ered as a means to enable test-driven de-
velopment (George and Williams 2003). There is an explicit focus on learning through an
increase in feedback enabled by bringing the test temporally closer to the writing of the
code. In this fashion, the test becomes a critical lens through which the programmer can
interrogate their own code as it is written.
Beck also makes clear that within pair programming, there are explicit roles to be
played. He tells us that:
There are two roles in each pair. One partner, the one with the keyboard and
the mouse, is thinking about the best way to implement this method right
here. The other partner is thinking more strategically:
• Is this whole approach going to work?
• What are some other test cases that might not work yet?
• Is there some way to simplify the whole system so the current problem
just disappears?
Pairing is dynamic. If two people pair in the morning, in the afternoon they
might easily be paired with other folks. If you have responsibility for a task in
an area that is unfamiliar to you, you might ask someone with recent exper-
ience to pair with you. More often, anyone on the team will do as a partner
(1999, p. 58).
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In this establishment of a speci￿c ‘strategic’ role or position (as depicted in ￿g-
ure 2.4 on page 32), this role can also be understood as a form of leadership whereby the
‘strategic’ role provides strategic leadership (Hernandez et al. 2011, p. 1179) in addressing
the questions Beck raises. Moreover, the latter portion of the quoted paragraph provides
the basis for an approach that can be understood as a distributed form of leadership, where
the process (as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32) of knowledge sharing is present (Bolden
2011, p. 258).
This short description provides the reader with a basic understanding of pair pro-
gramming, including some details on its emergence as a practice, and some of its distinct-
ive qualities. In particular, the aspect of there being no formal leader in the human dyad,
but instead a dynamic shifting of roles suggested that this practice would be an interesting
place to explore leadership practices and their relationship to computational objects. In
the next section, I discuss the ￿ndings of this particular investigation.
4.3 Findings: Pair Programming at Eta
At Eta, I observed pair programming at three locations within their organisation. While
there were certain similarities in structure at each location around how pair programming
was constituted, a key distinction was that in some cases the pairs were physically prox-
imal, while in others they were remote. In the cases I observed, the latter remote pairing
also involved additional computational objects.
I present below two episodes that explicate how various aspects of leadership are
enacted within the pair programming dyad. The ￿rst concerns the ways in which various
aspects of leadership are materialised in the material-discursive practice of the remote pair
and the computational objects through which they interact. The second depicts a more
radical case where leadership practice is initiated by a computational object, which serves
to support my claim that computational objects are both integral to modern-day leader-
ship practice but, in a literal and material sense, often constitutive of it. For convenience,
the ￿ndings presented herein are summarised in table 4.1 in terms of observed material-
discursive practices and the dimensions of leadership (as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32)
they have been analytically associated with.
4.3.1 Episode One: ‘Driving’ and Other Forms of Leadership
I begin with an (approximate) 45-minute time slice of the remote pair Walt and Robert:
At 10:28 a.m., Robert asks ‘Where did we leave it yesterday? There was stu￿
in the user interface (UI) we wanted to clean up.’ Walt is looking at code and
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Episode(s) Observed material-discursive practice Associated leadership dimension(s)
I Overcoming ‘resistance to closure’ through ‘persuasion’
(Larsson and Lundholm 2010, p. 1102) or ‘empowering
leadership’, ‘creative process engagement’, and increased




I, II ‘Driving’ and the negotiation of (keyboard) control or





I, II The ‘driver’ talking out loud; the ‘observer’ o￿ering
direction (Van Velsor and O’Connor 2007, p. 32; Uhl-Bien,
Riggio et al. 2014, p. 90); strategic leadership (Hernandez
et al. 2011, p. 1179)
process•
result•
II Computational object as source for guidance, knowledge,




II IM as a medium for decision-making (Useem 2010a, p. 510) position•
process•
II Build break alert: computational object as the source of






Table 4.1: Analytical Summary of Material-Discursive Practices observed in Pair Program-
ming and Their Association with Dimensions of Leadership, Grouped by Episode
suggests they start breaking down, or refactoring,1 the existing code.
Robert [the remote pair] is just watching the screen in front of him and not
looking at the camera at all, not saying a word. He is especially quiet and
withheld compared to the way I saw him yesterday. Meanwhile, Walt is talk-
ing about the code and what he thinks. This goes on for some time and ￿nally
Walt asks Robert what he thinks. Robert responds, but it’s almost inaudible
and sounds like mumbling.
The practice of thinking/talking out loud is common in the coding pairs I have
observed and this is precisely what Walt is doing. In principle, thinking out
loud enables the listener to question the speaker’s thoughts, and to establish
a bond in the pair that can lead to a way of working that might be described
as ‘thinking together’ (Scharmer 2009, p. 296). 2
Walt now realises he is not sharing his screen, an omission that, surprisingly,
Robert has said nothing about. Walt asks for a short break and goes to get
1Refactoring is a software engineering practice to satisfy the dual constraints required by production
software to satisfy increasing requirements concurrent with the need for reusability (Gamma et al. 1995,
p. 391). These constraints provoke a tension that can result in code that is di￿cult to read or poorly organised,
sometimes called ‘spaghetti code’ (Boehm 2006, p. 13). Refactoring is thus a means whereby the goals that
each of these constraints impose are achieved by restructuring the code so that it is considered more readable
whilst simultaneously maintaining its behaviour (Opdyke 1992, p. iii).
2A more vivid way of describing this is to draw on Hutchins’s notion of ‘an ecology of thinking in which
human cognition interacts with an environment rich in organizing resources’ (1995a, p. xiv).
114
some co￿ee and Robert goes to get water while the build/test tool kicks o￿
a local build and test of the code base. The build/test tool passes 15 tests,
resulting in zero failures.
Walt looks at the di￿erence between the previous block of code that was com-
mitted to the source control system and the current working copy. Robert is
cradling his chin in his palm, looking intently at the screen in front of him.
Walt says he wants to commit the code to the source control system. Robert is
visibly unresponsive. Walt types in a comment for the pending check-in and
checks the code in.
They move on to the next task and Walt o￿ers Robert control. Robert accepts
this silently. As Robert types, Walt o￿ers commentary about limitations of
the approach Robert is taking, but suggests that they continue and see if it
‘feels right’.
Robert runs the build/test tool and a number of errors show up. There are
a total of 17 tests and seven test failures. Walt suggests a logical modi￿ca-
tion; Robert says ‘yeah, that would be good’. Walt suggests an expression can
be condensed from several lines into one line. Here, Walt o￿ers guidance to
Robert.
At 10:50 a.m., Walt corrects a type declaration3 on the scope variable. 4
At 10:51 a.m., the build/test tool reports 18 tests run and eight failures. Robert
is writing a class5 and then proceeds to write a constructor6 for that class. At
10:53 a.m., the build/test tool reports 18 tests and seven failures.
Walt moves in to correct. He suggests to Robert that he adds stubs, or boiler-
plate code, to implement a particular class so that the tests will pass. Robert
seems a little more interested now.
At 10:58 a.m., Walt is driving again. The implemented class is now in place.
3In modern programming languages, variables are often preceded by ‘type declarations’ such as INT for
integers or STRING for textual data. This is a hint to the compiler (as well as a form of documentation to
the reader of the code) so that when the code is compiled into machine/byte code, the appropriate storage is
allocated by the operating system to the variable. (Backus et al. 1963, p. 13).
4A variable is considered in ‘scope’ when it is used only at a particular point in the control ￿ow of the code,
after which it is discarded or forgotten. This is in contrast to a ‘global’ variable that is available throughout
the control ￿ow of the code. Such distinctions have signi￿cant consequences for the management of compu-
tational memory, among other things. See Wulf and Shaw 1973 and George and Sager 1973 for a discussion
and debate on the topic.
5Within object-oriented languages, classes are the templates/recipes for ‘objects’ that will be instantiated
into memory when the code is executed. See Goldberg and Robson 1983, p. 40 for further discussion.
6A constructor is code used to create a software ‘object’ for a particular class within the computer’s
memory. Each ‘object’ created by such a constructor is an object instance. (ibid.).
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Walt suggests lazy initialisation7 and asks if the items in the NameOfClass
should also be scoped. Walt also suggests that it might be best to keep that
context for now. Walt continues, saying that he wants to get line 13 and 18 of
the ￿le to work.
At 11:07 a.m., they are writing the unit tests ￿rst and watching them fail, and
then Robert is writing the code to enable these to pass.
At 11:15 a.m., Walt is driving now and, with the modi￿cations he makes to
the code, the errors increase from three to ￿ve.
At 11:17 a.m., an issue referring to the wrong object type is ￿xed. We are now
back to two errors (￿eld diary 1030 26 March 2013).
4.3.2 Analysis: Episode One
Before proceeding with an analysis of this episode, I would like to ￿rst call the reader’s
attention to the materiality of Walt’s impressive arrangement of computational objects
that both enabled and constituted remote pair programming, where a number of important
features are discernible. These are rendered in ￿gure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Anonymised Image of Walt’s Remote Pair Programming Setup
7Lazy intitalisation or lazy loading, is a design patternwhereby data, perhaps being loaded from a database,
is not all loaded at once. Instead, ‘a marker in the object structure [is created] so that if the data is needed it
can be loaded only when it is used. As many people know, if you’re lazy about doing things you’ll win when
it turns out you don’t need to do them at all’ (Fowler 2012, p. 200).
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Computational Object Description
Desktop computer The desktop computer is centrally positioned and acts as the primary locus
of human a￿ention (Guimbretière 2002, pp. 15-19, 2003, p. 53). It is where
programming activities are projected and, in general, it is the rendering of
this screen that is shared/mirrored with the remote party in the other
location, fundamentally constituting pair programming.
iPad™ The iPad™ is used primarily for FaceTime™ and Google Hangouts™ to
virtually connect the remote pair. It is positioned to the le￿ at about 11:00
and at eye level to facilitate ergonomic viewing. It is also mounted on an
articulating arm so that it can be easily adjusted in situ.
Speakers Centrally positioned speakers are plugged into the iPad™ and therefore
place the audio of the remote pair spatially inline with the desktop
computer.
Unidirectional microphone A tripod-based unidirectional microphone is placed to the right of the
speakers and is plugged into the iPad™ so that Walt can move freely within
the workspace and be heard by the remote party in the other location.
Laptop computer A laptop computer is positioned to the right of the desktop computer. This
computational object is generally not shared with the remote pair and
provides Walt with a ‘private’ computational space.
iPhone™ While not rendered in figure 4.1, another substantive part of Walt’s array of
computational objects is an iPhone™ which he used to send and receive
various kinds of messages while involved in the pair programming activity.
For example, these can be signals to the other party either before or a￿er a
pairing session to coordinate specific details, such as communication
channel.
Table 4.2: Array of Computational Objects Employed by Walt for Remote Pair Programming
Figure 4.1 depicts a plethora of computational objects that have been assembled
by Walt to facilitate remote pair programming. These are enumerated in table 4.2 and
document the extent of thought and e￿ort given on the part of Walt to construct an envir-
onment where remote pair programming functions as seamlessly as possible.8 Based on
his statements to me and various blog posts he authored on the topic, Walt seemed to take
great pride in his work on the development of this sociotechnical frontier. It is through
this arrangement of what Latour refers to as the ‘assemblage of human and non-human
elements’ (1999, p. 159) or what Barad calls ‘material-discursive practice’ (2007, p. 178) that
the phenomenon of remote pair programming—and any attendant leadership that might be
observable in it—is actually produced.
Within the episode, evidence of leadership practice is present in a variety of forms
throughout this engagement betweenWalt and Robert. It begins with Walt o￿ering direc-
tion (Van Velsor and O’Connor 2007, p. 32; Uhl-Bien, Riggio et al. 2014, p. 90), suggesting
to Robert that they take the approach of refactoring and Robert’s tacit acceptance of this
suggestion, aligning with the leadership dimension of process as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on
8This is not to mitigate the role of the endless legion of human and non-human actants who participated
in the design, production, and distribution of these computational objects (Latour 2010a, pp. 2-3); however,
this legion is not the focus of the present study.
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page 32.
There is also an interesting dynamic that unfolds between Walt and Robert where
Robert is withdrawn and uncommunicative, as evidenced by Robert not looking at the
camera, his mumbling when asked what he thinks, and his failure to mention that the
screen is not being shared between them. It is not until Walt realises he has not shared his
screen that this fact materialises. Consequently, until that point, Robert has not been able
to see what Walt has been doing and instead was only able to hear it by virtue of Walt’s
talking. It is Walt, not Robert, who picks up on this detail of the state of the material-
discursive practice.
To borrow Larsson and Lundholm’s terminology, Robert is exhibiting a ‘resistance
to closure’ (2010, p. 1102), however, in my use of their term, I extend it to include engage-
ments that go beyond talk. Speci￿cally, I also include actions relating to computational
objects, such as initiating builds, and the dyadic typing, mousing, and watching of com-
putational object screens that occurs as part of pair programming. I argue, therefore, that
Robert resists this closure in the material-discursive practice of pair programming through
his various forms of nonverbal communication and/or inactivity that include not looking
at the camera, not responding in full sentences, and not telling Walt that the screen was
not being shared.
To be clear, I am not asserting beyond the shadow of any doubt that leadership lies
within these practices; rather, I am pointing out that if one looks at the literature, there
are numerous precedents to suggest that these practices can be interpreted as leadership.
And, as I will argue, it is the material-discursive practice of citing leadership that brings
leadership into existence within a member’s experience, just as my citing it within this
dissertation brings it into yours. In this sense, talking of ‘leadership’ is always performat-
ive and any ‘leadership’ that exists can only do so because some person or entity evokes
it in a way that is convincing or acceptable to the participant in that material-discursive
practice. I elaborate further on this point in section 4.4.
For the present moment, the point I want to make, according to Larsson and Lund-
holm’s, one of the functions (and therefore ‘markers’ of) leadership is the overcoming of
such resistance (2013, p. 1022). The preceding episode shows the dynamic of resistance
going on for some time until just before 10:50 a.m. when Walt o￿ers Robert control of the
keyboard. Such negotiation of control is enmeshed within extant meanings of leadership
(Alvesson and Spicer 2012; Barker 1993; Collinson 2005; Hales 1986).
Moreover, within the human pair programming dyad there are particular con-
straints that derive from a practiced relationship with the computational objects, one of
which is that only one person can type code at a time. In practice, this generally means
one person holds the keyboard and ‘drives’, as it is commonly called by the practitioners I
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observed. In this sense, it bears a close resemblance to conversational turn-taking (Sacks
et al. 1978). The person ‘driving’ is the person actively writing the code. In this and other
instances of practice I observed, this took the form of the ‘driver’ talking out loud about
what they were typing as they typed it.
Based on these various precedents, to say that these are leadership practices is
within the realm of possibility by means of the articulation of what the driver’s think-
ing or rationale is regarding what they were typing. In other words, by simply think-
ing/talking out loud about how they planned to solve a particular software engineering
problem, they were also engaging in the articulation of a vision or strategy towards some
speci￿c business goal (Guastello 2007; Montgomery 2012; O’Reilly et al. 2010). This per-
spective corresponds to the leadership dimensions of position and process as depicted in
￿gure 2.4 on page 32.
Thus, when Walt o￿ers the keyboard control to Robert, this appears to engage
Robert at a higher level in that he demonstrates the active typing of code, the initiation
of builds, and the utterance of fully articulated words. As with Larsson and Lundholm’s
study, through ‘repeated a￿rmative responses [. . . ] agreement is gradually developed and
the persuasion thus accomplished’ (2013, p. 1022).
The ‘persuasion’ here is to convince Robert to participatemore fully in thematerial-
discursive practice of pair programming. This is evident in Walt’s various o￿ers and sup-
port to Robert. Accordingly, I characterise the approach that Walt took here as ‘empower-
ing leadership’, ‘creative process engagement’, resulting in an increased ‘employee cre-
ativity’ (Zhang and Bartol 2010, p. 117). This is a mode of leadership that aligns with
the dimensions of purpose and person as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32. My claim is
that it was evidently Walt’s aim to engage Robert in pair programming and the means
by which he did so were through the capabilities of his personality—as enacted through
computational objects.
Then, at 10:50 a.m., Walt takes over ‘driving’ without any discussion—Walt simply
starts typing in what might be thought of as an ‘open space’ where Robert was not typing,
analogous to jumping in at a conversational turn (Sacks et al. 1978). This is a phenomenon
I observed quite often between many pairs. This phenomenon has also been closely ob-
served in terms of the negotiation of authority in Linde’s research on helicopter ￿ight
crews (1988), however, I extend her argument here to make the claim that such negoti-
ation can also constitute acts of leadership along the dimension of position as depicted in
￿gure 2.4 on page 32.
I make this claim because within this passing back and forth, the role each mem-
ber plays also changes. According to Beck (1999, p. 58), the ‘driver’ talks out loud, making
audible their thinking process whilst writing code whereas the ‘observer’ o￿ers strategic
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feedback, which can be interpreted as a leadership practice along the dimensions of posi-
tion and process as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32.
Moreover, the kinds of practices identi￿able in this role of the ‘observer’, according
to Hernandez et al., involve ‘strategic choices [. . . the] behavioural processes by which
strategic leadership in￿uences organizational outcomes’ where such leaders ‘can guide
interactions among other organizational members and channel knowledge’ (2011, p. 1179).
Such an approach is prefaced on the leadership dimension of result as depicted in ￿gure 2.4
on page 32.
Thus, the passing of keyboard control, I argue, provides markers for leadership
practice within the material-discursive practice of pair programming across a number of
dimensions depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32. First, when one party spontaneously ‘takes
over’, they enact through their personality, and with a speci￿c purpose, a change in process.
Second, in so doing, the material-discursive practice is dynamically restructured such that
the roles are reversed and the person formerly ‘driving’ is now placed in a role where
they enact what can be considered the leadership practice of o￿ering strategic guidance.
In this fashion, I argue that there is evidence for speci￿c leadership practices that can be
identi￿ed with each role, suggesting leadership in the plural (Denis, Langley and Sergi
2012).
Yet within the dyad described in the episode above, I rarely observed Robert play-
ing the role of observer as a strategic guide. Instead, what was more readily observed
was Walt playing both of these roles in ways that were more closely identi￿able to Beck’s
description. Thus, when Walt o￿ers commentary at close to 10:50 a.m. about limitations
of the approach Robert is taking, he injects an alternative perspective in line with Beck’s
vision of pair programming (1999, p. 58). And again, at approximately 10:53 a.m., Walt
advises Robert while he is writing code that he might want to approach the writing in
a particular fashion, providing strategic direction (O’Reilly et al. 2010). In these engage-
ments, while the roles shift dynamically, we see how particular roles are played, that align
with the dimension of position, as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32.
During this engagement, we see an increasingly ￿uid dynamic between the pair
where control passes freely between the two of them and where tests are being consist-
ently written and run as part of the material-discursive practice of pair programming. This
kind of engagements is typical of the instances of pair programming I observed, although
it is clear that, in this remote pairing context, the computational objects play a constitutive
role in enacting the material-discursive practice, for in addition to providing the context
of a shared programming environment (which is also the case in face-to-face pairing), the
computational objects also play a constitutive role of providing the communicative link
between the pair.
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I therefore argue here that within the short space of 45 minutes, the empirics
provide evidence for all ￿ve dimensions of leadership as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32.
These ￿ndings are summarised in table 4.1.
The question then arises, ‘Was what I observed leadership?’ I could argue that it
was, based on my citations of the various dimensions of leadership and the extant liter-
ature that align with the observed behaviour, but even if that is the case, that is not my
aim here. My point in drawing the reader’s attention to the way in which the observed
practices align with these dimensions is to make visible what may well be the ‘raw ma-
terials’ members employ when they materialise leadership through a citational material-
discursive practice. Thus, within a context such as Eta, the way ‘leadership’ comes into
being qua leadership in practice is through the citation of these dimensions by members
and their application of these citations to observed material-discursive practice: the en-
actment of a citational material-discursive practice that references some other enacted
material-discursive practice.
Verily, within Eta, evidence of such citations is present. For example, in analys-
ing an internal electronic discussion board that is materialised by and accessed through
computational objects, a number of statements are made by both employees and senior
leaders explicitly ascribing leadership to the material-discursive practice of pair program-
ming. I choose this data source in particular as the statements found therein precede my
engagement with the site. In other words, they precede my questioning members about
‘leadership’ and looking for it in situ. Thus, they provide here a particularly trustworthy
form of supporting evidence for my argument that precedes any activities I undertook that
may have biased or led the informants in any way to highlight leadership towards the ends
of my research. For example, one employee asserts with respect to a client engagement
that the practice of pair programming:
[C]learly led to a [positive] change in both engineering leadership and process
(Eta Internal Discussion Database).
Here, the employee links leadership on the part of engineers as a management
function resulting in e￿ective changes in business process and client engagement, binding
this citation with the leadership dimension of process as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32.
The founder of the company o￿ers similar remarks, linking the desired outcomes
(results) of pair programming with the leadership dimensions of person, position, process,
and purpose. He asserts that:
The key to stickingwith a process—or perhaps a better way to express it would
be to continue to *care* about process, since it doesn’t really matter if it maps
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exactly to what we do—is support at the executive level (Eta Internal Discus-
sion Database).
The founder cites explicit links between producing results (‘stickingwith it’) through
a process (pair programming) and a purpose (continuing to ‘*care*’), all of which he claims
is underpinned by speci￿c people (associated with the leadership dimension of person)
who hold certain executive leadership positions within the organisation. Thus, all ￿ve di-
mensions of leadership as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32 are mobilised to underscore
what makes Eta ‘special’ or ‘great’. What the founder is pointing out here is that this
‘sticking with a process’ is something Eta does particularly well in relation to the material-
discursive practice of pair programming. The statement therefore points towards what is
viewed as important or valued at Eta, that which is associated with the category ‘leader-
ship’.
Thus, I claim, not only embedded within the material-discursive practice between
Walt, Robert, and their computational objects, but also within the broader sphere of Eta
itself is an enacted and performative ideology that involves the association of various
material-discursive practices that includes humans and computational objects and their
relation to what is valued within the organisation and cited as forms of ‘leadership’. All of
these suggest the possibility that the production of ‘leadership’ is itself achieved through
material-discursive practices that may involve citing one or more of the ￿ve dimensions of
leadership as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32 and its association with some other enacted
material-discursive practice. To develop this argument further, I present a di￿erent episode
within the same site where the possibility of machines ‘leading’ is investigated.
4.3.3 Episode Two: When Machines Lead
In the next episode, which covers an approximate two-hour time frame, I explore a dif-
ferent location within Eta: an o￿ce in the UK. In this setting, as opposed to the previous
episode, all the pairs are physically together, as depicted in ￿gure 4.2.
In ￿gure 4.2, we see several groups of pairs together at a single table. This con￿g-
uration was far more common at Eta than the remote pair programming presented in the
￿rst episode.
Looking closely at ￿gure 4.2, there are four pairs, a total of eight people working
simultaneously on a single software project, with each pair working on di￿erent tasks
for the project as delineated in a work item tracking system (WITS). Each pair, as part of
their pair programming practice, selects a pending work item from the system they wish
to undertake. This approach re￿ects an imported material-discursive practice from lean
manufacturing called Kanban, where workers select from available work based on their
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Figure 4.2: Anonymised Image of Pair Programmers at an Eta UK O￿ce Worktable
predilections (Poppendieck and Poppendieck 2003, pp. 72-76).
Also, within ￿gure 4.2, prominently placed in the middle of the frame is a focal
computational object—a large monitor, sometimes referred to as a build monitor, build
meister, or information radiator based on its role to disseminate vital project information
to the team on an ongoing basis (Elssamadisy 2008, pp. 157-160). As I will show, this
particular computational object plays a particular role that aligns with understandings of
‘leader’ in a number of ways, both in terms of the manner in which it directs the pairs,
and in their responses to it.
In this episode, I will focus on the pair consisting of Paul and Etienne, who are
depicted sitting in the bottom left of ￿gure 4.2, closest to the reader.
2:42 p.m. - It looks like four pairs are working right now. From the build
monitor, I can see that the project was built three days ago with 78% volatility
and a velocity of 15. It is not clear to me how these metrics are calculated, but
the former refers to how many lines of code have changed with 78% of the
codebase having changed recently (and thus highly ‘volatile’) while the latter
refers to the rate at which work items have been completed in the current
work cycle, or sprint, which at Eta is two weeks. There is also a section of
the screen that shows the number of unstarted, started, ￿nished, delivered,
accepted, and rejected work items. The bulk of items are unstarted and a
few, perhaps two items, are accepted. This suggests that the project is at its
beginning.
123
2:58 p.m. - A build must have just happened. The display now says last build
27m and is still green. This means that a new build must have passed all the
tests.
3:01 p.m. - I focus now on what I see on the screen directly in front of me and
begin to listen more closely to Etienne and Paul. They are building a content
management system and right now I see the login screen for the system they
are building. There seems to be an error.
A discussion on how to move beyond the error ensues. They try logging in
as di￿erent users and, in the process, discover some code where Etienne asks
‘How did this get in here?’ Paul answers, ‘It does what you want, just not in
the way you expect it to.’
Paul goes into some ￿les under the settings folder and starts poking around.
He reports that the controller object that is used for the ‘edit’ page is not the
same as the one used for the ‘show’ page. Etienne says that he understands,
but he seems to be more concerned with how this bifurcation occurred.
For Paul, this is not a new phenomenon. He explains that this is something
that happens when di￿erent people work on code at di￿erent times. Paul now
employs a technique to focus the pair on how to proceed next. He attempts
to articulate what they are trying to do. He starts by saying ‘we want to ￿lter
this list by partner’. Etienne says ‘We really underestimated this’, at which
point Paul bends over with head in hands to think for a moment.
They continue to trace the current error in the debugger, 9 but now Etienne is
driving. This pair have a comfortable pattern where control of the keyboard
is transferred without explicit verbal request. In this case, each pair has an
individual keyboard and mouse connected to their monitor so they can freely
control the system at any time.
While Etienne is tracing the error, an instant messaging (IM) comes in from a
colleague not physically at this site. The colleague has asked Etienne a ques-
tion; Etienne answers it and then returns to the tracing/debugging.
Then without saying anything, Paul takes control of the keyboard and tries a
di￿erent syntactical approach using an include declaration.10
9A debugger is a software programme used to stop the execution of code at speci￿c locations set by the
programmers and allows for controlled execution. This functionality enables the programmer to explore the
contents of memory as a means to identify and correct software errors (Rosenberg 1996, p. 2).
10This is a means through which code from pre-existing external code libraries can be easily included in
the present code, and thus leveraged or re-used.
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Etienne’s colleague sends another IM and Etienne answers. This interruption
is handled smoothly and without conversation between the pair, as a matter
of course.
3:33 p.m. - Etienne gets up to go get co￿ee and asks me if I want some. I thank
him, but decline, and get up to get some water.
3:40 p.m. -We are back at work and checking results on the test website. They
have ￿nished copying over the new code and making the required changes to
connect it into the code base.
Running a test programme and debugging ensues. There are actually a few
iterative cycles of this, as the tests do not run properly. Etienne has been
running all of the tests. Then Paul makes an attempt. He starts editing, getting
rid of one line and one ￿le, tests and re-runs. They ￿nd something not quite
right and this time isolate text strings in the debugger which they then search
for in the code. They look in various ￿les for where these text strings are.
Paul ￿nds these, adds one line of code to each, re-runs the test, and this time
it is even worse.
In response to this, Etienne then points out that there is a default constructor
that creates a new panel for this portion of the code. It is also clear from
his tone that Etienne is familiar with this portion of the code. He suggests
‘initialising the tab in a code module somewhere else.’ Paul does this and the
solution appears to work. They now have working code for this work item
with all tests passing.
4:01 p.m. - As the work item is now complete, it needs to be checked in to the
code base and marked as complete in the work item tracking system (WITS).
Etienne brings up the WITS and selects the work item corresponding to the
task they have been working on.
4:10 p.m. - Etienne stages and commits the ￿les to source control system and
then marks the work item complete in the WITS.
4:33 p.m. - They begin work on the next work item. This one involves setting
the system up for internationalisation.11 They ￿rst try to remember where to
look in the ￿le hierarchy of code for this change.
As they are getting their heads around the ￿les they need to work with, Paul
looks up and says ‘Uh oh’. Etienne looks up and shouts ‘No!’ Someone else
11This is a process whereby software is made functional across a number of languages (Aykin 2004, pp. 3-
16).
125
in the room makes an arti￿cial sound analogous to the ‘wrong answer’ sound
one might hear on an American-style game show. Someone laughs. The o￿ce
director says, with a slightly joking tone in his voice, ‘everybody stop’, taking
the role of a mock policeman who has caught some criminals in the act.
Paul says, ‘I just happened to be looking there and it ￿ipped red.’ He is refer-
ring to the build screen. The build has failed. The o￿ce director laughs and
says, ‘Who did it?’
No one answers, but my sense is that Etienne’s and Paul’s last check-in that
went in is what broke the build.
Now that the build has broken, as signalled by the computational object—the
build monitor—and has been acknowledged by the group, the organisation
of work shifts immediately for Etienne and Paul. Instead of continuing work
on the internationalisation work item, they immediately shift to investigating
the broken build.
4:37 p.m. - Etienne brings up theweb-based system for inspecting builds. They
start looking at the log documenting the broken build. ‘Unitialised constant
action view,’ announces Paul from o￿ of the log, following up with ‘That’s
weird’. He then reads questioningly, ‘Asset tag? That makes no sense at all.’
Several seconds of silence follows, and then Etienne says ‘Oh, that’s not ours.’
Paul reads o￿more of the log and again, Etienne repeats, ‘That’s not ours’ and
then immediately breaks into a refrain of ‘That’s not ours, someone messed
up. . . ’ to the tune of the ‘Na-nana-nana-nah’ song familiar to many western
children.
Paul interjects with ‘But. . .well, hold on’ and continues looking at the log.
Then a few seconds later, he identi￿es a line in the log and says, ‘Oh, that’s
ours, OK’ and then a few seconds later says ‘false alarm, there must be some-
thing else in here.’
Acknowledging the di￿culty in identifying the source of the error, Paul says
‘I don’t know, there are so many things in here, it’s hard to ￿gure out. . . ’
and then a few seconds later, ‘Ah, OK, yeah, OK, so we need to open that,’
suggesting that he may have found a possible source for the build failure.
After further inspection, Paul mentions a merge operation12 they did awhile
12A good deal of managing code in larger projects revolves around source control systems (Loeliger and
McCullough 2012). Within such systems, a merge operation ‘uni￿es two or more commit history branches’
(ibid., p. 121). For example, developers may be working with some code from branch a on which their code
depends. As they work on their code, they make new additions, and when committed to the source control
system, would be referred to as branch b. Meanwhile, the original developers of branch a make changes to
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back that seems to be missing from this ￿le set.
A few seconds later, he announces, ‘There we are, expected false to be true,
well, you’re not going to get very far. . . ’ to which someone else in the room
laughs at the utterance, mocking Paul, saying, ‘Im sorry son, life’s sometimes
not what you expect.’ With this, the whole room bursts out in laughter.
Paul has now identi￿ed that problem as coming from their check-in where the
code that they pulled from the source control system had not been properly
merged. They now need to ￿x this.
Etienne takes the code that they have been working on and ‘stashes’ it as a
temporary item in the source control system, and then retrieves the code that
was previously checked-in.
Paul works on ￿nding the missing code that was not properly merged and
adds it to this set. They run the tests locally and they pass. Etienne then
checks-in the code to the source control system and they return their focus to
the newer work item (￿eld diary 1058/1065 02 December 2013).
4.3.4 Analysis: Episode Two
While there are a number of similarities in this and the previous episode in terms of the
material-discursive practices observable in Paul and Etienne’s engagement, what is dis-
tinctive in this account is the manner in which the computational object comes to the fore
as an actant that ‘tells’ humanswhat to do—analogous to a human leader giving commands
to her subordinates.
Along these lines, a notable phenomenon is my own orientation to the context,
in particular, the way I myself oriented to the computational object as a means to gather
information. Thus, at the beginning of the account and for the ￿rst three paragraphs of
episode two is my own ongoing consultion/relation with the build monitor to gather local
information through an engagement not dissimilar to an interview accompanied through
‘close observation’ (Van Maanen 1988, p. 19). By closely observing the projections made
material through the computational object, I was able to discern, much in the same way
I might ask questions of a human, aspects of the project status that suggested its initial
phase. A crucial consideration here depends on what McLuhan argues is an important
form of literacy (1962, pp. 36-40), where:
branch a concurrently to the changes being made by the developers on branch b. This creates a situation
where the changes from branch a must eventually be merged with branch b in order to bring the codebase
up-to-date. This does not occur automatically; the developers working in branch b must merge branch a and
ensure that their code still performs correctly. This is normally done at a convenient time or at particular
project milestones.
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[T]echnology is introduced either from within or from without a culture, and
if it gives new stress or ascendancy to one or another of our senses, the ratio
among all of our senses is altered. We no longer feel the same, nor do our eyes
and ears and other senses remain the same (1962, p. 24).
Thus for McLuhan, that I might be able to extend my senses through a computa-
tional object is a phenomenon in and of itself worthy of attention. Here, I characterise
my own engagement with the computational object as an accessible relationship made
possible in McLuhan’s terms based on my own literacy with it—one I immediately and
without question turned to as part of my own sensemaking of the context (Weick, Sutcli￿e
et al. 2005). It was through that relation I ascertained various project metrics by focus-
ing with my eyes and not my ears. This is one of the impacts brought about by modern
technologies—a shift from an aural to an optical society (cf. Braidotti 2006, p. 204; Har-
away 1991a, pp. 188-189; McLuhan 1962, pp. 28-29). So, although I was there to observe
Paul and Etienne, as part of my taking in context, the data shows that my attention went
￿rst to the computational object as an informant to the research. I, like my own human
informants, am apparently not immune from the ubiquity and background status of com-
putational object as sources for guidance, knowledge, and information. This status that
computational objects hold as a source or position as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32 for
guidance, knowledge, and information is one also viewed in the literature as a source for
leadership (Alvesson 2011b, p. 73; Nonaka and Takeuchi 2011).
Moving now beyond my own initial attention to the computational object at the
start of the episode, I would like to call attention to the periods of material-discursive
practice involving remote activity around 3:01 p.m. Despite Paul and Etienne being an
embodied human pair situated in the same room, there was nevertheless a simultaneous
stream of instant messagings (IMs) between Etienne and remote colleagues that were re-
lated to the deployment of the project that Paul and Etiennewereworking on. The ongoing
communication between Etienne and these colleagues was situated within the same visual
topography as pair programming, reinforcing the visual locus of attention (Guimbretière
2002, pp. 15-19, 2003, p. 53) and the primacy of the screen (Braidotti 2006, p. 204; Haraway
1991a, pp. 188-189). Such behaviour, in analysing its contextual detail, may also be under-
stood as leadership practice, because Etienne was being asked speci￿c questions to vouch
for the readiness of certain code to be deployed. Thus, based on his position as depicted in
￿gure 2.4 on page 32, the deployment team deferred to him for a decision (Useem 2010a,
p. 510) before they proceeded.
Moreover, the ￿uidity with which Etienne’s IM exchanges occurred was notable.
There was a sense of ￿ow with which Etienne handled these, one that I argue arises out of
the communication system itself being situated within the same computational object as
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the pair programming work. Thus, the ‘one-stop shopping’ approach that the computa-
tional object o￿ers to its human can provide particular a￿ordances that impact cognitive
and communicative practices including the externalisation of thought (Nickerson et al.
2013), coordination (Zammuto et al. 2007), and increased specialisation (Leonardi 2011,
p. 161). Such layered material-discursive practices beautifully illustrate the distributed
nature of activity as a collective form of leadership, much in the same way that Hutchins’
study of how a collective of people, artefacts, and machines navigate a submarine (1995a,
pp. 355-356).
Indeed, relational (cf. Cunli￿e and Eriksen 2011; Fletcher 2012; Ospina and Uhl-
Bien 2012), distributed (cf. Bolden 2011; Gronn 2002; Spillane 2006), and processual (cf.
Day and Antonakis 2013; Koivunen 2007; Wood 2005) approaches to leadership rely on
this same observation that Hutchinsmakes about cognition; namely that as a phenomenon
not directly visible, we must cite it in some way for it to materialise. All of the approaches
to leadership I just mentioned implicitly understand that citational process as occurring
through social systems, which as can be seen from these episodes, must necessarily include
the computational objects entangled as part of material-discursive practice. Therefore, the
thesis I want to take forward is that leadership is not simply understood in certain ways,
but that it is understood as leadership precisely because it is cited as such. I argue that
leadership, following Ailon and Kunda, acts as a ‘symbolic resource’ (2003) standing for
particular values within the context of a community such as an organisation. Thus, upon
interrogation, leadership always stands for something else; some value or values within
the active social system, for which the word ‘leadership’ is shorthand. In the speci￿c case
of the deployment team asking Etienne to con￿rm certain information, this underscores
particular values around authority and responsibility that align with the leadership dimen-
sions of position and process as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32.
Then at 4:33 p.m., as Paul and Etienne are working on their next work item, the
focal computational object stands mutely before the group but switches its colours from
green to red, signifying a problem. Then, in response to it, Paul says ‘Uh oh’, the o￿ce
director says ‘everybody stop’, laughs, and says ‘Who did it?’ In terms of the temporal
order of these speech acts, they were preceded by the computational object signifying the
issue and, in doing so, issuing a command to the group. Therefore, an important question
at this juncture is who—or what—is acting as the leader?
One way to answer this is to say that the programmers who wrote the software,
the people that built the computational object and the operating system, and all the other
components, as well as the management who decided that this approach to operations
would be implemented, were part of a sociotechnical assemblage of actants (Latour 1999,
p. 198). This must include the computational object that enabled this enactment where a
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crucial problem was reported and then solved. With this ANT-style analysis, we arrive, at
a minimum, to a conclusion where a highly distributed form of leadership is present.
However, I would like to suggest something more radical. I propose that we have
a situation where the computational object has become the source of leadership command
authority (Grint 2005b, p. 1477), where, as Haraway (1991a, pp. 188-196) has suggested, the
visual dimension is employed to control a group of people; not necessarily for nefarious
means, but to control them nonetheless. In the performance of this material-discursive
practice, it is the computational object that silently evaluates and delivers feedback to the
the group, analogous to a human leader o￿ering performance feedback. And from a tem-
poral perspective, it is the computational object that explicitly initiates this chain of events
where the group subsequently perceives a ‘problem’ that must be addressed as a priority.
The command has been issued and has been received. Thus, in an important sense, I argue
that the computational object is playing the role of leader, where it initiates action toward
compliance, followed by the evident receipt by humans of authoritative orders on what to
do. It is therefore plausible that this material-discursive practice constitutes a form of lead-
ership as authority or command (Air Command and Sta￿ College 2005; Benoit-Barne and
Cooren 2009; Miller 2008), one that aligns with the result or process dimensions depicted
in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32.
But there is yet another sense that the computational object in this context em-
bodies leadership. In its given formal role, it issues a command in a language that humans
readily understand in regards to a problem that needs to be addressed with some urgency.
Therefore, the role it plays is analogous to the one that Larsson and Lunholm’s manager
(2013) plays in her leadership interaction with a subordinate, however, in their case, what
requires a lengthy conversation betweenmanager and subordinate, where the formermust
persuade the latter, happens in this episode within the space of eight seconds. Here, the
dimensions of computational object’s ‘personality’ and its implicit purpose as depicted in
￿gure 2.4 on page 32 are established by the ways humans respond to it. Thus, in this epis-
ode, we see all ￿ve of the dimensions of leadership: person, result, position, process, and
purpose—all enacted by the computational object.
It is important to recognise, however, that this is not simply a claim about a com-
putational object playing a leadership role. Rather, it is a claim regarding shared meanings
and values that can be embodied by and/or attributed to humans and other objects within
material-discursive practice. For just as leaders cannot lead without followers (Bligh and
Riggio 2012b; Burke 1965; Kahai 2012), so too must the humans in the room understand
the meaning and rami￿cation of the message from the computational object and then play
their parts in order for any ‘leadership’ to occur at all. The o￿ce manager articulated to
and for the group this sensibility in his utterance of ‘Who did it?’ By making this state-
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ment, he implies that that someone ‘did it’, verbally establishing the existence of a problem,
and by extension, that someone needs to ‘￿x it’. Etienne and Paul then demonstrated their
recognition of the discursive nature of what just transpired. They understood that the
build was broken and they needed to determine whether it was their fault. Whether one
accepts that the computational object ‘led’ or not, this episode illustrates an example of
direction initiated by a computational object that was subsequently responded to by the
human group in kind. In this sense, the phenomenon of ‘leadership’ was performatively
produced by the particulars of this material-discursive practice (Barad 2007, p. 178).
However, I would be remiss if I did not report that the members did not speak of
‘leadership’ in this episode and did not seem to think about what the computational object
did as leadership. For thesemembers, my observations revealed that for them, humans ‘do’
leadership. What is therefore fascinating about this case is that while the computational
object may have functionally reproduced many aspects of ‘leadership’ as per my analysis,
members did not see it as such. In this sense, I would say that while the possibility for a
posthuman form of leadership was present, it was not materialised through subsequent
citational material-discursive practice.
In this episode, I have demonstrated possibilities for how leadership practices are
enacted by both humans and computational objects and then further distributed through
the sca￿olding provided by computational objects and their underlying systems. I argue
that in this episode we have witnessed a case where it is possible that the computational
object played the role of leader in a distributed system of leadership, authority, and re-
sponsibility, where the human participants are committed to the rules of the game (1953 /
Wittgenstein 2009, 6-8e; Lyotard 1984). Interestingly, the informants did not see what the
build monitor did, nor the impact it had on work￿ow as anything other than an instru-
mental intercession.
4.4 Discussion
The foregoing two episodes and accompanying analyses of leadership practice reveal a
processual model of how leadership is produced (Day, Fleenor et al. 2014, p. 70; Dinh et
al. 2014, p. 41; Langley, Smallman et al. 2013). In this view, leadership emerges through
ongoing successions of material-discursive practice. This is a particular vantage point
where what ‘leadership’ is—is enacted. Langley et al. describe this as the:
[P]oint at which ‘process’ meets ‘practice’, since how the past is drawn upon
and made relevant to the present is not an atomistic or random exercise but
crucially depends on the social practices in which actors are embedded (2013,
p. 5).
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These notions of ‘practice’ and being ‘embedded’ are precisely what I am attempt-
ing to foreground through my analytical emphasis of Barad’s material-discursive practice
(2007, p. 178).
Simultaneously, by including computational objects as an actant in the analyses, I
demonstrated how computational objects are intimately involved in the constitution and
transmission of material-discursive practices that may subsequently be cited through fur-
ther material-discursive practices as leadership practice. This intimate relationship with
the computational object is demonstrated in the ￿rst episode where the entire engagement
between Walt and Robert is materialised through their engagements with computational
objects. That is, without these objects, they would not interact at all. I then show that
prior to my research, members of the company refer to the material-discursive practices
of pair programming and cite them as being associated with leadership through the ￿ve
dimensions as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32, thus materialising ‘leadership’.
The intimate relationship with computational objects is also demonstrated in the
second episode where the computational object has been granted an authoritative role.
Speci￿cally, like a teacher or a manager, the computational object in the second episode
evaluates work that has been submitted by humans and issues feedback to the group,
sometimes resulting in direct commands to stop what they are doing and attend to a prob-
lem that it has detected. In so doing, it plays a particular position as depicted in ￿gure 2.4
on page 32 in the organisational hierarchy. This accomplishment involves a subtle but
crucial shift from the canonical relation of computational object as tool, where the user
is the subject and the computational object is the object whose being is subordinated to
the human (1927 / Heidegger 1996, pp. 64-67). However, in the case I presented, the role is
reversed; the computational object takes the role of subject, directing its command to its
object, the human group. Such a state closely aligns with Haraway’s views of technology
and with the argument I am putting forward here regarding leadership. Thus, leadership,
or leading, in the contexts I have presented, can be described as a phenomenon where:
[S]ocial relationships get congealed into and taken for decontextualized things
[. . . and where] social relationships include non-humans as well as humans as
socially [. . . ] active partners (1997, p. 8).
Haraway’s perspective not only highlights the observable decontextualisation of
technology as a relation but, more importantly, accounts for the invisibility of leadership
to members in its enactment. Haraway’s view also aligns with Barad’s argument that the
phenomenon of consciousness arises out of particular material-discursive arrangements
that include both bodies and machines. Here, Barad asserts that
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‘[M]inds’ are themselves material phenomena that emerge through speci￿c
intra-actions. Phenomena are real material beings (2007, p. 361).
Thus, in Barad’s agential realism, phenomena and not ‘things’ are the primary on-
tological elements, all of which arise through particular arrangements ofmaterial-discursive
practice (ibid., p. 178). Here I suggest, following agential realism, that the phenomenon of
‘leadership’ can be viewed as operating just like any other phenomenon that materialises;
it arises through particular arrangements of material-discursive apparatuses and practices.
Elsewhere, Orlikowski and Scott (2008), Nyberg (2009), and Iedema (2007) have
engaged with Barad’s agential realism in their respective IS and organisational research
to underpin a similar perspective. Central to the position all these scholars take is the
claim that:
Matter and meaning are not separate elements. They are inextricably fused
together, and no event, no matter how energetic can tear them asunder. Even
atoms, whose very name, ato￿os (atomos), means ‘indivisible’ or ‘uncuttable’,
can be broken apart. But matter and meaning cannot be dissociated, not by
chemical processing, or centrifuge, or nuclear blast. Mattering is simultan-
eously a matter of substance and signi￿cance, most evidently perhaps when
it is the nature of matter that is in question, when the smallest parts of matter
are found to be capable of exploding deeply entrenched ideas and large cities.
Perhaps this is why contemporary physics makes the inescapable entangle-
ment of matters of being, knowing, and doing, of ontology, epistemology, and
ethics, of fact and value, so tangible, so poignant (Barad 2007, p. 3).
Consequently, even when matter is ‘torn’ apart, Barad argues, meanings are still
produced—and indivisible from—subsequent material (re)con￿gurations. My application
of this construct is the claim that the ‘meaning’ of leadership cannot be decoupled from the
particular material-discursive practices that produce it. This is precisely why a practice-
based approach is crucial in studying such a phenomenon: to glimpse the materialisation
of leadership as it happens.
Moreover, I take it that Barad’s use of term ‘apparatuses of bodily reproduction’
(ibid., p. 178) refers to arrangements of material bodies of any form. The implication here is
that agency is not exclusive to humans but rather, like phenomena, constitutive of reality.
Thus, from an agential realist perspective, that computational objects may possess the
agency to lead is no surprise. What Barad is arguing here is that through the exploration
of what might be considered the mundane, that understandings capable of shaking ‘the
very foundations of Western epistemology’ (ibid., p. 97) can be undertaken. Indeed, one
of the central points of agential realism is a recasting of agency where:
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The primary ontological units are not ‘things’ but phenomena—dynamic to-
pological recon￿gurings/entanglements/relationalities/(re)articulations. And
the primary semantic units are not ‘words’ but material-discursive practices
through which boundaries are constituted. This dynamism is agency. Agency
is not an attribute but the ongoing recon￿gurings of the world (2003, p. 818).
Accordingly, when these ideas are di￿racted (Barad 2007, pp. 86-94; Nicolini and
Roe 2014) through the the empirics presented above, whether in the way keyboard control
is managed or the ways humans and computational objects in￿uence each other through
various dimensions of leadership, what Barad’s agential realism helps grasp is the pro-
cessual emergence of particular phenomena arising through material-discursive practice.
These phenomenamay be understood and attributed as a symbolic resource (Ailon-Souday
andKunda 2003) and commonly called ‘leadership’ but remain enmeshedwith thematerial-
discursive practices that (re)produce them (Barad 2007, p. 170).
4.5 Summation
This chapter has interrogated the relationship between leadership practices and computa-
tional objects by analysing such practices in terms of material-discursive practice. It has
focused on a particular set of material-discursive practices in pair programming, where
within the pair there are no formal leaders.
By combining and extending Grint (2005a, p. 18) and Kempster et al.’s (2011) ￿ve-
fold model of leadership as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32, I have highlighted particular
material-discursive practices within the empirics that illustrate how both humans and
computational objects can be mobilised as categories within the ￿ve dimensions of lead-
ership: person, result, position, process, and purpose. I suggest that this synthesis of Grint
and Kepmster et al.’s theoretical perspectives is a contribution to the leadership literature
through my proposals that their models be integrated and my proposed extension to their
work. Here I claim that leadership is not simply understood through the dimensions that
Grint and Kempster et al. suggest but that material-discursive practices are understood as
leadership precisely because they are cited as such. This is an argument that I will con-
tinue to develop in the coming chapters. Thus, I have argued that leadership functions as
a symbolic resource (Ailon-Souday and Kunda 2003) or repository for values. That is, it
points to an underlying process of human categorisation (Bowker and Star 1999) of value
and worth (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006; Mailhot et al. 2014).
I presented two episodes to support this argument. In the ￿rst episode I demon-
strated material-discursive practices that included the negotiation and assertion of con-
trol (Grint 2005b, p. 1477), the elaboration of strategy (Guastello 2007; Montgomery 2012;
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O’Reilly et al. 2010), and the o￿ering of direction as empowering leadership (Zhang and
Bartol 2010, p. 117). I also showed that within the broader sphere of the site I studied the
existence of an ideology (Kunda 1986, p. 54) around the association of various practices and
their relation to what is valued within the organisation and cited as forms of ‘leadership’
prior to the commencement of my study.
In the second episode I expanded these ideas to show that the computational ob-
ject acted as a source of leadership command authority (Grint 2005b, p. 1477) and I linked
these ideas to the work of Haraway who has argued extensively regarding the means by
which the technological and the visual are employed to control humans (1991a, pp. 188-
196). In sum, I illustrated what might be understood as a posthuman form of leadership
enacted by both humans and computational objects and distributed through the sca￿old-
ing provided by computational objects and their underlying systems. I argued that in this
episode leaves open the possibility that the computational object played an unacknow-
ledged role as leader in a distributed system of leadership, authority, and responsibility
where the human participants are committed to the rules of the game (1953 / Wittgen-
stein 2009, 6-8e; Lyotard 1984).
Finally, in my discussion, I highlighted how the agential realism perspective I have
taken in my analysis aligns closely with processual views of leadership (Day, Fleenor et
al. 2014, p. 70; Dinh et al. 2014, p. 41; Langley, Smallman et al. 2013). I then highlighted
another point that I believe to be a contribution to the literature—that Barad’s agential
realism helps us to grasp the processual emergence of particular phenomena arising out
of material-discursive practice—in this case leadership. These phenomena are material-
ised throughmaterial-discursive practice as a symbolic resource (Ailon-Souday and Kunda
2003) commonly called ‘leadership’ but remain enmeshed with the material-discursive




Es kann auch sein, daßGeschichte undÜberlieferung auf die gleichförmige Speicher-
ung von Informationen eingeebnet und als diese für die unumgängliche Planung
nutzbar gemacht werden, die eine gesteuerte Menschheit benötigt. Ob dann auch
das Denken im Informationsgetriebe verendet oder ob ihm ein Unter-Gang in den
Schutz durch seine ihm selbst verborgene Herkunft bestimmt ist, bleibt die Frage
(1967 / Heidegger 1978, pp. ix-x).
It could also come about that history and tradition will be smoothly ￿tted into
the information retrieval systems which will then serve as resource for the in-
evitable planning needs of a cybernetically-organized mankind. The question is
whether thinking too will he terminated in the business of information processing
(Heidegger 1967 / 1978 quoted in and translated by Heim 1987, p. 70).
5.1 Introduction
T￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ an alternate empirical framing to interrogate therelation between leadership practices and computational objects through a fo-cus on leadership practices of emailing by formal leaders. Whereas in the previ-
ous chapter, the observed humans enacting pair programming were not formally granted
any title of leader, many in this chapter are. This formalisation of position, as depicted in
￿gure 2.4 on page 32, is perhaps the most common site to locate—and according to my
argument—cite leadership. Thus, in canonical formulations, it is formal leaders that enact
leadership (Bass and Stogdill 1990a, pp. 37-55; Weber 1946, pp. 245-250). But is this as-
sumption valid? Moreover, drawing on the epigraph above, how might various forms of
engagement with computational objects in￿uence what leaders do, how they think, how
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they make decisions? Through an engagement with the empirical material and extant
literature, these are the central questions this chapter will explore.
Methodologically, by closely examining formal leaders’ material-discursive prac-
tice with computational objects, I will demonstrate what we think of as ‘leadership’ is de-
ciphered as a ‘nexus of practices’ (Schatzki 1996, p. xi). This conceptualisation of leadership-
as-practice (LAP) (Carroll et al. 2008; Crevani et al. 2010; Endrissat and Arx 2013) is much
less attached to an individual and much more dependent on various approaches to—and
therefore distributions of—practice (Shove et al. 2012b; Nicolini, Mengis et al. 2011, p. 8).
To render this perspective, I select for analysis a particularly ubiquitous and, what
may therefore appear on the surface, homogenous practice: email (Aral et al. 2012, p. 850;
Dourish and Bell 2011, p. 36; Hayles 2006, p. 136; Johnson 2012, pp. 63-85). The data for this
case was selected based on Flyvberg’s critical case approach (2011, p. 307), described in
greater depth in section 3.1.3.4 on page 96. By showing the variation formal leaders exhibit
within what Ducheneaut and Bellotti refer to as a the habitat of email (2001), I explain
how these practical variations lead to di￿erent sorts of engagements and outcomes and,
by virtue of their association with di￿erent results, as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32,
how they can also be characterised as di￿erent approaches to leadership.
In summary, what this chapter argues is that the way in which formal leaders
go about ‘doing’ (Nicolini, Gherardi et al. 2003, p. 21) a mundane, everyday task such as
email has signi￿cant rami￿cations for the outcome of that practice—and for any leadership
e￿ects it may produce. My purpose, then, is to demonstrate how the details of practice
not only establish particular roles for computational objects, but how they also constitute
particular styles of leadership.
To proceed, I present a short introduction discussing the emergence of email as a
large-scale practice.
5.2 Email: A Brief History
Email ultimately arises as a variation on established cultural and technological embodi-
ments (Kirby 2008, p. 224) of language, writing, reading, and highly transportable media,
the earliest form of which was perhaps papyrus (Harrison et al. 2001; Vandendorpe 2009).
Crucially, the association of this range of embodiments has a long-standing connection to
leadership. For example, early historical accounts argue that the technological capability
of media transport in the form of early relay/postal systems led to strategic advantages
for particular military leaders (Farazmand 1998). Indeed, the very word for the 6th century
B.C.E. version of postal delivery, angaréion, was associated with the ‘royal word’ (Siegert
1999, p. 6), and thus explicitly bound to the leadership of the empire.
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One of the earliest computational versions of what is now understood as email
dates from 1965 on an early time-sharing system1 at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology (MIT) called MAIL (Van Vleck 2012).
Another early electronic messaging system is documented in a report from the
US National Research Council entitled ‘Electronic Message Systems for the U.S. Postal
Service’ (NRCUSPSS Panel 1976). This was six years before the speci￿cation of Simple
Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP) (Postel 1982) that now forms the basis for current forms
of email over the Internet, enabled by the 1974 Internet Protocol suite (TCP/IP) (Cerf et al.
1974).
Prior to the advent of the Internet, a number of services o￿ered both business and
home users access to computational resources through time-sharing systems. Providers
included companies such as CompuServe™ and General Electric Information Systems™.
These systems were essentially private networks and o￿ered, among other things, the
capability for users to send messages to one another. For example, Apple Computer em-
ployed this facility internally in advance of the Internet back in 1986 as a combination of
the General Electric Information Systems™ backend, and its own bespoke software, Ap-
pleLink™ (Barnes and Greller 1994, p. 131). Figure 5.1 provides a rendering of this early
email system taken from the AppleLink™ user’s manual where electronic ‘Mail’ is a high-
lighted, metaphorically employing both an ‘In Basket’ and ‘Out Basket’ as central visual
metaphors.
Concommitant to the rise of Internet usage as rendered in ￿gure 5.2, major soft-
ware and Internet companies also began o￿ering free email services in the early 2000s,
resulting in further entrenchment of email into daily life (Cusumano 2005, p. 17). This
time frame corresponds to an important in￿ection point where a Pew survey (2014) shows
the intersection of the number of Americans who use the internet exceeded those who did
not. A graphic rendering of this survey is shown in ￿gure 5.2.
To further underscore the ongoing signi￿cance of this in￿ection point, another
Pew survey reports that in 2002, 55% of all Americans used email, while in 2011 this num-
ber grew to 70% (Purcell 2011). Crucially, in both surveys, email consistently scores at the
top of the list for popular online activities, as shown in ￿gure 5.3 (ibid.).
Thus, according to Purcell, email has long been a primary practice among US Inter-
net users. Previous technology acceptance research (Davis et al. 1989; King and He 2006)
further associates email with both ease-of-use and usefulness/perceived utility (Adams et
1Time-sharing is an approach to shared computation that was popular in the 1960s, based on many users
sharing the resources of one computer. This was traditionally accomplished through the use of terminals con-
nected to mainframe teletype machines that, in addition to being connected by cable, could also be connected
using an acoustic coupler, or modem (Fano and Corbató 1966). However, according to Fano and Cobató, time-
sharing ‘does more than save time and money. It sets up a dialogue between user and machine and allows
communication among users’ (ibid., p. 129).
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Figure 5.1: AppleLink™ User Manual Cover
Figure 5.2: Internet Use 1996-2014 (Pew Internet 2014)
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al. 1992, p. 233), which, along with additional moderators such as social (Karahanna and
Limayem 2000; Venkatesh and Morris 2000) and cultural in￿uence (Huang, Lu et al. 2003;
Igbaria et al. 1995), o￿ers a plausible, multivariate explanation for the acceptance and pop-
ularity of email as a ubiquitous practice. Given this ubiquity, it follows that an exploration
of formal leader practices for ‘doing’ email are an important place to study the relationship
between computational objects and leadership practice.
Figure 5.3: Top Online Activities 2002-2014 (Purcell 2011)
5.3 Findings: Email at Two Di￿erent Companies
With a practice as dominant as email which relies on a standardised infrastructure, one
may presume that the way people use email is also fairly standardised. This would be a
mistake. On this point, my ￿eld observations of formal leaders, their local human net-
works, and their engagements with computational objects serve as evidence that demon-
strates such practices are being continually innovated on an ongoing basis within some
organisations, arguably leading to new forms of leadership. In comparison, other data I
have collected exposes alternative, more restricted practices in relation to email. By com-
paring these two sets of data, presented respectively as episode one and episode two, I
construct a binary continuum that maps some of the choices leaders make about engaging
with computational objects and, through this approach, shows that when formal leaders
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engage in the practice of email, they do so in di￿erent fashions with very di￿erent kinds
of collaborative engagements and organisational outcomes.
In other words, di￿erences in material-discursive practices involving email pro-
duce di￿erent kinds of outcomes that are, in turn, cited through successive material-
discursive practices to a formal leader as leadership through one or more of the ￿ve di-
mensions of leadership as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32, as in the example of Cisco I
presented in section 2.2.9.3 on page 38.
Speci￿cally, I will show how some practices produce a much broader form of real-
time computational engagement where the ‘doing’ (Nicolini, Gherardi et al. 2003, p. 21)
of leadership practices is distributively enacted through an assemblage of sociotechnical
humans and computational objects (Latour 1999, p. 159). Thus, my analysis will show that
the enactment leadership is not accomplished solely by an individual, but rather, by a hu-
man and non-human network of actants (Latour 1992, p. 256). Moreover, I will continue to
build on my argument that leadership is materialised through speci￿c material-discursive
practices where citations of one or more of the ￿ve dimensions of leadership, as depicted
in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32, are enacted.
5.3.1 Episode One: Email Up Close
In the following presentation of empirical material, I ￿rst draw upon ￿eld data compiled
from the site Eta over a nine-month period. This presentation of the data supports a rich
understanding of the emergence and ongoing change of an innovative leadership practice.
It amply demonstrates how engagement with email evinces not only various dimensions
from the ￿vefold leadership framework as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32, but empiric-
ally supports claims for a form of leadership that is both enacted and distributed through
networks of people and computational objects.
The empirical presentation follows Sebastian, Eta’s COO, his executive assistant
(EA) Ruby, and their computational objects through various temporal phases of relation-
ship where an innovative leadership practice emerges with seemingly positive e￿ects.2
The site of such material-discursive practice is fertile ground for a process Barad refers to
as iterative intra-activity, where connections, di￿erences, and commitments are (re)made
(2007, pp. 392-393).
5.3.1.1 Discovering the Practice
Prior to physically observing Sebastian, I had a number of Skype™ interviews and con-
versations with him. During one of these, he mentioned he was trying out a practice of
2Background information regarding Eta is located in section 3.3.1. Section 3.3.1.1 contains additional back-
ground information on Sebastian, while background information on Ruby can be found in section 3.3.1.2.
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not checking his work email during weekends (￿eld diary 19 Mar 2013).3
Thus, on my ￿rst day observing Sebastian, I asked him how his practice of abstain-
ing from email over weekends was going. He answered ‘very well’, and eagerly proceeded
to show me his inbox, which had no more than 20 emails.4
He further explained that he had developed a relationship with his executive as-
sistant (EA) whereby she has full access to his email, archives or deletes items that are un-
important, responds to those items that she can on his behalf, and drafts email responses
on his behalf, leaving them in his draft folder. He then showed me the drafts folder, which
had about 10 works-in-progress (￿eld diary 03May 2013).5 At this stage, I considered what
Sebastian was showing to me anomalous, having shadowed a number of other C-level ex-
ecutives as well as interviewing many more whose inboxes regularly contained several
hundred unread emails. I was therefore surprised to encounter such a meagre inbox.
5.3.1.2 Origins of the Practice
The following week, I shadowed Ruby and she shared with me further details of their
practice and o￿ered her perspective on how it emerged. She ￿rst explained to me how
she lays out the screens of her multiple computational objects in order to focus her work
at her desk. As shown in ￿gure 5.4, Ruby’s standard setup consists of two computers and
a total of three browser windows. On the left computer is Sebastian’s calendar. On the
main screen, Ruby’s email is on the left and Sebastian’s is on the right rendered as two
windows.
Crucially, she was e￿ectively logged in as Sebastian.6 The implication here is that
email respondents have no indication that Ruby may be responding on Sebastian’s behalf.
For this reason, I also asked Ruby if she monitors his instant messagings (IMs), another
feature of the Google Apps™ platform. She said that she does, and added that when he is
busy, she will often respond for him. Ruby also indicated that she is responsible for ‘man-
aging’ his calendar and that one of her core responsibilities is ensuring that Sebastian’s
time is ‘protected’ (￿eld diary 08 May 2013).
3This was approximately two years after Volkswagen had publicly announced its decision to stop its serv-
ers from sending emails to some of its employees when they were not on duty (BBC 2011) and may therefore
be an instance of the type of practice di￿usion that Ansari et al. describe (2010).
4Like many of the sites I observed, Eta uses Google Apps™ through which a suite of information and
communication technology (ICT) services are made available across an array of computational objects. Of
the six di￿erent companies I had observational access to, 50% of them used the Google Apps™ platform.
Those three sites also happened to be the largest and most successful companies included in the study.
5My ￿eld notes show that at the point where Sebastian made these remarks I also wrote the following:
‘Look into shadowing Ruby’ (￿eld diary 03 May 2013). In making such notes and following up on these
promptly as the research progressed, Alvesson’s ‘situational focus’ (1996, p. 201) as well as Latour’s tracing
networks of people and objects was achieved (1999, p. 24).
6Technically, this was accomplished through delegation (Google 2011).
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Figure 5.4: Anonymised Image of Ruby’s Desk
I then asked her how she came to work with him so closely on email, and how
she is able to make decisions on his behalf. She asserted that ‘a good EA can judge what
needs to be delegated’ (ibid.), suggesting a form of self-assignment, where Ruby anticipates
Sebastian’s needs without Sebastian necessarily (ever) articulating them.
O￿ering further context, she explained that she was hired at Eta when Sebastian
began as COO, which also coincided with his return from paternity leave after the birth
of a child. Thus, not only was Sebastian starting a new role, but had also been out of the
o￿ce for some time—and for these reasons had a particularly signi￿cant backlog of email.
At that time, she explained, he had more than 300 unread emails. She recalled him
telling her that he was anxious about this and did not know how to approach the issue. In
response, she o￿ered to read the messages for him and let him knowwhat she thought was
important. To further support this activity, she says she met with all department heads in
her ￿rst week to understand what they do, what their relationships were with Sebastian,
and what their needs were. As part of these activities, Ruby reported that she additionally
took time to communicate with ‘remote people.’ (￿eld diary 08 May 2013) According to
Ruby, meeting with all of these people took about a week.
After con￿rming that he wanted help with this backlog, Ruby read his email and
then ￿led it into three categories: ‘important’, ‘not sure’, and ‘not important’. This gave her
a way to check the categorisation with Sebastian. As he con￿rmed her judgement over
time, this formal categorisation gave way to a simpler system, where urgent messages
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received a ‘star’ (Google 2013b).
Other factors have also impacted the way Ruby manages Sebastian’s email. For
example, after some time in his new roles as COO, Sebastian proposed a practice around
maintaining a zero inbox (Mann 2006). In this practice, email that has been read and
which has been responded to or requires no response is archived,7 leaving the inbox empty.
Thus, the only email in the Sebastian’s inbox consists of those emails that have either
not been read or those for which a response has been deemed necessary, in many cases,
by Ruby, but also by Sebastian. This material-discursive practice explicitly broadens the
interaction paradigm with email from a purely communicative medium to one where each
item in the inbox is now something to be explicitly decided upon and actioned in some
meaningful way. In other words, through the material-discursive practice of zero inbox
(ibid.), Sebastian’s inbox is enacted as a site for an ongoing stream of decisions which
Sebastian and Ruby make in tandem.8
Thus, Ruby, the EA, regularly makes decisions on behalf of the COO, Sebastian,
that include her archiving what she feels he does not need to read. She concedes here that
this practice is imperfect. For example, she explained to me that the director of marketing
contacted her about an email sent to Sebastian to which no response was received. Ruby
was able to ￿nd this email, which had been archived; she presumed Sebastian read it and
inadvertently archived it.
Ruby also actively drafts emails on behalf of Sebastian, some of which she sends on
his behalf without seeking his approval. For example, Ruby explains that while Sebastian
was recently on holiday she ‘wrote a bunch of drafts’ (￿eld diary 08 May 2013) for him.
She points here to a broader collaboration with the executive team where, for example,
a member of this team recently wrote an email to Sebastian but sent it directly to Ruby
rather than Sebastian for further editing and review. She then edited this email which
was eventually edited and sent to the entire company by Sebastian. Ruby also asserts that
there are cases where she prepares a response and sends it without seeking Sebastian’s
approval, making clear that such latitude is prefaced on a level of trust that was granted
7Archiving email is available in various forms, on a variety of email clients, however, it has a speci￿c
meaning and associated function within the context of the Google Apps™ platform used at Eta. Speci￿cally,
archiving a message moves it from the ‘inbox’ to the ‘all mail’ container. An archived message is still available
within what can be considered a meta-folder where all of the user’s mail resides, but no longer appears
in the ‘inbox’. For further information on this feature and its implementation within Google Apps™, see
https://support.google.com/mail/answer/6576.
8The zero inbox (Mann 2006) approach to email is far from novel; HCI researchers have also explored email
as a task management system. For example Bellotti et al. noted in their literature review that ‘dealing with
email and managing tasks and projects are indistinguishable’ (2003, p. 345) and used this assertion as their
inspiration to design an email interface speci￿cally for task management purposes. Zero inbox, however,
addresses this concern through alternative means. Yet, Bellotti et al.’s assertion, linking email to task and
project management, already encroaches on the realm of leadership, for those often referred to as ‘project
leaders’ are those responsible for managing/leading projects.
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by Sebastian over a period of their nine months of working together. I asked her if this
kind of collaboration is something she has experienced in previous positions. She said that
it was not.
5.3.1.3 Observing the Practice
A couple of days later I was shadowing Sebastian again for a very full day of appointments.
Around 3:15 p.m., Sebastian and I are alone in his o￿ce for a short period where he is
writing a company blog post to announce some company-wide changes, a task for which
he has engaged me in support. In about 10 minutes, we have developed all of the points
he wants to make in a form Sebastian is satis￿ed with.
It’s now 3:30 p.m., and the next appointment on Sebastian’s calendar is ‘email re-
view’. For this appointment, Ruby comes in with her laptop in with her. As she walks in,
Sebastian asks her to complete the writing of the blog post from the points we just worked
up. Sebastian tells her that he would like to review the revised version again before it is
published on his blog. Ruby acknowledges all of this and proceeds to sit next to Sebastian
at his desk, placing her computer next to his. Both of them have their computers pointed
to his email.
To begin, Sebastian selects an urgent message from his inbox of about 15 emails.
He explains his rationale to Ruby regarding the email with the implicit instruction for
Ruby to respond to it. She does.
The email is about some upcoming appointments. Looking at his calendar, Ruby
reviews these appointments verbally with Sebastian. She says she is going to send one
of the attendees a meeting email. At this juncture, Sebastian enters into an informal con-
versation with Ruby while she works on the email, relating a social event to Ruby that
Sebastian was present at, but Ruby was not. The story is told in a style that implies she
missed something very amusing. Ruby laughs and makes a jovial retort.
Now Sebastian is looking at another email that has an attachment. He saves the
attachment to his local disk and then opens it. Meanwhile Ruby, looking at a di￿erent
email, says ‘What is this update on the [name of business opportunity] thing?’ Sebastian
answers, ‘They want to switch to [name of technology]. Eta would then build the apps
for their [name of another technology]’ (ibid.). This seems to be su￿cient for Ruby to go
ahead and respond to the email and she does so.
Next, Sebastian has opened a Google Sheets™ spreadsheet from another email and
is reviewing sales data that has been made available. After a minute or so, Sebastian starts
to write a response to the email. For a few moments, there is no conversation between
Sebastian and Ruby. He is writing one email on his screen while Ruby silently writes
another on hers.
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This moment of silence is when the idea of pair emailing, as a natural extension
of Eta’s pair programming practice, ￿rst comes to mind. It does not, however, appear that
Sebastian is explicitly applying pair programming to his work practice. Rather, the practice
emerges through ‘circuits and cycles of interdependency’ (Pantzar and Shove 2010, p. 459),
including, among many, the use of pair programming at Eta, his appointment as COO, the
arrival of Ruby as his EA, her initial o￿er to help with his email, a trust between them
that subsequently grew over time, and Sebastian’s decision to pursue a zero inbox (Mann
2006) policy. Breaking the silence, Sebastian continues with informal conversation.
Sebastian has now sent an email and turns his attention to a draft email Ruby
has prepared earlier on alerting the directors to a set of sta￿ members who have been
added to an internal system. A verbal discussion among the three of us on the wording
of this email ensues. Then there is silence again. Ruby continues writing one email while
Sebastian works on another. Sebastian completes his email and then reviews the inbox, at
which point a new email arrives. Expressing displeasure, he says ‘another one just arrived’
(ibid.). He immediately sets to respond to this new email.
As each email in Sebastian’s inbox is sent, it is archived and the number of mes-
sages in the inbox is slowly dwindling. Sebastian brie￿y looks a web site for a golf tourna-
ment online and tells us ‘Tiger is in second place’ (ibid.). Ruby then asks him about another
email. ‘You can answer it,’ he says, and proceeds to provide her background, including de-
cision points that go into his thinking (ibid.). Here Sebastian is not telling Ruby what to
say, but rather what he thinks, and seems to be comfortable that with this direction, Ruby
will know what to say.
Someone else emails Ruby directly (to her email account, not Sebastian’s) about
whether she has ‘circled back’ with Sebastian yet and she verbally alerts Sebastian to this
(ibid.). Sebastian responds to this query through an already existing thread in his inbox.9
Then Sebastian goes on to another email about receivables. He responds at the top
of the thread and directly to the sender rather than to the entire group to whom it was
initially sent. This comes across as a particular rhetorical strategy. It signals a response
to a particular temporal location in the conversation and by virtue of Sebastian’s direct
reply, suggests a speci￿c intent. Brightly, Sebastian says ‘Twelve emails left!’ (ibid.) Ten
minutes have passed since Ruby entered the room.
The practice continues in this fashion for more than two hours. At 5:50 p.m., I note
there are three messages left in his inbox. There is some discussion between them on an
email about organisational practice management. They are looking at the same email on
both screens. There is an attachment to the email—an Eta executive meeting slide deck.
9A ‘thread’ refers to a single message within a group of messages that are, in turn, replies to an initial
message that are grouped together by the email client. Such groupings, within Google Apps™ are referred to
as ‘conversations’. For more information, see https://support.google.com/mail/answer/5900.
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Ruby has opened this and is reviewing it. Sebastian switches over to the draft email view.
There are three draft messages. Sebastian comments to me that ‘these slip under the radar
because they are drafts’ (ibid.). Then Sebastian looks over at his inbox and twomore emails
have arrived, raising the total to ￿ve emails.
At 18:00, Sebastian says he has to go. We stop, with one email in his inbox and
four drafts left. It is the end of the working day, and we all say good-bye.
After I leave Sebastian’s o￿ce, I wrote the following in my ￿eld diary:
What I have observed here is part of a larger process where conversations
turn into notes that are repeated in other conversations that themselves turn
into more notes—in draft emails that are then sometimes reviewed in greater
depth—as the writing process progresses. These ￿nally achieve a ‘sent’ state
to become part of the company’s discursive communication record (￿eld diary
10 May 2013).
5.3.2 Analysis: Episode One—Where is the leadership?
Having a historical perspective from Sebastian and Ruby on how they view the devel-
opment of their working relationship together (and with their computational objects)
provides a useful starting place to challenge traditional assumptions of leadership and
generate an insightful account (Miettinen et al. 2010, p. 1321; Park 2008, p. 394; Susi 2007).
First, the episode provides compelling evidence that the practice of engaging with the
COO’s email through pair emailing grew out of an ongoing series of engagements and a
growing sense of trust between Sebastian and Ruby that was independently given voice
by each of them.
For example, Sebastian said at one point that:
Ruby is an incredibly capable person. She could do any executive job she
wanted to here at Eta. She is an executive assistant (EA) because that is what
she wants to be (￿eld diary 15 May 2013).
Sebastian’s assertion invests a great deal in Ruby’s abilities. Moreover, he explicitly
views her level of capability as a peer when asserting that she could do any job at Eta and
quali￿es her role as EA as a choice she has made rather than a level of employment based
on her ability. He evidently sees those abilities as above and beyond the level of EA.
Similarly, Ruby invests a certain trust in Sebastian and in Eta as an organisation.
This is revealed to some degree in her own comparison of working at Eta to her previous
EA role elsewhere. In this vein, Ruby asserts generally that she is treated with much more
respect at Eta than with the previous company (￿eld diary 01 May 2013). For example, she
tells me that:
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[T]he culture here is much more respectful of your personal life. At my pre-
vious company, there were a lot of younger people with no kids, so no one
cared if you had a family. Here, there is a good balance of younger and older
(￿eld diary 08 May 2013).
Thus, Ruby calls out particular values she perceives as being embodied at Eta and
therefore contribute to making Eta an improvement over her previous job. More spe-
ci￿cally, however, she also identi￿es Sebastian’s ‘thoughtfulness’ as a factor contributing
to her positive view of working at Eta, which I take to mean not only her perception of
Sebastian treating her in a way she would like to be treated, but also a respect directed
towards him in recognition of what she sees as his intelligence and vision. I make these
latter claims based on her overall engagement with Sebastian and the ongoing stream of
ideas he o￿ers her, which, as I’ve noted above, are generally not in the form of commands,
but rather framed as the sharing of a perspective with which she is entrusted to work on
her own. In her appreciation for this thoughtfulness, however, there is also an implicit
expectation; she expects or trusts that he will continue to treat her this way.
I call attention to these expressions mutual trust and respect as they highlight the
dynamics of two peers working with each other rather than denoting a statically ￿xed
leader and follower.10 For there are clearly ways that Ruby takes a leadership role over
Sebastian and vice-versa. Functionally, this dynamism appears to be based on the distri-
bution of labour between them and the ways in which they employ computational objects
to accomplish their work. Indeed, it is through this distribution of labour that it becomes
much easier to see forms of leadership in action as it ￿ows from person to computational
object and back again.
For example, the reader will recall that in addition to the complete access Ruby
has to Sebastian’s email that she also has unrestricted access to his calendar. In fact, Ruby,
consistent with a role ful￿lled by many EAs, is responsible for Sebastian’s calendar (Muller
and Gruen 2005, p. 115). In this role, Ruby states that she:
[L]ike[s] tomanage the calendar tightly tomaintain open space andmanoeuv-
ring room. I will ￿ll open slots with bu￿er so that I can manage the incoming
requests. Otherwise, I have nothing in my back pocket (￿eld diary 08 May
2013).
Thus, one of Ruby’s domains of responsibility can be understood in terms of the
dimensions of leadership as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32. This includes a clearly
10Notwithstanding, I would be remiss were I not to point out that there exists ample evidence claiming that
mutual trust is also essential for e￿ective leader-follower relations. See, for example, Bligh and Kohles 2013;
Kramer 2011; Yang and Mossholder 2009.
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de￿ned positional space where she exercises processual control in the oversight of Se-
bastian’s calendar. To this end, she has developed particular strategies in pursuit of spe-
ci￿c results—‘open spaces and manoeuvring room’—by deliberately placing mock appoint-
ments in Sebastian’s calendar, so that colleagues within Eta, who can view Sebastian’s free
and busy slots, are thereby limited by the open slots presented to them as viable availab-
ility for Sebastian’s time. Such practices also include what leadership scholars refer to
as decision-making (Useem 2010a) and the in￿uencing of resource allocation (Yukl 2009,
pp. 8-9) which, for them, are constitutive elements of leadership.
Moreover, this particular strategy also reveals something about Ruby’s relation-
ship with and dependence on the computational object. For, though she has not articulated
it explicitly, Ruby’s material-discursive practice around Sebastian’s calendar reveals that
she understands that colleagues can view Sebastian’s calendar through their own compu-
tational objects and make use of his free and busy times as rendered on their screens to
make choices about requests for appointments.
Ruby has thus developed a strategy of arti￿cially ￿lling Sebastian’s calendar with
dummy appointments as a means to present a view to potential requesters that provides
her with greater organisational power or leverage, a tactic which she referred to with the
metaphor of keeping something in her ‘back pocket’. This places the computational object
in the role of accomplice to Ruby in presenting a particular ‘reality’ to others and in this
sense one could also reasonably say that Ruby is, by controlling the computational object,
leading it to do her bidding, thereby achieving speci￿c results as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on
page 32.
However, the possibilities for leadership do not end here. It is also the case that
Ruby is simultaneously led by the computational object in the sense that her participa-
tion requires that she follow certain steps in order to maintain a calendar. These include
creating and updating calendar items on Sebastian’s calendar and adding attendees and
resources such as meeting rooms and/or Google Hangout™ connections for remote at-
tendees. It also includes responding to emails that contain incoming calendar requests.
In other words, by participating in a rule-based, structured system through her computa-
tional objects, she is subject to its mechanisms and must work within these by following
particular steps. Following Orlikowski here, the computational object choreographs (1996,
p. 65) her activities in all of these aspects; Ruby is thus led by the computational object to
accomplish such tasks throughmail noti￿cations, calendar alerts, and other computational
mechanisms.
Thus, more than being a mere embodiment of leadership through control (Grint
2005b, p. 1477), Ruby’s calendar activites are also an example of a set of interdependencies
that de￿ne a sociotechnical system (Rice 1953; Trist and Bamforth 1951), where it is not
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simply the automating or computational aspects of the system that constitute it. There
are also social aspects at play here, perhaps most notably Ruby’s subterfuge to present the
appearance of a calendar that is more full than it actually is in order achieve the desired
results—control over Sebastian’s calendar. This discursive aspect can also be categorised
as being comprised of a distinctly human intelligence, one that is required for the ongoing
intended operation of the system. This human dimension, as I will continue to show, often
plays a critical role in the constitution of both leadership practices and the associated roles
played by computational objects in their enactments.
Most importantly, Sebastian openly acknowledges Ruby’s authority over his cal-
endar and the management of his time at Eta. For example, when asked by a subordinate
if he has time available to meet in future, Sebastian responded, gesturing to Ruby, ‘You’ll
have to ask my boss’ (￿eld diary 25 Nov 2013). While perhaps in some ways joking, Se-
bastian is nonetheless reinforcing through humour (Meyer 1997, p. 202) what I had pre-
viously observed; Ruby holds a position of authority over Sebastian’s calendar. Here the
word ‘boss’ cites that Sebastian is positionally subordinate to Ruby. It is no far stretch
to suggest that Sebastian acknowledges that Ruby takes a leadership role with respect to
his calendar and, in this exchange, Sebastian makes clear that he knows this. Sebastian’s
assertions merely show, as in the analysis in the previous chapter, that members make use
of the dimensions of leadership as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32 in order to cite certain
material-discursive practices and people with the connotation of leader, thus materialising
leadership in practice.
Furthermore, Ruby is also responsible for tracking and entering how much time
Sebastian spends on particular classes of activity in his role as COO within an internal
system at Eta used for tracking the use of time for particular human resources within the
company. Such data is collected as part of the organisation’s larger e￿orts to quantify
its own use of time in its ongoing planning and execution of strategy. However, as with
Ruby’s control of Sebastian’s calender, it is Ruby who makes the determination of what
data to enter into this system and thus formalises, for the company’s records, Sebastian’s
use of time on Eta’s behalf.
Consequently, one of the key points I wish tomake about the location of leadership
in the various exchanges between Ruby, Sebastian, and their computational objects is that
what counts as leadership must be evaluated in terms of a Taylorian division of labour
(Grint 2011, p. 8, 2010a, p. 41). In other words, leadership must be considered with respect
not only to the degree of authority and responsibility an individual holds for a task, but
in addition, must also lie to some extent with who—or what (as I have explained above
in the case of the computational object choreographing [Orlikowski 1996, p. 65] Ruby’s
activity)—determines those divisions or boundaries.
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Applying these ideas di￿ractively (Barad 2007, pp. 86-94; Nicolini and Roe 2014)
to the empirical material presented in episode one, when we look at the kinds of emails
Ruby responds to on behalf of Sebastian, Ruby does not reply indiscriminately to all mes-
sages on his behalf. For example, I did not observe her responding to emails containing
budget requests or seeking the approval of a new hire, although I did see her review such
messages and pass over them, leaving them in Sebastian’s inbox for his review. Instead,
Ruby responded as Sebastian for a di￿erent class of requests which would certainly in-
clude requests for appointments from people outside of Eta and she would archive those
messages she deemed unimportant. This raises the question of what the boundaries are.
Here, the evidence suggests that Sebastian has a hierarchical form of control (Chand-
ler 1977, pp. 1-2; Miner 1975, pp. 201-204) to de￿ne Ruby’s boundaries by virtue of his
titular role, or position, as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32. This relationship is re￿ected,
for example, in the way Ruby initially o￿ered to categorise Sebastian’s email on his return
from paternity leave. Ruby o￿ered this as a suggestion, from which Sebastian was o￿ered
the right of decision (Useem 2010a, p. 510). I suggest here that Ruby’s o￿ering this right of
decision is one way that leadership is materialised in material-discursive practice. Thus,
when o￿ering a decision to another, the one o￿ering the choice becomes subordinate to
the one making the decision. By o￿ering Sebastian a decision about what she should do,
Ruby implicitly played the role of follower, for if Sebastian had said hewas not comfortable
with Ruby categorising his email, it is highly unlikely that she would have done so. By
deferring to Sebastian, Ruby signals both to him and to the world-at-large her recognition
of his role, or position, as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32.
However, Sebastian did decide in favour of Ruby’s proposal and was subsequently
comfortable with the manner in which she categorised his email. This, according to the
narratives o￿ered by both Sebastian and Ruby, led to other developments that resulted in
further divisions of labour between Sebastian and Ruby which are now well established
as part of their working practice. These include Ruby drafting emails on Sebastian’s be-
half, Ruby sending some emails on Sebastian’s behalf without explicitly checking with
him in advance, and other executive team members sending Ruby emails directly that
are meant for Sebastian. All of these, to some extent, blur the boundary of leadership
authority. These empirics therefore demonstrate that it is not always clear who is actu-
ally responding to Sebastian’s email. From the recipient’s perspective, all emails coming
from Sebastian are from the COO, but what begins to emerge, when the minute details
of the production of those messages are taken into account, is an understanding that the
leadership activities of the COO are both computationally and geographically dispersed
across a range of people and computational objects for their accomplishment. This kind of
dispersal, often associated with computational technology, is far from new within work-
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place studies (O’Mahony and Barley 1999; Zubo￿ 1988, p. 243), however, that its e￿ects
are linked speci￿cally to leadership practices as they are in this study is a novel ￿nding
within the context of the extant leadership literature.
Even I was drawn into this network of production. As described above, while I
was in Sebastian’s o￿ce, before Ruby came in to begin the pair emailing session, Sebastian
enrolled my assistance in writing a blog post that was intended as a formal company-wide
announcement. In this experience, my expertise as a writer was sought, but the points to
be made were already clear to Sebastian. He knew what he wanted to say but wanted
assistance in saying it. Put di￿erently, Sebastian had the substance and saw my skills as
o￿ering additional style. The former is a distinctive contribution and commonly associated
with the ideological vision of the leader who engages his subordinates in accomplishing
the work to be done (Grint 2005a, p. 33; Ladkin 2010, pp. 101-126; Shamir et al. 1993, p. 585).
Meanwhile, the role of the computational object in this engagement was transpar-
ent in service of the task, but was nevertheless present. Using Google Docs™, we employed
the services of the computational object in a dual role of recording and re￿ecting our think-
ing, as discussed between us, by then typing alphanumeric symbols on a keyboard, which
were then converted to binary symbols and stored on Google servers somewhere on the
planet in triplicate (Ghemawat et al. 2003, p. 30), and then represented back on the screen
as alphanumerics. This role of the computational object as a combination of a recorder
and representational or projective device is so commonly employed that it is hardly ever
noticed, however, without it, the practice would have been signi￿cantly di￿erent on a
number of levels, as studies on the cognitive e￿ects of word processing clearly demon-
strate (Haas 1989; Joram et al. 2008).
In a similar fashion, many of the material-discursive practices I witnessed were
dependent on the existence of computational objects and the infrastructures behind them
to accomplish everyday work. Without these in place, the enactments cited as leadership
that I witnessed would have been materially and substantively di￿erent. Thus, particu-
lar enactments of leadership are revealed here to be constituted to some degree by the
computational context in which they are performed. Were, for example, Sebastian and
Ruby to be working with parchment and ink rather than computational objects, it is fair
to say that both the practice and its various outcomes would be substantially di￿erent, for
as Carlile notes, artefacts are ‘consequential’ (2006, p. 101). Taking another example, the
temporal dynamics that result from the virtually instantaneous indexing and retrieval of
e-mail message content available through Google Apps™ as well as the facility for instant
messaging (IM) both extend the reach of the already communicative activity embedded in
the practice of pair emailing. Crucially, all of these support alternative modes of thought
(Coyne 1995, p. 132; Rheingold 2000, pp. 132-151), speci￿cally in its rhizomatic expression
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(Coyne 2008, p. 552). Put simply, the practice would likely be more linear without the
support of computational objects, however, through them, modes of lateral or divergent
thought become increasingly available to the humans that interact with them (Bono 1969),
a capability recognised as bene￿cial to those in leadership positions (Garratt 2007; Hughes
2011; Jung 2001).
After Sebastian and I worked on developing the points he wished to make, in an
additional act of delegation, Sebastian asked Ruby to review what we had written and
stored in the Google Docs™ system, to work towards ￿nalising the language, and to re-
turn it to him for a ￿nal review before she made the post available company-wide. The
role of the computational object here is analogous to a ￿ling cabinet but entails more than
that. For example, it is implicit that when Ruby later works on the draft of the blog post,
she too will draw on the computational object’s recording and representative capabilities.
This dynamism, in terms of the computational object’s ability to play multiple roles simul-
taneously, is common—and by design (Gaver 1991; MacLean et al. 1990; Silberschatz et al.
2010, pp. 14-19). However, from the human perspective, it is reasonable to propose that
within these material-discursive practices, Sebastian is orchestrating various forms of del-
egation and empowerment, an activity closely associated with individuals in leadership
positions (Yukl 2009, pp. 103-116) and in which lies the basis for the division of labour.
Thus, it can be suggested that Sebastian is often leading through delegation, both through
humans and computational objects.
Another way that pair emailing can be understood as a site for leadership prac-
tice is by drawing attention to the results (see ￿gure 2.4 on page 32) it produces. Here,
Sebastian’s email is a crucial site for the o￿cial communications of the COO. As such,
it contains sensitive and strategic information regarding company ￿nances, hiring, cus-
tomer engagements, company-wide policy announcements, and other such subject areas
relating directly to the company’s central authority. A signi￿cant number of emails that
garner responses are requests for some sort of approval, thus supporting the claim that
Sebastian’s email is a site for ongoing leadership decision-making (Useem 2010a, p. 510).
Such decisions are a manifestation of the leadership authority prefaced on the formalised
position (see ￿gure 2.4 on page 32) of the COO. On this basis, pair emailing becomes a
principal site for leadership practice at Eta.
Beyond this, there are additional phenomena to consider. First, when Ruby started
working at Eta she reported that Sebastian had a backlog of over 300 messages. However,
during the initial phase of my observations, this queue was in the range of three to 40 mes-
sages. At the low end then, this represents a reduction of the COO’s formal communication
backlog by at least 86% and up to 99%. Such a reduction and its continued maintenance at
a signi￿cantly lower level implies that leadership decisions are being taken at an improved
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level of e￿ciency. This phenomenon of ‘leadership e￿ciency’ arising from the particu-
lar arrangements of humans, computational objects, and material-discursive practices is
perhaps best described as a cyborgian hybrid where, as noted in the previous chapter:
[S]ocial relationships get congealed into and taken for decontextualized things
[. . . and where] social relationships include non-humans as well as humans as
socially [. . . ] active partners (Haraway 1997, p. 8).
Thus, from this perspective, there is no way to decouple any phenomenon of ‘lead-
ership’ that may be present from the apparatuses of humans and computational objects
that are also present in the context. This is why Barad suggests:
The boundary between ‘the object of observation’ and ‘the agencies of observa-
tion’ is indeterminate in the absence of a speci￿c physical arrangement of the
apparatus (italics in original, 2007, p. 114).
I would further suggest that there is also an aspect of purpose (see ￿gure 2.4 on
page 32) present here. Speci￿cally, since Sebastian made the decision to introduce the
zero inbox practice to his work, it follows that he had some purpose in doing so, and it
is likely that this purpose relates in some way to his idealisation of how he would like to
function (e￿ectively) as a leader. Even without knowing speci￿cally what the purpose or
purposes might be, this is a reasonable inference to make.
Another striking feature of this computationally centric leadership practice was
the presence of an ongoing verbal conversation between Sebastian and Ruby.11 By per-
petually engaging in various kinds of verbal and computationally-supported conversa-
tions (exploratory, visionary, operational, social, and so forth), the unfolding narrative
of the company is simultaneously imagined as ideas are developed in conversation and
enacted as material-discursive practices (such as decision-making and formal communic-
ations) later (possibly) realised as leadership accomplishments (Nicolini and Meznar 1995,
p. 727; Czarniawska and Joerges 1996, pp. 32-33).
Thus, I submit that the functionality of the computational object contributes to
the maintenance of a dialogic space (Caronia and Cooren 2014) by enabling the possibility
for very quick interactions with almost immediate feedback, allowing for these interac-
tions to sit alongside verbal conversations and run in parallel with them. For example, it is
11More generally, the role of verbal conversation was observed to be elemental to this COO’s overall leader-
ship practice. One way to summarise this is that the COO’s role is both performative (cf. Alvesson and Spicer
2012; Barad 2003; Case and Piñeiro 2006) and improvisational (cf. Orlikowski 1996; Weick 2002; Whalen et al.
2002). See also Boden’s ethnomethodological thesis of organisations being constituted through various forms
of talk, especially her suggestion that with the rise of computational objects in the workplace, electronic
conversations must also be considered (1994, p. 209).
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possible for Sebastian to ask Ruby about an email regarding and upcoming appointment
conversationally. In response to this, she can review the message while he is speaking to
her and then open an IM window, spawning another conversation with the attendee in
question and determine that person’s availability in real-time. She is then able to respond
to Sebastian in a time frame that enables the verbal conversation between them to con-
tinue normally. The ongoing human-to-human conversation between Sebastian and Ruby
is thereby sustained by the capabilities of the computational object. If instead, Ruby had
to use a telephone or physically get up and vacate the o￿ce in order to check with the
attendee, the dialogic space would have been disrupted. In this fashion, the dialogic space
observed in pair emailing can be understood as a layer that rests on top of the computa-
tional layer of capability. Keep in mind, however, that conversations are occurring both in
physical and virtual spaces. It is also the case that many of the emails that both Sebastian
and Ruby work on are themselves ongoing conversations in their own right.
This multi-threaded reality is exempli￿ed when Sebastian opens a Google Docs™ -
spreadsheet attachment to an email. He does so to familiarise himself with further details
of the request being made in its parent email. His response to that email is itself an asyn-
chronous conversational enactment taken from the perspective of the COO; Sebastian is
writing as the formal authority in this matter and gives a decision and his reasons for that
decision in his response. That this conversation happens to occur in an asynchronous
virtual space does not lessen the continuance of the dialogic mode. Quite the contrary:
I would argue that Ruby’s physical presence and the availability of face-to-face dialogue
enhances the overall dialogic experience, centring the leadership practice of pair emailing
￿rmly on the ground of human-to-human conversation.
During this phase of observation, which continued until the end of June 2013, the
leadership practice of pair emailing was enacted regularly in this fashion and was seen
to contribute to the general capability of the COO role to lead, manage, and respond to
organisational concerns.
5.3.3 Episode Two: Email at a Distance
This next episode stands in stark contrast to the previous. What I now set forth depicts a
very di￿erent form of engagement with computational objects and email, where the leader
takes a much more isolated and individual approach. It is an approach that is backed-up
by the clearest of business logic, however, like all decisions, by including some things it
must also exclude others (Barad 2007, p. 179). Unfortunately, such exclusions are not al-
ways visible (Suchman 1995; Szymanski and Whalen 2011b). However, by bringing these
exclusions to light, I attend to something inherent in all leadership decisions: the trade-o￿
(Grint and Jackson 2010, p. 353). Here, I show how such decisions, sometimes unknow-
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ingly, include choices about engagement with computational objects that have a material
impact on leadership outcomes.
The empirical case follows Marilyn, the CEO of Epsilon and her use of email. It is
also informed by interviews with her executive team in terms of their perceptions of Mar-
ilyn as a CEO in general and their observations regarding her use of email in particular.12
5.3.3.1 Discovering the practice
During my interview with Marilyn, we discussed a number of topics, including how she
came to an understanding of leadership, how she came to an understanding of computa-
tional technology, and a discussion of the kinds of practices she found important to her
leadership practice.13
At a certain point in our interview, I asked Marilyn about her own use of compu-
tational technology within the organisation:
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿: Me myself? Hmm, well I would say from a work perspect-
ive, I would say I spend 80 to 90 percent of my day in, kind of, either
group meetings or one-on-one meetings. I spend most of my time
on the computer, either after-hours or some other time, which is
probably a frustration for people who are always trying to get in
touch with me. Right now I get back to people on email but if I
get email all day I wouldn’t—I’d feel like I wouldn’t be running the
company, you know?
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿: No I completely get it. It’s like there’s this lived experi-
ence of being in the company and being there physically, presently—
that’s very important to your leadership style.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿: Right, so I can’t be sitting behind the computer getting
every email returned immediately, so I’m always trying to ￿gure
that [laughter] out but I spent all weekend thismorning—all weekend—
because I have probably threeweeks of emails that I glance at them,
I look at them, I take my iPhone™ out, is this urgent, you know?
I mean I try to triage the emails but I mean in terms of processing
all of them, that doesn’t really happen very much at the o￿ce. It
happens on planes. It happens from home. It happens early in the
morning, late at night so it still becomes a big part of how I do
anything, so I would say I’m very involved in technology, however
12Background information on Epsilon is located in section 3.3.2.
13For further details on the content of these sensitising interviews, see section 3.1.3.3 on page 94.
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it comes to me through other people, through how they do their
work, you know, probably more so than just me as one individual
(Interview with 1005 26 March 2012).
5.3.4 Analysis: Episode Two
Even in this very short excerpt, there are both similarities and di￿erences to the ￿rst epis-
ode depicting Sebastian and Ruby. Speci￿cally, the previous case shows the importance
of the relationship between Sebastian and Ruby in the way the emails are handled; the
present case also highlights the importance of relationships between the Marilyn and her
followers as indicated by her focus on group and one-on-one meetings.
So while there is a similarity in both Sebastian and Marilyn’s focus on human
relationships, there exists a vastly di￿erent orientation to computational objects. Marilyn
attests that she spends between 80 and 90% of her time in face-to-face engagements. While
she indicates an awareness that her minimal engagement with computational objects are
likely a cause for frustration with ‘people who are always trying to get in touch’; she
does not see this as a problem for the principal reason that if she did spend more time
working on computational objects, ‘I’d feel like I wouldn’t be running the company.’ Thus,
Marilyn’s conception of her identity as a leader is to some degree in con￿ict with choices
she makes regarding her use of computational objects (Friedland 2006, pp. 37-39).
And yet, Marilyn isworkingwith computational objects—just not at work. Instead,
she reports that she spends weekends (‘all weekend’), early mornings, and late nights in
o￿-site locations such as her home and on airplanes to engage with computational ob-
jects. Put di￿erently, her use of computational objects for any sort of leadership practice
has been slotted in what I would term ‘in-between’ times and places. In Go￿man’s termin-
ology, Marilyn’s use of computational objects would be classi￿ed as occurring backstage
(1956, p. 69). The result is that in choosing not to engage with computational objects on
the front stage (ibid., pp. 13-19) in her role of CEO, she nevertheless ￿nds herself engaging
with computational objects in these in-between times and places, a location de￿ned by
Go￿man as:
[R]elative to a given performance, where the impression fostered by the per-
formance is knowingly contradicted as a matter of course (ibid., p. 69).
Indeed, Marilyn openly acknowledges that her approach is far from e￿ective, both
in terms of the frustration she may impose on others and in terms of her self-estimated
three-week email backlog. With regard to the former, the topmanagement team at Epsilon
concurred with Marilyn’s self-assessment in terms of lack of response on email. One of
157
the senior members of the executive team delicately describes his reaction to this lack of
response:
[I]t’s been a struggle for me [. . . ] What I would say is, we’re learning to adjust,
I guess, and when I say ‘adjust’ what I counsel my people on is: We’ll do the
best we can—period (Interview 1061 19 March 2010).
In this quote, the executive acknowledges the issue as a ‘struggle’ to which he and
his team are ‘learning to adjust’. The message here from the senior executive is that the
executive and his team must accept Marilyn’s lack of email response and work around it
as best they can.
With regard to Marilyn’s self-assessment of her email backlog, when comparing
this backlog at Epsilon to what was observed at Eta, there are several orders of magnitude
di￿erence. In an interview, Sebastian stated that he tends to receive at least 100 messages
per day (Interview 1019 10 October 2013). Three weeks at that rate would be a backlog
of at least 1,500 messages. This disparity is a signi￿cant material di￿erence in outcomes
between these sites.
One of the other reasons for this di￿erence appears to be that Marilyn’s executive
assistant (EA) did not take the same kind of interest in Marilyn’s emails as Ruby did with
Sebastian’s. In my discussions with Marilyn, she asserted that her EA has access to her
email and that the EA alerts Marilyn if something important comes in. However, the
level of engagement with Marilyn’s email seemed to stop here. There was no mention, for
example, of responding on behalf of Marilyn and no talk of drafting of emails on Marilyn’s
behalf. In the case of Epsilon, Marilyn’s EA apparently engaged in none of these practices.
These characteristics, coupled with Marilyn’s view of how a CEO ‘should’ behave vis-à-
vis a computational object thus contributed to a materially di￿erent set of circumstances
than what was observed at Eta.
Marilyn o￿ered supplementary details of the logic behind her decision to focus
more on people and less on computational objects. In the excerpt below, I had just asked
her about how she likes to receive information from her subordinates:
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿: I like to be updated either by email or hallway conversa-
tions, you know, beginnings and endings of meetings in terms of so
that I can track. My least favorite is ‘Here’s information, an element
from here, here’s more information,’ and the reason why I ￿nd that
to not work very well is because if I’m relying on my—kind of the
emotional intelligence to ￿gure out [a] di￿erent direction we can
go then I’mmissing a lot of information along the way as to smaller
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nuances as to how things are unfolding to be able to kind of help
direct or problem-solve when we—when they get stuck, which is
usually when they come to me for information.
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿: So I’m kind of getting this image of like Epsilon is a body
that you inhabit, that you have to make sure that you get around
even though there are other leaders. It sounds like you’re very
tactile in away. You have to be in front of people, you need to speak
with them, you need to see what’s going on in their eyes to get a
sense of what’s really happening in the environment. Do you feel
like—I mean, how is that, in your mind, di￿erent than intuition?
Because I think you talk about it in terms of emotional intelligence
[crosstalk]—
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿: Yeah or intuition. I use those interchangeably, you know?
Intuition’s a great—I just sat in ameeting thismorning andwewere
working on our [name of product line] business and some of that
intuition of is somebody being conservative, you know, do read-
ing body language in terms of how much have they really gotten
done versus howmuch they’re telling me they’ve gotten done, you
know, how questioning, kind of, their process of how they came
to the conclusions that they came to kind of test the logic and the
reasoning of the conclusion that they made (Interview with 1005
26 March 2012).
Here, Marilyn expresses the importance for her of ‘reliance’ on ‘emotional intel-
ligence’ or ‘intuition’ by being attendant to ‘smaller nuances’ that are implicit in face-to-
face engagement. In the ￿nal paragraph of the excerpt, she provides an example of how a
face-to-face context—a meeting—provides an arena for her to read the participant’s ‘body
language’ while simultaneously evaluating the ‘logic and the reasoning’ being presented
to her. This way of being in the world is apparently central to Marilyn’s identi￿cation
with her role as CEO.
To compare this with how things are at Eta, let’s begin with a statement from its
CEO and his perspective on empathy in his leadership practice:
So really, what you’re talking about with empathy is understanding or con-
necting with what someone else is thinking. You know, what’s—and it’s not
about mind-reading. It’s about listening to people and hearing what they’re
saying and taking their body language and cues and whatever [. . . ] when
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you’re collaborating very intensively, if you’re jointly solving a problem, it’s
my contention that it’s more important to understand how the other person
is trying to solve a problem and to work with [rather] that than to simply
be able to solve the problem themselves [. . . ] You really need to come to a
consensus and have a collaborative approach to problem solving. And that
simply requires empathy. You’ve got to stop and listen. You’ve got to recog-
nize what the other person is saying to you, to consider it carefully. I mean
I’m sure you’ve met plenty of people who it feels as if you’re talking to them,
but really, they’re talking to themselves (Interview 1008 February 25 2013).
And indeed, not only is this notion of empathy promoted and practised by the CEO
within Eta, but it was also, for example, recognised by Ruby in her relationship to Sebastian
and Eta when she said in section 5.3.2 on page 148 that she felt that she was respected at
Eta. To be respected means to be seen as you would like to be seen and such a state is
achieved by what Eta’s CEO describes above as ‘stopping and listening’, recognising what
the other person is saying, and carefully considering it.
Moreover, at Eta it was common for meetings to be structured with a number
of in-room participants along with a number of participants also present through Google
Hangouts™, thus constructing a hybrid space where somemembers are physically present
and some were not. An example of such meetings was the weekly director meeting con-
ducted by Sebastian at Eta, where all the directors of Eta’s various sites worldwide were
present. It was common for four participants to be present in Sebastian’s o￿ce with him
with an equal number of participants on the Google Hangout™.
In these director meetings, Sebastian was often quite active on his computational
object, however, this did not seem to lessen his ability to apply what Marilyn called ‘emo-
tional intelligence’ and attention to ‘nuance’; what the CEO of Eta called ‘empathy’ in his
engagements with his reports. For example, I witnessed a meeting where a disgruntled
employee came to speak with Sebastian about their concerns. I was impressed with the
degree to which Sebastian attended to the person on an emotional level and also addressed
the concerns practically.
Thus, the existence of Sebastian and his enactments of leadership practice, includ-
ing both empathetic engagements as well as intensive engagement with computational
objects, suggests that the style of leadershipMarilyn guards so closely can also be achieved
in an environment where engagements with computational objects are also undertaken
by the senior executive without devaluing either face-to-face engagement or the C-level
position.
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5.4 Discussion and Summation
Is Leadership Located in a Leader? Acentral question this chapter has posed iswhether
it is a valid assumption to locate leadership within formal leaders. Empirically, what I have
shown is that leadership arises through practice, and that not all such practices are en-
acted by formal leaders. I have shown, for example, that humans who do not hold formal
leadership positions, as well as non-human computational objects, are constitutive in the
enactment of leadership practices. This is evidenced in great depth through the case at
Eta where we saw the signi￿cant roles that Ruby and various computational objects play
in the enactment of such material-discursive practices as pair emailing and calendar man-
agement. Thus, I argue that while it may be a valid assumption to locate leadership within
formal leaders, the enactment of leadership is not limited to this narrow purview. Rather,
as Uhl-Bien and Ospina note, leadership is:
[A] relational (social) process. It is a distinct and pervasive social phenomenon
that has important outcomes in society (both good and bad). Moreover, be-
cause it is a social process, it occurs in context. Therefore, to learn more about
relational leadership, we need to consider process and context in the study of
leadership (2012a, p. 546).
To this extent, the present study has immersed itself in process and context through
its empirical focus on practice as it unfolds over space and time. As a result, the evid-
ence presented in this chapter, in terms of the doings and sayings of the parties involved,
provides a rich account of how the practice of leadership is accomplished at Eta vis-à-vis
email. At Eta in particular, these data reveal a form of real-time computational engage-
ment, where the ‘doing’ (Nicolini, Gherardi et al. 2003, p. 21) of leadership activities is dis-
tributively enacted through an assemblage of sociotechnical humans and computational
objects (Latour 1999, p. 159).
Thus, the analysis presented here has highlighted the concept that the enactments
of leadership are not accomplished solely by an individual holding a particular position,
but rather, by a human and non-human network of actants (Latour 1992, p. 256). And
while the present chapter is limited to two cases, I suggest that given the ubiquity of
computational objects within globalised corporate organisational environments (Lyytinen
and Yoo 2002; Yoo 2010), one would be hard-pressed not to ￿nd formal leaders within such
environments who, in one fashion or another, lead through their computational objects,
as the present data have shown. In this sense, the study addresses a critical gap in the
leadership literature where computational objects are excluded from the action (Lowe and
Gardner 2001, p. 501). What the present chapter illustrates is that computational objects
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are, in a very real sense, focal points (Guimbretière 2002) for the practice of leadership,
evidenced, for example, in the practice of pair programming as enacted by Sebastian, Ruby,
and their computational objects. For this reason, I suggest that leadership, among many
other qualities, ￿ows through these objects.
Technological ‘Choices’ and the Technological Unconscious Further, the data sug-
gest that the choices a formal leader makes about the ways they engage with computa-
tional objects is a structuring factor in leadership style. To illustrate this point, I contrasted
two very di￿erent approaches formal leaders take with their email, leading not only to dif-
ferent outcomes or results, as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32. In the ￿rst case, Sebastian’s
approach at Eta coalesces both a technological and human stance towards engagement,
where Marilyn at Epsilon asserts to favour the human while her backstage (Go￿man 1956,
p. 69) practice with computational objects nevertheless reveals that she is caught up in the
grip of the computational object during her isolated time at home and on airplanes. These
observed variances in practice are also consistent with the ￿ndings in Mazmanian’s study
that explores how similarly polarised styles of engagement with mobile devices emerge
(2013).
Crucially, these di￿erent approaches to computational engagement also lead to
very di￿erent kinds of human engagement, where in Sebastian’s case at Eta there was
evidence of a more simultaneous real-time engagement with other humans and compu-
tational objects that includes instant messaging (IM) and other modes of information and
communication technology (ICT). I would describe what was observed at Eta as displaying
a signi￿cantly greater and more ￿uid style of engagement between people and computa-
tional objects than what was observed at Epsilon.14 This is not to argue that one approach
is better than another but rather to note that there are qualitative distinctions that corres-
pond to di￿erent styles of human-computer interaction, potentially leading to alternative
entanglements. The subtle detail here that sometimes escapes conscious attention is that
human relations are often constituted through computational objects, whether these are
within email, IM, or audiovisual communication like Skype™ or Google Hangouts™.
In this vein, I would like to suggest that formal leaders, as a function of their sym-
bolic position, as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32, are likely have some impact on the way
practices, such as the mode of engagement with computational objects, are taken up by
their subordinates (Jackson and Parry 2011, p. 43). Thus, it is possible that formal lead-
ers who engage openly and ￿uidly with both human and computational objects may well
engender similar behaviour on the part of their subordinates (Elenkov and Manev 2005,




However, as previously reported in section 3.1.3.3 on page 95, where the narrat-
ives from early sensitising interviews revealed distinctive orientations to computational
technology between technology and non-technology companies, it may also be signi￿cant
that Eta is a technology company while Epsilon is a clothing manufacturer. While both
use information technology extensively, it is also the case, based on the focus of the busi-
ness, that the people who work at Eta by and large have a much more explicit orientation
towards computational objects than those at Epsilon. Perhaps these di￿erences also ac-
count for, to some degree, for why formal leaders in di￿erent sites make di￿erent kinds of
decisions regarding their relations with computational objects. Thus, it remains an open
question, the degree to which leader behaviours shape organisational culture or vice-versa
(Heifetz et al. 2009b; Kellerman 2012, pp. 42-43). If, however, one were to take a Baradian
perspective that favours intra-action (Barad 2007, p. 237), both would be acknowledged to
be correct and co-constitutive.
Amidst these complexities where leaders may be shaped by and simultaneously
exert in￿uence on the environment, I want to clarify that when I refer to ‘choices’ formal
leaders make about computational engagement, I am not suggesting that such delibera-
tions are made under rational choice theory (March 1991, p. 97). Rather, I refer to a more
subtle and passive view of choice, one instead in￿uenced by the ‘technological uncon-
scious’ (cf. Clough 2000, p. 2; Hayles 2006, pp. 138-139; Thrift 2004a, p. 41, 2004b, p. 187).
Hayles describes the technological unconscious as being marked by:
[T]he everyday habits initiated, regulated, and disciplined by multiple strata
of technological devices and inventions, ranging from an artifact as ordinary
as a wristwatch to the extensive and pervasive e￿ects of the World Wide Web
[. . . can be understood by] thinking of cognition as something that, far from
being limited to the neo-cortex, occurs throughout the body and stretches
beyond body boundaries into the environment (2006, pp. 138-139).
Thus, critical to this concept of the technological unconscious is the lack of aware-
ness an individual may encounter regarding the phenomenological experience of living
(and thinking) amongst artefacts. As Clough puts it, this is observable as a:
[R]esistance to recognize the technical substrates of unconscious memory
[. . . and the] refusal of an intimacy between the body and the machine, nature
and technology, the virtual and the real, the living and the inert (2000, p. 17).
Thus, I argue that in many of the cases where ‘choices’ about computational ob-
jects are being made by formal leaders, there is a tendency, as evidenced in the case of
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Marilyn at Epsilon and her rationale for not wanting to be seen at work sitting behind a
computer screen, for this rationale to completely overlook the level to which daily life is
‘initiated, regulated, and disciplined by multiple strata of technological devices’ (Hayles
2006, p. 138). In other words, in consciously choosing her rationale, there appears to be a
lack of awareness of its e￿ects, for despite her choice not to engage with technologies at
work, she is doing so backstage (Go￿man 1956, p. 69), which means that she is bringing
work into her personal life. There is a paradox here in that she consciously chooses to
distance herself from computational objects at the workplace, but ends up having to work
with them anyway. Through this course of action, I suggest that she is not fully consider-
ing the role of technology in her worklife and the e￿ects she is trying to produce through
it. Instead, her rationale e￿ects a ‘choice’ that privileges human-to-human interaction and
thereby places technology in a role where it receives less attention and thought in terms
of how it is mobilised in practice. This raises the question of what exactly she is trying to
achieve with it. In the case of Marilyn, I suggest that this question, as a function of her
logic, remains unaddressed.
In this sense, Marilyn’s rationale can be viewed as an unconscious form of reason-
ing in that it ignores the technological ‘reality’. Moreover, and consistent with Marilyn’s
position, in almost every observational case I undertook with a formal leader, similar gaps
in formal reasoning were evidenced. For example, when I asked a formal leader at Eta
why he did something with a computational object in the way that he did it (for example,
conducting an interview without initiating video), the answer, surprisingly, was ‘I never
thought about it before’ (￿eld diary 13 Nov 2012). Thus, I argue, there is a degree to which
myriad ‘choices’ regarding computational objects are not being fully considered.
This is a paradox, for while the empirical evidence presented in this chapter shows
that the computational object clearly plays a signi￿cant role in constituting human rela-
tionships in these environments, it does not seem, among the formal leaders I followed,
to be conspicuously considered in practice, whether they are technologists or not. Rather,
its use tends to fall into particular habits that, in many cases have, not been exposed to
the same levels of formal analysis that the same leader might apply to a ￿nance or hu-
man resources decision. It is relegated, in the spirit of Clough’s term, to the ‘technological
unconscious’ (2000, p. 2), both cognitively and in terms of the actual leadership practices
being enacted.
In contrast, I refer the reader back to section 5.3.1.3 on page 148, where I argued
based on the constraints that the Google Calendar™ system imposes, Ruby developed a
strategy of arti￿cially ￿lling Sebastian’s calendar with dummy appointments. This, per-
haps, epitomises the opposite of making decisions through a ‘technological unconscious’
(ibid.), for in this case, Ruby actively partnered with the system to align with and exploit
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its constraints to her advantage in pursuit of her goal to achieve speci￿c results as depicted
in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32.
A recommendation that follows from this ￿nding for leadership development pro-
grammes is to include the idea of the technological unconscious as a sensitising concept
in formal leadership training where leaders-in-training can be made aware of the concept
and some of the rami￿cations of their choices, such as the distances various technological
means of communication introduce (cf. Bligh and Riggio 2012a).
The Question of Technology But despite Ruby’s technological consciousness with re-
gard to Google Calendar™, or any separate e￿orts that might be made to inject increased
consciousness with respect to technology in leadership development, technological un-
consciousness, according to Hayles, cannot ever be completely overcome. This because:
[T]he cognitive systems entraining human behavior become even more per-
vasive, ￿exible, and powerful in their e￿ects on human conscious and non-
conscious cognition [. . . thereby resulting in] human behavior is increasingly
integrated with the technological nonconscious through somatic responses,
haptic feedback, gestural interactions, and a wide variety of other cognitive
activities that are habitual and repetitive and that therefore fall below the
threshold of conscious awareness (Hayles 2006, p. 140).
This view echoes, and in a sense, speci￿es Heidegger’s assertion that:
[T]echnology will never allow itself to be mastered, either positively or negat-
ively by a human doing founded merely on itself. Technology, whose essence
is Being itself, will never allow itself to be overcome by men (Heidegger 1977,
p. 38).
For Heidegger associates technology itself as one of the ways Being conceals itself.
His solution to this dilemma, according to Coyne, is to learn to cooperate with this form
of Being, which he describes as:
[A] “letting be” or “releasement”. Heidegger uses the archaic German word
Gelaßenheit, which [in this sense means] letting Being reveal itself. The an-
tidote to the enframing of technology is not revolution but adopting a new
attitude (Coyne 1995, p. 85).
This Gelaßenheit, according to Heidegger, is a game of balancing opposites. He
suggests that:
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Still we can act otherwise. We can use technical devices, and yet with proper
use also keep ourselves so free of them, that we may let go of them any time.
We can use technical devices as they ought to be used, and also let them alone
as something which does not a￿ect our inner and real core. We can a￿rm
the unavoidable use of technical devices, and: also deny them the right to
dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature.
But will not saying both yes and no this way to technical devices make our re-
lation to technology ambivalent and insecure? On the contrary! Our relation
to technology will become wonderfully simple and relaxed. We let technical
devices enter our daily life, and at the same time leave them outside, that is, let
them alone, as things which are nothing absolute but remain dependent upon
something higher. I would call this comportment toward technology which
expresses ‘yes’ and at the same time ‘no,’ by an old word, releasement toward
things? (1966, p. 54)
Under this balanced view of Heidegger’s Gelaßenheit, I suggest that Ruby’s en-
gagement with the Google Calendar™ represents an enactment of this Gelaßenheit. Ruby
says ‘yes’ to the technology by using it to manage Sebastian’s calendar, but she also says
‘no’ to it by using her cognitive skills to understand what its constraints are, what the
other people using the system see based on her actions, and what her goals are to come
up with an interactional approach that allows her to reach her desired goals.
Implications for the study of Leadership To some extent, all of the arguments I make
here in this chapter are an inevitable conclusions if one takes seriously the words of Fou-
cault and Latour. Foucault, for example, makes it clear that the ‘great state apparatuses’
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are ‘technological’ in nature (Foucault 1984,
p. 61). And in a similar vein, Latour notes that the:
[Q]uestion known as ‘the division of labor’ may in no sense be di￿erentiated
from the question of what is technical (Latour 1994, p. 45).
Thus, for both Foucault and Latour, there is never any question but to include tech-
niques and technologies in the same analytical category—and to ensure their inclusion in
the analysis of the ‘social’. Contrary to this position, the general propensity of leadership
scholarship is to omit technology altogether (Bass and Stogdill 1990b, p. xiii; Kahai 2012,
p. 100; Lowe and Gardner 2001, p. 501). More broadly however, Zammuto et al. note this
is a symptom attributable more generally to organisational scholarship (Zammuto et al.
2007, p. 749). Indeed, Latour suggests, based on the historical trajectory of sociology, that
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the omission of artefacts reaches back to the work of Durkheim (1994, p. 45). From this
perspective then, there is systematic and historical tendency to ignore the role of tech-
niques that become embedded as technological objects in organisational life. Thus, one of
the foundational implications of this research for the study of leadership is to highlight
the central role these objects play in the enactment of leadership.
One might also argue that such a bias to remove technology from the equation is,
to some degree, engendered from a dominant view of individual agency based on indi-
vidualism and liberalism where:
‘[L]iberalism’, as Friedman called it, has penetrated economics, law, sociology,
social psychology and most other core disciplines, yielding theories such as
agency theory, transaction cost economics, game theory, social network ana-
lysis, theories of social dilemmas, and so on, that we now routinely draw on
both, radical individualism and Friedman’s liberalism, to frame our research
and to guide our teaching (Ghoshal 2005, p. 84).
Within this volunteerist frame, technologies are generally not viewed as autonom-
ous agents, although there is no shortage of scholarly support for such a position.15 Indeed
my position here is decidedly posthuman in that the empirical evidence I have presented
shows that it is not only the human that acts or has agency. In the next chapter, I ex-
plore this so-called agency of non-humans even more closely, through an exploration of
technological breakdowns on leadership practice.




Who indeed has not felt the force of his own personality before a sensitive ma-
chine? (Mailer 1970, pp. 167-168)
6.1 Introduction
W￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿, it often seemsto fade into the background. But what about when it does not? Whereasthe previous two empirical chapters looked at speci￿c material-discursive
practices—pair programming and emailing—in order to reveal how leadership is consti-
tuted in their enactment, this chapter instead explores theways that breakdowns—speci￿cally
those materially embodied through computational objects—impact leadership practices.
As with the previous chapters, the data for this case was selected based on Flyvberg’s crit-
ical case approach (2011, p. 307), described in detail insection 3.1.3.4 on page 96. Moreover,
heeding the call of Sandberg and Tsoukas (2011), this chapter employs breakdowns as a site
for understanding the relationship between leadership practice and computational objects
from a novel perspective, one that can be understood as an inversion of practice.
According to Sandberg and Tsoukas, it is through these:
[B]reakdowns that the relational whole of sociomaterial practice is moment-
arily brought into view (ibid., p. 344).
Here they suggest that when breakdowns occur, it is possible to see practice in a
di￿erent light; for in themoment of a breakdown, the practice ceases to function, while the
sociomaterial assemblage that was previously employed and obscured by the active, func-
tional practice comes into sharp relief. The underlying assemblage is, then, for the dura-
tion of the breakdown, made visible. Thus, in this chapter, I focus on empirics involving
breakdowns in order to reveal this ‘relational whole’ to which Sandberg and Tsoukas refer.
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Following their call further suggests that I mobilise a number of associated theor-
etical concepts in tandem, including Heidegger’s views on tools, technology, and break-
downs (1927 / 1996, 1977). Further, this approach implicates Sandberg and Tsoukas’ prac-
tical rationality. Practical rationality involves the development of theory that ‘explore[s]
how organizational practices are constituted and enacted by actors, [and] capture[s] es-
sential aspects of the logic of practice’ (2011, p. 339). In addition to the empirical material
itself, I engage with these theoretical concepts as a means to more fully explicate the re-
lationship between leadership practices and computational objects and, in particular, the
ways in which leadership practices are enacted through, and their dependency on, com-
putational objects.
6.2 Breaking Down Breakdowns
Within various literatures, breakdowns have been studied extensively. Many of these em-
phasise the philosophical rami￿cations of breakdowns. Verbeek (2005), for example, has
observed in his analysis of Heidegger’s view on technology that:
The trustworthy world that developed around the computer—the open books,
the keyboard, the screen, the cup of co￿ee; in short, the entire mutually refer-
ring network that Heidegger calls a world—is abruptly destroyed. The com-
puter changes over from being one of the handy or ready-to-hand objects
that shape this world to what Heidegger calls something vorhanden: ‘object-
ively present’ in the newer translation, or ‘present-at-hand’ in the older. Its
transparency is transformed into opacity. The computer no longer can be
conveniently utilized in the practice of writing, but abruptly demands inter-
action with itself. The relation with the world around the computer that took
place ‘through’ it is disturbed. Only when it starts up again and everything
works without a hitch is the world that was destroyed again restored (ibid.,
pp. 79-80).
This space of the breakdown, according to Verbeek, marks a qualitative shift in
the relationship between a human and a computational object, one that moves away from
the former’s intended practice to the attendance of the latter’s ‘needs’. These ‘needs’ are
not like human or animal needs, nonetheless, because without attending to them or ￿nd-
ing some way to work around them, the practice that was formerly in process cannot be
reconstituted.
Yanow and Tsoukas (2009) also leverage Heidegger in their re￿ections of the prac-
tice perspective of Donald Schön to reframe his ideas in a phenomenological perspective.
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They explore the concept of breakdown explicity as a means to explain competency in
practice through re￿ection-in-action which they distinguish from:
[S]urprise and awareness [. . . ] articulating more clearly the way improvisa-
tional responses emerge in the misdst of action (2009, p. 1357).
Sandberg and Tsoukas also invoke Heidegger in their conception of breakdowns
by employing Heidegger’s categorisation of temporary and total breakdowns. According
to Sandberg and Tsoukas, temporary breakdowns involve a movement from a previous
intention and towards ‘paying deliberate attention to what we do in order to continue’
(2011, p. 344). In contrast, a total breakdown involves an acknowledgement on the part of
the human that the intention cannot continue, resulting in a state that Dreyfus refers to
as ‘theoretical re￿ection’ (1991, p. 80). This is a term he uses to denote a mode of being
in the world ‘detached from the everyday practical context’ (ibid., p. 83) when ‘work is
permanently interrupted, [and] we can either stare helplessly at the remaining objects or
take a new detached theoretical stance towards things and try to explain their underlying
causal properties’ (ibid., p. 79).
Within their work, Sandberg and Tsoukas also argue for an alternative framework
to the representationalism of scienti￿c rationality that brings the research closer to ‘the
logic of practice’ (2011, p. 353). Their alternative, practical rationality, is an approach that
enables the development of open-ended theories ‘in the sense that they are open to further
speci￿cation in particular cases’ (ibid.) that:
[A]re seen as indicators that guide the search for better understanding, en-
couraging researchers to look for family resemblances—namely, for the simil-
arities and di￿erences among the empirical phenomena indicated by a concept
(such as, for example, routine-in-action, strategy-as-practice, sensemaking)
(ibid.).
In this view, Sandberg and Tsoukas argue for a methodologically comparative ap-
proach, not unlike Ragin (1989). Unlike Ragin, however, theirs is ontologically grounded
in the work of Heidegger (1927 / 1996) and his core ideas of tool-being and breakdown.
Indeed, their alternative to the hypothetico-deductive tradition of scienti￿c rationality is
argued explicitly through the very notion of breakdowns.
Graham and Thrift also explore repair and maintenance as an ongoing response to
continual breakdowns. For example, within the modern-day city, they call our attention
to:
[S]irens denoting accidents, to the noises of pneumatic drills denoting the
constant upkeep of the roads, through the echoing clanks and hisses of the
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tyre and clutch replacement workshop, denoting the constant work needed
just to keep cars going (2007, p. 3).
Mobilising a materialist perspective and invoking Heidegger’s zuhandenheit (1927
/ 1996, pp. 64-67), they argue:
[T]hat a major research challenge in the social sciences currently is to re-
imagine economies and places in ways which, to adopt Susan Leigh-Star’s
term, manage to ‘surface the invisible work’ (1999, p. 385) of maintenance and
repair that continuously surrounds infrastructural connection, movement and
￿ow (2007, p. 17).
Thus for Graham and Thrift, a processual cycle of ongoing breakdowns triggers
ongoing repair and maintenance and is a profoundly political issue; one where options
abound and choices have consequences. Their concern is how the space of ongoing break-
down gives rise to choices and that the choices and their outcomes have wide-reaching ef-
fects, including worker wages, living conditions, deskilling, and concealment of expendit-
ure related to repair (ibid., p. 18).
Suchman also explores breakdowns in her landmark study of user interaction with
copying machines, drawing on both the work of Heidegger and Dreyfus (2007, pp. 73-74).
Here, Suchman makes a distinction between the kinds of temporary breakdowns already
described and those that arise out of a user’s lack of familiarity with the equipment. Indeed
it is explicitly as a result of such breakdowns that Suchman argues for situated action,
which:
[I]s not made explicit by rules and procedures. Rather, when situated action
becomes in some way problematic rules and procedures are explicated for
purposes of deliberation and the action, which is otherwise neither rule based
nor procedural, is then made accountable to them (ibid., p. 74).
In other words, when breakdowns occur, rules and procedures, which are often
the reference points for various practices, no longer function and people must account for
their own actions in a di￿erent fashion than through pre-existing rules and procedures.
Such action must therefore be situated and not predetermined.1
Note however, that Suchman’s view on breakdowns not only applies to interac-
tions between humans and non-humans, but also between humans in terms of breakdowns
in communicative acts where:
1See, however, Ciborra’s critique of this term and his argument that Heidegger’s term, be￿ndlichkeit, has
been mistranslated into the term situated, and omits an essential a￿ective component in its general under-
standing and use within the literature (2006).
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[T]he coherence of the interaction over some inde￿nite number of past turns
may be called into question, and the source of the trouble may be di￿cult or
impossible to reconstruct. In contrast to the routine problems and remedies
that characterize local repair in conversation, such a situation may come close
to communicative failure; that is, it may require abandoning the current line
of talk or beginning anew (2007, p. 101).
It is interesting to note that Suchman does not refer to such issues as ‘breakdowns’
but instead uses words like ‘problems’ and ‘failure’. I suggest, however, that while Such-
man never explicitly states this, breakdowns in communication between people o￿er yet
another site of the same pattern of breakdown where subject-object relations are trans-
formed. A di￿erence is that in human communication, the object-in-question is intelligib-
ility, which is a not an externally materialised, physical object.2 Suchman acknowledges
the existence of such a non-physical object when she asserts that:
Human interaction succeeds to the extent that it does, however, due not simply
to the abilities of any one participant to construct meaningfulness but also to
the possibility ofmutually constituting intelligibility, in and through the inter-
action. This includes, crucially, the detection and repair of mis- (or di￿erent)
understandings (2007, p. 12).
This, as with the positions of Graham and Thrift (2007), Sandberg and Tsoukas
(2011), and Yanow and Tsoukas (2009) asserts a processual perspective where breakdowns
are considered an inherent part of the construction of, in this case, intelligibility. When,
through breakdown, access to intelligibility is obstructed, human communicative practices
employ the breakdown as a means to repair and maintain, just as Graham and Thrift’s
pneumatic drills maintain the roads.
Elsewhere, however, Suchman speci￿cally acknowledges the role of technology
and its associated breakdowns as located amidst an even more basic phenonenon—the
very constitution of subjects and objects. In this view, computational technology sits:
[P]rovocatively on the boundary of subjects and objects, threatening its break-
down at the same time that it reiterates its founding identities and di￿erences
(2011, p. 133).
Thus, human interactions with computational technology, for Suchman, o￿er a
Janus-faced set of relations. On the one hand, these relations always hold the possibility
2For perspectives on such non-physical objects limited to the technical sphere, see Faulkner and Runde
2010; Kallinikos, Aaltonen et al. 2013.
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for breakdown, while on the other, idealisations about them are discursively employed
‘within both technical and popular imaginaries’ (2011, p. 133) as a means to normatively
shape perceptions of such objects, and thus, our own identities in relation to them.
In summary, all of these positions explore breakdowns, not only from a practical
perspective through their outcomes and consequences, but through a consistent emphasis
on their philosophical rami￿cations.
Meanwhile, a still broader stream of literature explores speci￿c and famous break-
downs as a means to understand them and, in many cases, to either promote learning or at
least suggest opportunities for learning that arise out of breakdowns (Beck and Plowman
2009; Bostrom and Heinen 1977; Christianson et al. 2009; Weick 2008). Such studies are
often couched in terms of a tension between human and system error that leads to break-
down (Beynon-Davies 1999; Yeo 2002). Such studies tend to frame breakdowns as events
that contradict expected outcomes and, therefore, have the power to surprise and shock
(Lyytinen 1988; Weick and Roberts 1993).
Speci￿cally, with respect to relationships with technology, there exist studies on
systems that inadvertently kill people by administering too much radiation (Leveson and
Turner 1993), space shuttle disasters (Starbuck and Milliken 1988), buggy missile defence
software (Halpern 2005), failed transit systems (Latour 1996a), military drones employed
as thanatological devices (Sharkey and Suchman 2013), and a range of other high-risk
technologies (Perrow 1984). However, it is not necessary to explore such Frankensteinian
scenarios (Winner 1997); one can just as easily argue that any study that explores how
people work with technology in any depth must also address the everyday mundane issue
of breakdown (Nicolini and Roe 2014, p. 70; Nicolini, Mengis et al. 2011, p. 13; Orr 1996,
p. 3; Star 1999, p. 382).
Thus, a wide range of studies have explored breakdowns as a means to make sense
of practice. Such studies, as I have shown, highlight the philosophical rami￿cations of
breakdowns; for many of these, the work of Heidegger (1927 / 1996, 1977) is a perennial
resource. I have also shown that studies that explore breakdowns can be very speci￿c,
looking at particular incidents and linking them to human learning and/or relationships
to technology. This chapter follows this established tradition but, in particular, also re-
sponds to Sandberg and Tsoukas’s call for the development of open-ended theory through
practical rationality (2011, p. 353).
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6.3 Findings: The Indeterminacy of Breakdowns
The data presented in this chapter was collected from two di￿erent sites at the company
Eta. The informants presented in the episodes include Walt and Ari,3 both of whom work
at di￿erent locations within Eta and both of whom, in my presence, experienced break-
downs with their computational objects. However, they each responded to these break-
downs quite di￿erently. The episodes, by describing these di￿erent responses, demon-
strate a spectrum of responses to (computational) interruption ranging from ‘freezing up’,
at one end of this spectrum, to improvisation, at the other.
These two episodes are exemplars of a common phenomenon observed throughout
the study, namely the mode in which computational objects, in opposition to their ideolo-
gically accepted purpose as tools for e￿ciency (McCarthy 1966, p. 65; Winograd and Flores
1986, p. 175), serve as centres of interruption or delay. This was especially and repeatedly
observed during many Skype™ calls, FaceTime™ calls, Google Hangouts™, and other au-
diovisual information and communication technology (ICT) platforms. For example, on
many occasions, commencing or continuing a meeting involving these platforms was fre-
quently delayed due to someone’s audio not working properly. Adjustments of cameras,
sound preferences, and other necessary material engagements with the computational ob-
ject to address these breakdowns were accepted as part of everyday experience for those
I observed, often with the participants making jokes about the problems they commonly
experience with these tools.4 In this chapter, I explore two cases in order to interrogate the
di￿erent responses to such interruptions, that is, interrogating the human choices made
in response to them. I turn now to the ￿rst episode, where we re-join Walt in a remote
pair programming environment.
6.3.1 Episode One: ‘Freezing Up’ with Walt
As an Eta employee often paired with clients, Walt is expected to embody the idealisation
of agile software development practices (Poppendieck and Poppendieck 2003) and appears
to takes great pride in this. This is an implicit rather than formal leadership role, where
Walt is presented to clients as an expert whose knowledge and experience enable him
to guide (and thus lead) them in learning and understanding agile methodologies, whilst
3For more information on Eta, see section 3.3.1. For further information on Walt and Ari, see sec-
tions 3.3.1.3 and 3.3.1.4, respectively.
4In Heidegger’s terminology, this class of breakdown would be referred to as Malfunction (Dreyfus 1991,
pp. 71-72) and is considered least impactful with respect to the way it alters the relationship between subject
and object. In contrast, the more extreme temporary breakdown (ibid., pp. 72-79) and total breakdown (ibid.,
pp. 79-83) would more accurately describe the kinds of breakdowns explored in the episodes, albeit I will
argue that the extent of the breakdown hinges on the human decisions made about it and the subsequent
actions taken.
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simultaneously addressing real-world programming challenges. As presented in chapter 4
on page 110, one of the central agile practices at Eta is pair programming, where two
programmers sit together and work on the same screen, programming lines of code as an
ensemble through ongoing conversation.
However, most of Walt’s engagements with clients and other Eta employees is
virtual, and Walt explains to me that he has put a great deal of e￿ort into organising
an array of computational objects to enable e￿ective remote pair programming. These
arrangements are discussed in detail in section 4.3.2.5 It is clear from the speci￿city of
these arrangements thatWalt has given considerable thought to how his workspace might
be arranged with particular attention to the enablement of pair programming practice
remotely.
During my observations withWalt he explained that a recurrent stand-up meeting
(Augustine et al. 2005, p. 88) is generally set for 10:00 a.m. each day.6 As this is a recurring
event, Walt has created a persistent Google Hangout™ that appears as a link in his a
calendar entry on his Macintosh™. However, due to platform di￿erences, the link to the
persistent hangout is not visible on the web-rendered view of the calendar on an iPad™.
Walt remarks that he ￿nds this frustrating because he wants to initiate the hangout from
the iPad™. Further, going to the Google Plus™ application on the iPad™ does not allow
access to the named hangout either, so he copies the link from the Macintosh™, mails it to
himself, and then retrieves the link through an email client on the iPad™. He remarks that
these ‘kinds of hacks are par for the course’ (￿eld diary 26 March 2013). We ultimately end
up connecting via FaceTime™ instead of a Google Hangout™.
When we do connect at 9:53 a.m. to a colleague at the other location, we discover
that he is struggling with updating a shared iPad™ whose applications have been down-
loaded under a number of Eta user accounts. As he is a client and not an Eta employee, he
does not have the account password and so is unable to initiate the update.
At thismoment, the power inWalt’s home goes out. The FaceTime™ link is severed
and the network also seems to be down. However, Walt has an uninterruptible power
supply (UPS), which is currently powering his main computer. It remains on despite all
the lights now being o￿. He proceeds to shut the machine down cleanly, expressing his
frustration to me with the fact that there are things beyond his control. Walt then tries to
send a message to his colleague via Google Plus™ on his iPhone™ but is blocked by two-
stage veri￿cation (Google 2013a), as he has not installed the authentication application
on his phone that generates the second-level passkey. I ask Walt if he has the phone
5In particular, I call the reader’s attention to ￿gure 4.1 and table 4.2 on page 116.
6Despite the name, Walt did not stand during any of these meetings. This is one of the ways in which
virtuality distorts traditional meanings. In contrast, I did observe other stand-up meetings at Eta. At these
meetings, all participants were physically present and they all did stand during the meeting.
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number at the other location and he says he does not. Suddenly, Haraway’s ‘congealed
decontextualization’ (1997, p. 8) has completely dissolved. The general role of technology
that Borgmann asserts as being invisible and unchallenged (1987, p. 220) has suddenly
become centrally visible and extremely challenging.
Growing more agitated, Walt switches to Google Chat™ on his iPhone™ and sug-
gests a Skype™ voice call for the stand-up. It is not clear that his message is received
and Walt appears to struggle as he thinks about what he wants to do in the face of this
interruption while simultaneously typing text messages on a tiny phone keyboard.
We discuss strategies of what to do if the power does not come back on. There is a
sense of a sort of thrashing that one experiences with a computer when memory resources
are overloaded; clock cycles are taken up with very little visible activity. Like a deer in the
headlights, Walt seems to have frozen mid-stream, not able to complete any single task
without signi￿cant e￿ort, perhaps called by the circumstances to make a decision without
the support of computational objects and, at the same time, bound to them. After some
minutes that pass like this, we agree he will check the power company’s Twitter feed and
I will report the outage on-line through our handheld computational objects and their
associated cellular networks.
In navigating to the utility’s web site, I ￿nd that the power outage is known to
the power company and their estimated time for restoring the power is more than two
hours, away, 12:15 p.m. This is not good news for Walt, who is already visibly upset by
this disruption and further troubled by this new information. We discuss the possibility of
going up the street to an Internet café and agree that this will be the best course of action.
Walt begins typing a message to this e￿ect to his remote colleague and then at 10:08 a.m.
the power comes back on. Breathing a sigh of relief, Walt restarts his computer.
There is a sense, with the power having just gone out and all of the scrambling
and resistance with technology that was experienced, that Walt has been under a sort of
technological assault. Here, the computational objects, in a Latourian (1999) sense, has
rebelled and refused to be enrolled (ibid., p. 185) in the desired practice.
At 10:11 a.m., we are back on FaceTime™ with his colleague. While it has been
less than 10 minutes since the power went o￿, this event has brought us to a palpable
state of disruption. Walt is visibly agitated and tense. He relates to his remote colleague a
previous situation where he had to work at an Internet café under a similar circumstance.
He describes having a headset on, lots of cables connected to his computer, and typically
arranged terminal windows with lots of code on the screen. He says he remembers that
in sitting at the bar near where people add their milk and sugars people looked at him
strangely. He realised that he looked like a typical hacker and was therefore being viewed
as such. Walt and his remote colleague laugh about this, and I ￿nd myself thinking about
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how this way of working reminds me of tribes of nomads, who have no real home, but
must constantly move to ￿nd food. Except in this case, the target is internet connectivity.
At 10:14 a.m., in preparation for the stand-up meeting, Walt brings up the project
work item tracking system (WITS) on his desktop machine. Others gather (and stand) re-
motely, signs that the stand-up will begin momentarily. Since yet another colleague is also
working remotely, it is realised that the FaceTime™ link cannot be used for the stand-up
as it only allows calls between two devices, so Walt tries to call both locations on Skype™.
Walt is now on two cameras since calls are open on both Skype™ and FaceTime™ simul-
taneously.
The stand-up proceeds quickly and then Walt moves on to the work of pair pro-
gramming with his client pair, but it is more than an hour before the heightened sense of
agitation coming from Walt begins to dissipate.
6.3.2 Episode Two: Improvisation with Ari
Ari is scheduled to have a meeting with Maureen, Director of Marketing at the HQ o￿ce
of Eta, via a Google Hangout™. Ari has initiated the hangout and there is some delay in
the initial connection, so Ari clicks again on the ‘Connect’ button, causing two hangout
windows to open, thereby creating a con￿ict he must resolve before the conversation can
proceed. Once this has occurred, and the two are in conversation, their ￿rst task is to
brie￿y discuss the problems with Google Hangouts™, where sentiments range from a gen-
eral sense of never quite knowing if it is going to work properly to an appreciation of the
way it works.
Turning to Eta business, Maureen notes that there has been a demand for materials
to show customers. This includes overall sales and marketing materials as well as case
studies. Maureen has prepared a grid showing the vertical markets where source materials
for case studies exist within Eta. The grid shows some areas where no source material
exists, represented by blanks in the grid. Maureen asserts that her focus right now is to
explore how to direct their e￿orts to ￿ll these gaps. She says that she is just starting to get
a pipeline of enterprise case studies prepared. Maureen asks Ari if he has thought about
the markets he wants to target. He responds without delay that he has selected three
markets—and names them.
Attention then turns to reviewing a slide deck. Ari is not able to open this slide
deck on the Macintosh™ operating system, apparently not having the correct software,
so opens it by launching a virtual machine running Windows™. I note that he is on a
MacBook Air™ with eight gigabytes (GB) of memory. Once the slide deck is open, the
system crashes, suddenly disconnecting the call and forcing Ari to reboot. During this
time, he uses his iPhone™ to re-establish and continue the call.
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The interruption to the call is handled as a matter of course. Voice communication
is re-established through the mobile phone (which is very quick, less than 30 seconds).
After the machine reboots, Ari restarts the virtual machine, brings up the slides, and pro-
ceeds where he left o￿. Here, options for communication using di￿erent computational
objects have been employed in quick succession. The disruption, in this case, was hardly
noticeable.
6.4 Analysis: When is a Breakdown?
What are we to make of these two events? Why do two experienced technical leaders re-
spond so di￿erently to interruptions associated with the use of electronic and networked
computational objects? Why are the outcomes di￿erent? To begin to answer these ques-
tions, let us ￿rst look at what happened before any breakdown.
In both cases, we see evidence of what Heidegger would refer to as malfunction
(Dreyfus 1991, pp. 71-72) that precedes any actual breakdown. In Walt’s case, this is evid-
enced by the issues he had with accessing the persistent link to the Google Hangout™ on
his iPad™ and the various material enactments he must undertake to ‘hack’ the link to
himself so that it is accessible from the iPad™. As a result, FaceTime™, rather than Google
Hangouts™ is used and then, as a result of another remote party attending the stand-up, a
combination of Skype™ and FaceTime™ is used. Also, withinWalt’s episode, his colleague
Robert is blocked from updating the iPad™ since he does not have the Eta password. For
Ari, a malfunction occurs when at the beginning of the Google Hangout™ with Maur-
een when he inadvertently clicks the ‘Connect’ button twice, thus opening two hangout
windows and causing a con￿ict so that one of the windows has to be closed before the
conversation with Maureen can proceed. In both of these cases, these ‘breakdowns’ are
nominal in that they did not signi￿cantly alter the relationship between subject and object.
The object in these cases, the computational object, continued to be treated by the human
as a tool. The path both Walt and Ari took here was improvisational (Orlikowski 1996, cf.
Orr 1996, p. 1; Vera and Crossan 2005; Yanow and Tsoukas 2009, p. 1357; Weick 2002); they
both ￿gured out ways to work around the limitations they encountered without breaking
the frame of the established subject-object relationship between human and computational
object.
However, when, in Walt’s case, the power went out and, in Ari’s case, the com-
puter crashed, these breakdowns did alter the subject-object relationship between human
and computational object in distinct ways. InWalt’s case, his call was disconnected and he
went through a period of sensemaking (Weick 1995) as he determined that the power had
gone o￿ from the evidence around him, while in Ari’s case, the computer screen went
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grey—an indication of a system failure. In both cases, conversations enabled through
computational objects were terminated mid-stream, dramatically changing the working
context. The question then becomes ‘What kind of breakdowns were these?’ Were they
temporary breakdowns (Dreyfus 1991, pp. 72-79) or total breakdowns (ibid., pp. 79-83)? I
suggest here that the answer, to an important degree, depends on the response of the per-
son to the computational object enacting the breakdown, which can be likened to a form
of leadership where the individual either leads themselves (and others) towards a solution,
thus enacting a temporary breakdown or remains mired in the breakdown, enacting a total
breakdown.
In Walt’s case, the sensemaking (Weick 1995) process continued for some time
into the breakdown where he tried to shift to other computational objects to re-establish
communication but encountered further computational barriers, for example, in the form
of the two-step veri￿cation (Google 2013a) that he was unable to cross. This was due to
the fact he had not con￿gured his computational object to provide the second-level au-
thentication key. Through these kinds of encounters, Walt enacted a state where he was
e￿ectively immobilised through the selection of actions that did not adequately resolve the
breakdown. This immobilisation is the ‘freezing up’ I referred to in the title of the episode
and could also be referred to as a ‘deer in the headlights’. Yet, the possibility of an action
Walt could have taken to resolve the breakdown remained. For example, he could have
contacted the main o￿ce and asked them for the phone number of the remote site in order
to re-establish communications, however, this was not a possibility he considered. Instead,
he focused his attention on attempting to resolve the issue by using other computational
objects within his ￿eld of awareness to re-establish communication via alternative chan-
nels. Indeed, this may have been a ‘rare event’ for Walt that ‘trigger[ed] learning because
[. . . it ] expose[d] weaknesses and reveal[ed] unrealized behavioral potential’ (Christianson
et al. 2009, p. 846).
Meanwhile, Ari, in response to the system crash, ￿ipped his iPhone™ over and
called the number of the colleague he had just been disconnected from. The lag between
the time of the system crash and the reconnection did not exceed 30 seconds. Once recon-
nected, he relied on his colleague to verbally lead him to where they were in the slide deck,
since the voice call alone did not provide a visual reference to the slide deck. This was ar-
guably slower and less e￿cient than using a screen to reference the material, however, it
worked, and it had the overall e￿ect of reframing the breakdown, making it unimportant.
Through Ari’s selection of action, the breakdown was e￿ectively jettisoned; he impro-
visationally selected another computational object that was arguably not as well-suited
as the previous one given the lack of visual capability, however, it worked—it enabled the
communication to be maintained and the joint work to be progressed through an impro-
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visational refocusing into/through another computational object.
One might think that previous experience may have something to do with these
di￿erences. Following this logic, I discussed this idea with Ari after the incident and he
reported that this sort of thing had happened when he was in other remote locations,
suggesting that he had learned from those previous experiences. Yet, Walt also told his
colleague, once the power was restored, that he had experienced something similar before
and said that he felt that he had been viewed as a ‘hacker’ when he had previously gone
to an Internet café to re-establish communications. So it is not the case that Walt lacked
the experience. Reading both situations di￿ractively through the lens of Ciborra (2004) ,
the improvisational and hacking elements that can lead to ‘radical innovation’ (ibid., p. 29)
were present in both, but failed to materialise for Walt.
It would also be easy and predictable to generally critique what could be called
a lack of preparedness in the face of this interruption and argue that Walt should have
ensured he had the phone number to the other location and that if he was going to use two-
step veri￿cation (Google 2013a) that he should have had the authentication application set
up on his phone so that he could log in when necessary. And perhaps Walt should follow
such advice, however, my point is broader than a knee-jerk ‘blame the leader’ analysis.
Here Grint observes that:
[W]e seem to have a problem with Nietzschean anxiety over the determina-
tion of causation. In other words, when situations appear both threatening
and ambiguous we seem to demand a clear causal agency; because if we can-
not establish this agency then ‘the problem’ is potentially irresolvable [. . . ]
In the presence of such a potential conclusion the tendency seems to be [. . . ]
to ￿nd ‘the culprit’ by looking harder, not to accept the conclusion. In short,
such intolerable Nietzschean anxiety guides us back into the search for a com-
mander to resolve the irresolvable crisis (2010b, pp. 24-25).
Instead, I would like to propose, following Grint, that we look elsewhere for other
explanations for these di￿erent outcomes. Speci￿cally, I’d like to hone in on the leader-
ship dimension of purpose (see ￿gure 2.4 on page 32), andmake some comparisons between
what was observed between Walt and Ari that suggest di￿erent orientations to purpose.
Through the remainder of this analysis, I will show that di￿erent purposes produce dif-
ferent leadership outcomes.
Speci￿cally, recall that Walt has an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) as part of
his array of equipment to support remote pairing.7 It is clear, when hearing Walt speak
about the process he went through to set up the remote pairing console, that he has given
7See page 175 for this description.
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a great deal of thought and attention to the selection of the equipment in service of the
remote pairing practice. In particular, the provisioning of a uninterruptible power supply
(UPS) suggests that speci￿c thought has been given to power failures. However, Walt’s
purpose in having a UPS for a potential power failure may have been to protect the com-
putational technology and data being worked on in the event of a power failure rather
than the preservation of communication with other humans. Indeed, it was observed that
Walt did move to shut down his main computer shortly after the power failed and did this
before he attempted to reconnect with his human colleague. One way this can be inter-
preted is that Walt prioritised the computational object over the human—that his purpose
resulting from his thinking about power failure was to protect the computational objects
from damage rather than protect communications from being severed.
In contrast, while Ari, being a programmer himself, was adept with technology,
his purpose can be interpreted as being much more human-centric. When his machine
enacted the system crash, he did not even try to restart the machine until after he ￿ipped
his phone over and had his caller back on the line. His apparent purpose was human
communication over computational recovery.
This interpretive subtlety, if accurate, tells us a lot about theways inwhich purpose
relates to leadership practice. Purpose is about ends or goals and, from the perspective
of human behaviour, appears to drive the means to achieve them. Thus, a purpose to
protect the computational technology drives actions that serve those ends but do little to
re-establish the communication that the power failure severed. Meanwhile, Ari’s singular
focus on human communication led to a di￿erent set of actions that were more e￿ective
than Walt’s in terms of maintaining the conversation.
Thus, based on the informant’s response, inWalt’s case, we have a total breakdown
(Dreyfus 1991, pp. 79-83) while in Ari’s we have a temporary breakdown (ibid., pp. 72-79),
with the di￿erence between them being the underlying purpose each individual held with
respect to the context. The implication here is that when a ‘breakdown’ occurs, that it
is only seen as a breakdown in relation to people’s response to it. Given two similar
circumstances, as I have shown, an improvisational response can lead to a swift resolution,
virtually obscuring the breakdown from experience (Yanow and Tsoukas 2009, p. 1357). In
the other case, I have shown that some responses can lead to a ‘freezing up’ that, in a very
important sense, is the substantiation of a breakdown. Hence, if the ‘freezing up’ can be
avoided, it is less likely the event will be understood as a breakdown.
For these reasons, I argue that the leadership dimension of purpose, as depicted
in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32, is crucial to include when considering the di￿erences in a hu-
man leadership responses to a breakdown involving a computational object. Further, I
am arguing that the same human response to the breakdown is a critical component in
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determining whether such a breakdown is total or temporary (Dreyfus 1991, pp. 72-83).
Due to indeterminacy, while it can never be guaranteed that a given response will
produce an outcome that transforms a breakdown into one or the other category, the
data suggests improvisational attempts to switch to another mode are more fruitful than
‘freezing up’, in that ‘freezing up’ cannot o￿er a transformative frame through which the
breakdown is later experienced as temporary (ibid., pp. 72-79). In other words, while an
improvisational response may not succeed, ‘freezing up’, by its very nature, has no hope
of transcending the threshold between total and temporary breakdown (ibid., pp. 72-83).
Moreover, the arguments I have presented in this chapter are an attempt to make
good on Sandberg and Tsoukas’ call to developmore open-ended theories that are in align-
ment with the logic of practice (2011, p. 339), that is, the local logics in place where the
practice is observed. Thus, the theoretical perspective I have o￿ered here suggests that the
way a leader responds to a breakdown in practice is a signi￿cant determinant of whether
it will ultimately be considered as temporary or total (Dreyfus 1991, pp. 72-83). It invites
the reader to consider the role of purpose (see ￿gure 2.4 on page 32), both for the hu-
man and the computational object plays. For the human, this chapter shows that purpose
makes available certain choices to the person making them, while occluding others. For
the computational object, the breakdownmaligns the purpose of the object, disrupting the
subject-object relationship and forcing the human to either circumvent the breakdown or
become mired within it.
These are views that resonate strongly with the actor-network theory (ANT) con-
ception of objects ‘striking back’ (Latour 2000), however, in my view, what events such as
those reported in this chapter really begin to touch on is the notion of agency. If, as Callon
suggests, ‘a veritable battle is being fought’ (1986a, p. 11) between various non-human
objects and humans in pursuit of the latter’s goals, this raises the question of the agency
of the objects. More radically, Barad suggests a view of agency that permeates all matter
when she suggests that:
[M]atter plays an agentive role in its iterative materialization. This is an im-
portant reason, but not the only reason, that the space of agency is much lar-
ger than that postulated in many other critical social theories (2007, p. 177).




In this chapter, I have focused on breakdowns as a means to better understand an everyday
aspect of leadership—the choices people in leadership positions make regarding computa-
tional objects as part of their material-discursive practice. I have presented two di￿erent
cases where breakdowns transformed the relationship between subject and object and un-
folded with entirely di￿erent outcomes.
In the ￿rst episode presented, I showed how the decisions made led to a state of
‘freezing up’ on the part of the subject and, where the relationship between subject and
object remained, as Verbeek refers to it, ‘disturbed’ (2005, p. 80). This state can also be
described as a sort of paralysis where the subject was unable to move forward and was,
therefore, at the mercy of the breakdown. Further, the subject in question was noted to
have become agitated and to have remained so for some time after the power came back
on, a response that appears to be linked to the perception of the breakdown. For these
reasons, I suggest that this case is aptly described as a total breakdown (Dreyfus 1991,
pp. 79-83) where leadership practice does not have the desired impact.
In the second episode, I presented a very similar set of circumstances where a sim-
ilar breakdown also interrupts the relationship between the subject and the computational
object, which, at the point of the interruption, plays the role of the projective mechanism
through which a conversation with a business associate (as well as speci￿c information
being discussed in the meeting) is focused, making it the locus of attention for the practice
(Guimbretière 2002, pp. 15-19, 2003, p. 53). This has been a consistent role for the com-
putational object throughout observations, as also evidenced in chapters 4 and 5. When
breakdowns disrupt this role, this presents a challenge to on-going leadership practice.
When Ari’s system crash occurred, these projective and focalising functions of
the computational object e￿ectively withdrew, and the computational object no longer
played this same role. Throughout the breakdown, its relationship to the subject changed
profoundly. However, unlike the ￿rst case, the person facedwith this breakdown identi￿ed
another computational object with slightly lesser capabilities and e￿ectively employed it
to re-establish the conversation in a mode I have characterised as improvisational (Yanow
and Tsoukas 2009, p. 1357). I have argued that this improvisational response opened the
possibility for lessening the impact of the breakdown to be lessened, transforming it into
a temporary breakdown (Dreyfus 1991, pp. 72-79).
While not arguing for a prescriptive stance in the sense that a standardised re-
sponse will guarantee an improved outcome, I do argue that an improvisational response
(Yanow and Tsoukas 2009, p. 1357) is superior to freezing up’. This is because impro-
visation, at the very least, o￿ers the possibility of circumventing the breakdown, whereas
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‘freezing up’ does not. However, such ‘freezing up’ can provide important learning exper-
iences from which the person can later recognise and to better address future situations
(Christianson et al. 2009, p. 846).
In addition, I have argued that the leadership dimension of purpose as depicted
in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32, is a useful lens through which to explore these starkly di￿erent
responses. I have o￿ered an interpretation that places purpose as a crucial mechanism for
providing a way of seeing the world, whereby certain possible choices are made visible
through their identi￿cation with purpose.
This theoretical view not only provides a plausible explanation for the observed
phenomena (Weick 1989, p. 517), but may also hold more generalisable implications; that
purpose may also play a similar role of making available possible choices in any and all
material-discursive practices, not merely those associated with the computational object.
And ￿nally, by exploring these episodes, I touched on questions of agency these
cases raised and possible reconceptualisations that may be useful in light of the data




Indeterminism [. . . ] admits that possibilities may be in excess of actualities, and
that things not yet revealed to our knowledge may in themselves really be am-
biguous. Of two alternative futures which we conceive, both may now be really
possible; and the one becomes impossible only at the verymoment when the other
excludes it by becoming real itself (1897 / James 1979, p. 116).
According to well-established principle, when we accept an idea which was once
controversial, we like to forget its origins. We prefer to think of it as eternal. But
the idea of technological innovation as an integral part of corporate activity is
only about ￿fty years old (Schön 1967, p. xiv).
T￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ have o￿ered distinctive vantage pointsfor the interrogation of the relationship between computational objects andleadership practice. In chapter 4, I located this relationship in the practice of pair
programming (Williams 2001). This approach showed both how leadership is performed
as well as o￿ering evidence demonstrating how leadership is produced and recognised
by members. Then in chapter 5, I explored approaches formal leaders take with their
email, explicating some of the implications of these human-computer engagements for
leadership practice. The view of leadership described in chapter 5 challenges traditional
accounts, being less attached to an individual and more dependent on various approaches
to—and therefore distributions of—material-discursive practice (Barad 2007, p. 178; Shove
et al. 2012b; Nicolini, Mengis et al. 2011, p. 8). Finally, in chapter 6, I followed the call
of Sandberg and Tsoukas (2011) to employ breakdowns as a site to further delineate the
relationship between leadership practice and computational objects. Speci￿cally, this ap-
proach revealed how leadership practices are enacted through, and dependent on, compu-
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tational objects, while simultaneously highlighting the role of human decisions in these
enactments.
The objective of this chapter is to take a step back from the speci￿c cases presented
in each of the three previous chapters and coalesce what has been learned. Thus, I bring
together the threads of analysis, synthesise the ￿ndings arising from these, and present
my own original theoretical contributions, as well as re￿ecting and di￿racting (Barad 2007,
pp. 86-94; Nicolini and Roe 2014) these through extant theory. This approach, according
to Barad, involves:
[A]ttending to and responding to the details and speci￿cities of relations of
di￿erence and how they matter [. . . ] in order to produce a new way of think-
ing about the nature of di￿erence, and of space, time, matter, causality, and
agency, among other important variables (2007, pp. 71-73).
This closing chapter is organised in the following manner: First I revisit the mo-
tivation and principal interest with which this study has concerned itself (section 7.1). I
then present the ￿ndings of the study, which include an elaboration of an original the-
oretical perspective on leadership that allows for the role of computational objects in
leadership practice (section 7.2). In particular, I present a range of roles built on Ihde’s
human-technology relations (1990) that have been encountered in this study. These roles
provide a framework to explain how computational objects are accommodated in their
enactments of leadership practice. In addition to this analysis of roles, I also present two
original theoretical accounts that explain a) how leadership is changing in relation to its
enactment through computational objects and b) how leadership is produced in practice.
The ￿rst elaborates on a disjunction of authority and responsibility resulting from the
delegation of authority to computational objects. This theory builds on Barad’s agential
realism to sketch the theoretical outlines of a posthuman leadership. The second presents
a citational (1993 / Butler 2011, pp. xxi-xxiv; Derrida 1977, p. 18) model that explains how
members produce, recognise, and reify leadership in practice. I then proceed to a discus-
sion of the implications of both the ￿ndings and the original theories I propose in terms of
the extant literature (section 7.3). From here, I move on to a discussion of the limitations
of the present study (section 7.4), suggestions for future research (section 7.5), and the
overall contributions of this research (section 7.6). I then conclude the dissertation with
some closing remarks (section 7.7).
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7.1 Research Motivation and Principal Interests
Bounded within this dissertation, I have set out to chart a territory on which little research
has been conducted, the relationship between leadership practices and computational ob-
jects. This work has been motivated by a gap in the literature, where a broad range of
studies show that the introduction and presence of computational technology within the
workplace have profound impact on the practice of work (cf. Bailey and Leonardi 2015;
Barley 1986; Clark et al. 1990; Leonardi 2011; Markus 1994; Miller and Slater 2000; Mum-
ford and Banks 1967; Nicolini 2011; Orlikowski and Yates 1994; Zubo￿ 1988). Such tech-
nologies are ubiquitous and said to be involved in an ever-increasing range of work prac-
tices (Barley 1988, p. 33; Zubo￿ 1988, pp. 124-126), and yet, when turning speci￿cally to
the leadership literature, there is very little empirical work to be found on exploring the
relationship between leadership practice and computational objects (Avolio, Walumbwa
et al. 2009, pp. 440-441; Lowe and Gardner 2001, p. 501; Kahai 2012). In this sense, the
present study contributes to the leadership literature by providing an empirical basis for
understanding this unexplored relationship (Kahai 2012, p. 102).
7.2 Findings
The principal ￿ndings from this study address the research questions presented in sec-
tion 1.3, which, to remind the reader, are:
1. What roles do computational objects play in the enactments and possibly the cre-
ation of leadership practices?
2. How do informants’ perceptions and use of computational objects align with respect
to the constitution, (re)production, and articulation of their leadership practice?
3. How is ‘leadership’ produced and recognised qua ‘leadership’ in practice?
To address these questions, within this section, I describe and interpret the fol-
lowing central ￿ndings: a) computational objects are entangled with leadership practices
(section 7.2.1); b) humans tend to overlook computational objects and their authoritative
roles in leadership practices, leading to a disjunction of responsibility from authority in
such delegation (section 7.2.2); and c) when leadership does materialise, it does so through
speci￿c citational material-discursive practices (section 7.2.3). I now proceed to elaborate
on each of these ￿ndings in greater depth.
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7.2.1 Computational Objects Are Entangled in Leadership Practice
Within this study, a number of sites have been observed where people spend a lot of time
working with one another and with computational objects. In some cases, the people who
have been observed are formal leaders and, in some cases, they are not. Yet, even when
they are not formal leaders, evidence suggests what they do during their day-to-day work
is often recognised as leadership practice by formal leaders in their organisation.
In chapter 4, for example, I followed both humans and computational objects in-
volved in pair programming. In this setting, no formal leadership role was assigned to a
human, however, there was evidence from senior management and employees alike that
the practice of pair programming at Eta was viewed as a leadership practice within the
organisation. In this setting, both the humans who worked remotely, and the humans
whoworked together, physically used computational objects as a means to constitute their
working environment. All the people observed in the pair programming environment em-
ployed networks of computational objects as tools of their trade. In fact, very little of their
work was done—or could be done—without these computational objects. This chapter also
demonstrated how computational objects possess the agentive power to act and in￿uence
human behaviour, to reverse the traditional subject-object relationship and, most provoc-
atively, to assume a role, enacting a practice that historically would have been enacted by
a human leader.
Then, in chapter 5, I explored practices formal leaders engage in with their email. I
looked both at formal leaders who employed computational objects extensively and those
who did not, comparing the di￿erences between them. In the process, I was able to reveal
networks of production where, for example at Eta, the executive assistant (EA), senior
executive team, and their computational objects were intimately involved with the pro-
duction of the COO’s email. This chapter also revealed that certain practices, such as
the management of the COO’s calendar by the EA, evoked a form of language from the
COO, assigning leadership to the EA and placing her in a hierarchically superior position
to the COO. Comparatively, even in the case at Epsilon, where the CEO avoided engage-
ment with computational objects at work, it was revealed that the computational object
became a backstage partner (Go￿man 1956, p. 69), where the CEO found herself engaging
with computational objects during in-between times and at in-between places, such as on
airplanes and at home during nights and weekends.
And ￿nally, in chapter 6, I showed how practices of leadership were disrupted
by temporary and total breakdowns (Dreyfus 1991, pp. 71-83) involving computational
objects and human responses to them.
What is common to all of these cases is the rhizomatic presence of computational
objects. In each and every case, computational objects were deeply embedded in work
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Role Description Empirical Basis
Focal In this role, the computational object acts as the primary locus of human a￿ention
(Guimbretière 2002, pp. 15-19, 2003, p. 53). This role is enacted whenever the user is
engaging with the computational object as part of their work practice, where such
engagement is prefaced on the user focusing on the computational object in an a￿entive
fashion, involving visual, auditory, or through motor-coordination focus. This is a




Intermediary In the role of an intermediary, the computational object provides access to something or
someone else. Enactments include accessing data, which, in many cases, represent




Recorder The role of recorder is enacted when a user o￿ers data to a computational object for
processing. Such data can be symbolic, as in alphanumeric key presses, mouse-clicks, or




Projector The role of projector is the inverse of the recorder. It is enacted whenever the user
receives data from the computational object for interpretation. Such data can be o￿ered




Authority The authoritative role is enacted when the user defers to the computational object as a
command authority (Air Command and Sta￿ College 2005; Grint 2005b, p. 1477) or




Disruptor The role of disruptor is enacted when the computational object violates the user’s
expectations in some fashion through a provocation interpreted by the user as a
possible breakdown (Dreyfus 1991, pp. 71-83).
chapter 6•
Table 7.1: Analytical Summary of the Roles of Computational Objects
practice. The computational objects played a variety of roles at a many levels, from re-
corder to projector, from communication device to task list manager, from authoritative
to fallacious calendar, from being the focus of attention to being the point of focus for on-
going decision-making. Moreover, the roles that the computational object played in these
material-discursive practices were often simultaneous, as when a screen was shared by
two people (projector) for the purpose of doing their work (recorder). Thus, within the
empirical ￿ndings is a profound ￿uidity with which the role of computational object may
simultaneously enact.
The Roles of Computational Objects Thus, from across the empirical chapters, and
building on thework of Ihde and his theoretical conception of human-technology relations
(1990) as outlined in section 2.3.7.3, I have analysed the following general roles computa-
tional objects were found to have played. These are: a) focal, b) intermediary, c) recorder,
d) projector, e) authority, and f) disruptor. These roles are outlined in table 7.1 and are
o￿ered as a starting point to chart the entanglements between leadership practice and
computational objects.
The ￿rst role, focal, expresses a mode of engagement between a computational
object and a human, where the computational object provides the dominant ￿eld of atten-
tion for its human user(s). This role builds on the overarching focal category of Ihde’s ￿rst
three dimensions of human-technology relations as presented in table 2.5. In this mode,
the computational object becomes what Guimbretiére refers to as a ‘locus of attention’
189
(2002, pp. 15-19, 2003, p. 53). Evidence of such focal roles played by the computational
object were presented in all three empirical chapters. For example, in chapter 4, the re-
mote pair programming between Walt and Robert was constituted as presence through
the computational objects. Walt and Robert were in fact thousands of miles apart from
each other; and yet, each talked and interacted with the other as if they were in the same
room. In chapter 5, a focal role enabled Sebastian and Ruby to track the various emails
that needed response to and to execute on the goal of a zero inbox (Mann 2006). And
in chapter 6, Ari demonstrated how the focal role can easily be shifted from one com-
putational object to another when he so deftly called Maureen on his iPhone™ after his
MacBook Air™ experienced a system crash.
On the one hand, a focal role as I am describing is a prerequisite, enabling the
usage of a computational object, but on the other, it closely approaches Kittler’s depic-
tion of the practice of reading text as a ‘hallucination’ (1999, p. 151); that is, once engaged
with the computational object in the focal mode, the user’s ￿eld of attention is subsumed
(Ihde 1990, p. 47). It is therefore not an overstatement to say that particular realities are
made manifest through the focal role. I refer to the focal role as a primary role because
the remaining roles are particular manifestations of a focal role. In this sense, my ana-
lysis diverges from Ihde’s in that I am not looking at human-technology relations per se;
rather, I am exploring speci￿c manifestations of the roles computational objects play in
the enactment of leadership practices. Thus, rather than zooming out like Ihde, across all
possibilities, I zoom in on the phenomenon at hand (2012, pp. 219-239).
The intermediary role is characterised by a condition where the computational ob-
ject plays the role of gateway to a desired resource, such as a ￿le or an email, but can also
include multimedia data, such as video conferencing. The intermediary role is enacted
when a human wants to establish a connection with some particular data and takes steps
to make that connection. This was evidenced in chapter 4 when Walt was attempting to
use various computational objects to set up a conference call for the stand-up meeting. It
was also present in chapter 5 when Sebastian clicked on certain attachments in emails to
review their content. And in chapter 6, it was evidenced when Ari opened a particular
presentation ￿le for his discussion with Maureen. Thus, the intermediary role is charac-
terised by the human acknowledgement of the computational object’s positional relation
to desired data which are, in some cases, such as the electronic discussion board described
in chapter 4, available exclusively through particular computational channels. In estab-
lishing such structures, the computational object is deemed to play an intermediary role
in being the primary means of access to that data.
The recorder and projector roles are paired inverses of each other. These roles re-
spectively isolate particular ‘technological intentionalities’ (1990, p. 103) that are observ-
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able by computational objects, allowing for a variety of engagements. The recorder role
was evidenced in chapter 4 whenWalt and Robert wrote code together andwhen they sub-
sequently checked it in to the source control system. It was also present in chapter 5 when
Sebastian wrote emails and Ruby entered appointments through the Google Apps™ plat-
form. And it was visible in chapter 6 when Ari allowed the computational object to record
and then transmit his voice and image to Maureen during a conference call with her. The
projector role was also evident in each of the empirical chapters. In chapter 4, the build
monitor turning red is a prime example. In chapter 5, users who viewed Sebastian’s cal-
endar (including Sebastian and Ruby) are the bene￿ciaries of projection. And in chapter 6,
the empirics show that Walt relied entirely on his computational object to project and,
through this projection, materialise his relationships with his remote co-workers.
The authority role is enacted when a user defers to the computational object as a
command authority (Air Command and Sta￿ College 2005; Grint 2005b, p. 1477) or where
the computational object enacts control over the user (Haraway 1991a, pp. 188-196). This
occured in chapter 4 when the computational object turned red and the people in the room
responded in kind by attempting to determine which pair of programmers had introduced
the problem detected by the computational system. In chapter 5, Ruby, by participating in
a rule-based, structured calendar system through her computational objects, was shown to
be subject to its mechanisms and worked within these by following particular steps. Fol-
lowing Orlikowski here, the computational object choreographed (1996, p. 65) her activities
in all of these aspects. And, in chapter 6, the authority role was present when during a
power outage atWalt’s location, where he encountered further computational ‘barriers’ in
the form of the two-step veri￿cation (Google 2013a) he was unable to cross. This conun-
drum only occurred because Walt explicitly granted the computational system this kind
of authority to keep potential hackers out of his account. Little did he realise that later
on, this would prevent him from accessing his own account when he needed it. In other
words, in granting the authority role to his computational object, he inadvertently was
subjected to that authority in a way he had not anticipated. Ihde refers to such manifest-
ations as the ‘quasi-hate underside’ of a ‘quasi-love relationship’ with technology (1990,
p. 106).
And ￿nally, the role of disruptor applies when the computational object violates
the user’s expectations in some fashion through a provocation interpreted by the user as
a possible breakdown (Dreyfus 1991, pp. 71-83). This was evident throughout chapter 6,
where both episodes explored precisely how humans responded to such provocations, to
the decisions these humans made in response to those provocations, and to the outcomes
that were then materialised.
Based on the elaboration of these various roles, which delineate with some degree
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of granularity just what roles computational objects play in relation to leadership practice,
I suggest that these roles may be more general than any relation they have to leadership
practices. Thus, I argue here that it is on the basis of these roles, and the speci￿c a￿ord-
ances they enable, that many of the material-discursive practices encountered throughout
this study were accomplished at all. I suspect that these roles may well transcend the pur-
view of leadership practice to a much broader range of organisational practices, such as
strategy and innovation.
Irrespective of this conjecture, what these roles demonstrate is a level of support
for a principle ￿nding of this study: Computational objects are entangled in enactments of
leadership practice. In fact, they are so entangled that in some cases it may be impossible
to accurately determine the precise boundaries between human and computational object.
For example, when an email is sent from the COO to the entire sta￿, engagement with the
COO is projected through the computational object. While recipients of the message may
identify with the COO, the email hides the other people involved in writing and various
parts that computational objects play in enacting these material-discursive practices, in-
cluding the possibility to read the message.
In many ways, this phenomenon is not new, and must be acknowledged as an ex-
tension of previously reported phenomena arising from the introduction of various tech-
nologies in the workplace (cf. Yates 1993, 2008; Zubo￿ 1988). What makes this ￿nding
unusual, however, is how it is located in a study that relates the phenomenon speci￿c-
ally to leadership practices. Moreover, the presence and particular deployments of these
computational objects leads to some additional novel outcomes not seen in previous de-
ployments of organisational technology. I describe these below.
7.2.2 The Disjunction of Responsibility from Authority
Despite the ongoing presence of and participation with computational objects, there ap-
pears to be a sort of ‘blind spot’ with respect to computational technology. This was
evidenced, for example, in chapter 5 I discussed how di￿erences between the ways the
various executives engaged with computational objects, arguing that this revealed an as-
pect of a ‘technological unconscious’ (Clough 2000, p. 2). Under this view, the use of a
computational object tends to fall into particular habits that, in many cases have, not been
exposed to the same levels of formal analysis that the same leader might apply to a ￿n-
ance or human resources decision. This suggests that the way many humans think about
computational technology in their daily lives is not fully considered.
Correspondingly, the data in this study was consistent in showing that humans
do not project the quality of leadership onto these objects. Instead, ‘leadership’ was a
qualitative description reserved for humans or speci￿c practices with which they engaged.
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For example, in chapter 4, data was presented on page 121 that came from an
internal electronic discussion board at Eta and accessed through computational objects.
These data linked the practice of pair programming to positive changes in ‘both engin-
eering leadership and process’ (Eta Internal Discussion Database). However, the citation
of leadership here is intended to describe the leadership of human engineers, not the ma-
chines they use to accomplish their work.
Where this wasmost salient was the case presented in section 4.3.3 where the com-
putational object, acting as build monitor, was granted an authoritative role to intervene
in practice. Its role here was to alert the human group of users to possible errors intro-
duced into the code base. Like a teacher or a manager, the computational object in this
case evaluates work that has been submitted by humans and issues feedback to the group,
sometimes resulting in direct commands to stop what they are doing and attend to a prob-
lem that it detected. In so doing, it ful￿ls a particular position (as depicted in ￿gure 2.4
on page 32) in the organisational hierarchy. This accomplishment involves a subtle but
crucial shift from the canonical relation of computational object as tool, where the user is
the subject, and the computational object is the object, whose being is subordinated to the
human (1927 / Heidegger 1996, pp. 64-67).
Thus, despite the authoritative or command role (Air Command and Sta￿ College
2005; Benoit-Barne and Cooren 2009; Miller 2008) the computational object played in this
scenario, thereby legitimating the possibility for citing leadership through the dimensions
of result or process dimensions (as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32), such citations did not
come to pass. Of this practice, the humans did not assign the category of leadership to the
computational object.
Similarly, in chapter 5 on page 148 we ￿nd that Ruby, Sebastian’s executive as-
sistant (EA), works closely with her computational objects and has worked out a strategy
whereby she enters dummy appointments on his calendar so that internal requests for
Sebastian’s time are more tightly controlled. I suggested that in this material-discursive
practice, Ruby is led by the computational object in the sense that her participation within
the Google Apps™ platform requires her to follow certain steps in order to maintain a cal-
endar. In other words, by participating with the computational object in a rule-based,
structured system, she becomes subject to its mechanisms and must work within them by
following particular steps. Following Orlikowski here, the computational object choreo-
graphs (1996, p. 65) her activities in all these aspects. In this sense, Ruby is led by the
computational object to accomplish such tasks through mail noti￿cations, calendar alerts,
and other computationally supported mechanisms. However, despite whatever logic my
argument may hold, it is crucial to understand that Ruby did not speak of this relationship
in terms of leadership, nor did Sebastian or any of the other informants at Eta.
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Accordingly, across the data I collected, and irrespective of any role that the com-
putational object played, humans did not ascribe leadership to computational objects. This
is despite the paradoxical fact that those very objects are now placed in roles where they
enact practices formerly enacted by human leaders.
In addition to raising an interesting question that speaks to sceptical constructiv-
ism (Grint andWoolgar 1997, p. 143), a view that seeks to understand how it is that certain
views come to be accepted, this absence actually reveals something important to us about
how leadership is mobilised and constituted in practice.
Perhaps it is simply a question of novelty. For while machines have been around
for some time, computational objects and the realities they constitute have become a wide-
spread phenomena only in the last quarter century. Indeed, the epigraph by Schön opening
this chapter reinforces the novelty of computational innovation within the corporation as
being a recent phenomenon (1967, p. xiv). One way to frame this recent development is to
categorise the placement of computational objects in the kinds of leadership positions de-
scribed in section 4.3.3 as a side-e￿ect of their deployment, where the traditional functions
of leadership are agentially cut (Barad 2003, p. 815) and extended beyond the boundary
of the human towards a form of leadership that could be called posthuman, a view that
attempts to address the historic privileging of the human perspective by including per-
spectives which go beyond the human.1
In other words, when computational objects are assigned positions of authority
with the label ‘leadership’ withheld, this highlights a disjunction of responsibility and
authority that is traditionally associated with leadership. For according to MacGregor:
[A] leader cannot avoid the exercise of authority any more than he can avoid
responsibility for what happens to his organization (MacGregor quoted in
Bennis 1959, p. 261).
The empirics presented in this study demonstrate computational objects being
placed in roles of authority without receiving the citation of leadership, thus violating
MacGregor’s dictum. Therefore, from the perspective of agential realism, as the boundary
of what kind of objects authority can be delegated to has expanded, the phenomena pro-
duced by particular arrangements of apparatuses (2007, p. 140) is altered from its historical
materialisation. Responsibility is now decoupled from authority. Heretofore, when deleg-
ating leadership authority to another human, with that authority also came responsibility.
Yet, what this study reveals is through the (re)con￿guration that enables humans to del-
egate authority to computational objects, a novel state has emerged where computational
1See section 2.3.5 for an elaboration of a posthuman perspective.
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objects are placed in authoritative roles but are not necessarily seen as responsible for the
actions they undertake.
I suggest that this ￿nding materialises a newfound space of indeterminacy that
was not a logical possibility before the deployment of semi-autonomous computational
objects in authoritative positions. Exactly who—or what—might be responsible is now
open to interpretation, as exempli￿ed in a number of high-pro￿le cases. One example is
the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion, where complex interactions between humans and
computational systems are understood to have caused the explosion, while subsequent
investigations sought a human-corporate actant to take responsibility (Balmer et al. 2011;
Pelley and Williams 2010). Another is the case of the News of the World, where ‘phone-
hacking’ was the operative term, enacted through and toward other computational objects,
while legal proceedings focused on idenitfying humans that were ‘responsible’ (Logue and
Clegg 2015). I submit that in each of these cases there are important deployments of com-
putational objects in authoritative roles that are consistent with the ￿ndings of this study.
Together, these suggest we are now entering an age of posthuman leadership where ques-
tions of responsibility become increasingly crucial to consider, and yet, as these debacles
demonstrate, can also be quite di￿cult to determine. Given such circumstances, I suggest
that what computational objects enable, in terms of expanded delegation of authoritative
capability, appears to have an associated side-e￿ect: the obscuring of important ques-
tions of responsibility such as who—or what—is in charge? Thus, the posthuman view of
leadership I propose here suggests that in this separation of authority from responsibility
‘leadership’ is being (re)con￿gured to include computational objects in ways that distrib-
ute leadership while simultaneously obscuring it.
On this point of the expanding agential boundaries of computational objects and
associated disjunction of responsibility from authority, scholars have explored similar
questions for the class of computational objects employed by nations as thanatological
devices for warfare (cf. Sharkey and Suchman 2013; Suchman 2013; Suchman and Weber
2014). According to their argument, when the practice of nation-sponsored warfare is en-
acted through/with autonomous machines that allow killing at a distance such as drones,
traditional interpretations of accountability and responsibility are dubious at best. Their
work argues it would therefore be useful to rethink the social constructs of accountability
and responsibility that are impinged upon as a result of these changes.
I suggest a similar logic is applicable to the present ￿nding, where in this study,
computational objects are observed to enact roles of authority and yet there is neither
discussion nor recognition of leadership in practice. I would therefore propose that the
categories of accountability and responsibility found in Suchman et al.’s research be aligned
with the concept of posthuman leadership I present here. In other words, as computational
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technology begins to increasingly participate in leadership practices, taking a more sub-
stantive role, it becomes important to re-think the concepts that have previously been
applied only to humans, such as ‘leadership’. A posthuman view of leadership asks us to
recognise the di￿erences that delegation to computational objects enables and constrains
with respect to a disjunction of responsibility from authority, to consider to what degree
the concepts of leadership and responsibility might apply to computational objects and
human beings, and how these (re)con￿gurations alter the meanings and materials of lead-
ership. In particular, my proposal of the term posthuman leadership signals an explicit ac-
knowledgement of the disjunction between traditionally bound authority and responsib-
ility in leadership practice where delegation to computational objects materialises a more
complex space where who—or what—is responsible is open to broader interpretation.
Indeed, it is on the basis that computers have been created to be more like humans,
with the addition of technologies such as the graphical user interface (GUI) (Bewley et al.
1983; Jørgensen 2008) and the mouse (Engelbart 1962), that we work with them at all.
The entire premise of human-computer interaction (HCI) is to enable humans to inter-
act with computational objects as they do with one another : through everyday language
and indexical gestures (Myers 1998). In other words, in bringing the term ‘ease-of-use’
(Adams et al. 1992) into the popular vernacular, computers have materialised more like us,
that is, more human. I argue it is this achievement that has enabled the entanglement of
these objects so ￿rmly into contemporary human experience, which is evidenced by the
material-discursive practices of delegating to them roles of authority.
Interestingly, while scholars have written extensively of leadership as being ‘dis-
tributed’ (cf. Bolden 2011; Denis, Langley and Sergi 2012; Harris 2008) or ‘stretched over
[. . . ] social and situational contexts’ (Spillane et al. 2001, p. 23), this perspective does
not generally include non-human objects as part of its theorisation. Moreover, the inter-
pretation of ‘distributed’ leadership is made in these studies irrespective of whether the
members they studied saw leadership that way or not. That is, these are, on inspection,
researcher-generated citations of leadership.
On this ￿rst point, even the more ‘modern’ theorisations of leadership, of which
‘distributed leadership’ is among, focus on human actors at the expense of exploring the
networks of humans and non-humans out of which the phenomena arise. Actor-network
theory (ANT), one of the theoretical frames this study has deployed would instead remind
us to be attentive to:
The attribution of human, unhuman, nonhuman, inhuman, characteristics;
the distribution of properties among these entities; the connections estab-
lished between them; the circulation entailed by these attributions, distribu-
tions and connections; the transformation of those attributions, distributions
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and connections, of the many elements that circulates and of the few ways
through which they are sent (Latour 1996b, p. 75).
Here, Latour is framing the central concerns of ANT, where the distribution and
transformation of some social quality can be explored. For him, the ‘network’ is the space
in which that investigation must take place. Moreover, he demarcates the space explicitly
as posthuman, that is, a space that must necessarily go beyond the human. Similarly,
Barad’s notion of the ‘apparatuses of bodily reproduction’ (2007, p. 178) refers to precisely
the same ideas, namely that apparatuses, in the Baradian sense, are the Latourian network
or assemblages that appear as black boxes and must be explored (Latour 2005, p. 39).
Consequently, that scholars of distributed leadership have not taken the notion of
‘distribution’ as an invitation to explore symmetrical networks of both people and objects,
that they have not attempted to understand the apparatuses that produce the phenomenon,
and, as a result, have not opened these black boxes up for inspection, is, I suggest, another
instance of this ￿nding in another site—the academic literature. I suggest that these lead-
ership scholars align with the informants within this study in avoiding the ascription of
leadership beyond the human.
This second point actually takes us to the third ￿nding of this chapter, because
when scholars studying distributed leadership interpret the phenomenon of ‘distributed
leadership’ irrespective of whether the members they studied saw leadership that way or
not, they are engaging in precisely the behaviour that Latour describes above, namely the
‘attribution of human, unhuman, nonhuman, inhuman, characteristics’ (1996b, p. 75). This
links directly to the work of Pfe￿er, whose work I discussed in section 2.2.3. In my review
of Pfe￿er’s work, I reported that he suggested a more fruitful direction for the study of
leadership would be to investigate the process of how such attributions of leadership are
made (1977, p. 104). In this sense, I am arguing for an ethnomethodological interpretation
of leadership where:
[T]he principle that any social organization or communal gathering, however
mundane or exotic, simple or complex, is a local and thus thoroughly endo-
genous production (Szymanski and Whalen 2011a, p. 6).
In sum, what the absence of ascriptions of leadership to computational objects re-
veals are twofold: a) computational objects are increasingly placed in authoritative roles,
materialising a disjuncture between authority and responsibility; b) the phenomenon la-
belled ‘leadership’ is produced through citation. I elaborate on the latter ￿nding in the
next section.
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7.2.3 Leadership is Produced Through Citationality
The previous ￿nding highlights the absence of leadership and in so doing, reveals to us
how its presence is produced; namely, that which is recognised as leadership is materi-
alised through citational (1993 / Butler 2011, pp. xxi-xxiv; Derrida 1977, p. 18) material-
discursive practices. Here I suggest that leadership is mobilised as a symbolic resource
(Ailon-Souday and Kunda 2003), standing for particular values within the context of a
community, such as an organisation. This is due, I argue, to a practical extra-ordinarisation
of ordinary practices (Alvesson and Sveningsson 2003b). In this view, ‘leadership’ is con-
structed through empirically observable enactments ofmaterial-discursive practiceswhich,
successively, transform ordinary practices into instances of leadership. I argue that lead-
ership necessarily emerges from this encounter of ordinary practices of organising and
other equally ordinary practices of signi￿cation and categorisation (Bowker and Star 1999;
Zuckerman 1999). However, as only a limited number of such practices of are considered
legitimate in the Western world, based on historical precedence and a negotiated under-
standing of value and worth (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). Thus, leadership tends to be
produced in certain ways and not others.
In other words, leadership, rather than a phenomenon per se, is instead, referenced
as such through speci￿c citational material-discursive practices and produced by these.
Crucially, as I will explain, this applies not only to how lay people produce leadership, but
applies equally to what researchers do. I argue that it is through these citational practices,
which, crucially, mobilise one or more of the ￿ve dimensions of leadership as depicted in
￿gure 2.4 on page 32, that the phenomenon of leadership is materialised in practice.
The theoretical model I present here builds ￿rst on Ladkin’s ontological question
of ‘What kind of phenomenon is leadership?’ (2010, p. 3). Secondly, it draws on the fol-
lowing central concepts from Barad’s agential realism, which I discussed in section 2.3.7.2:
a) indeterminacy, b) material-discursive practice, and c) agential cuts as an intra-active site
for the possibility of materialisation.
My argument to support this theoretical position is developed in the following
manner: I start by arguing that in order to understand leadership as a phenomenon, a
good place to start is at the level of practice, wherein such practices must always be en-
acted. I argue that many such enactments always already contain many of the features
that are customarily associated with leadership, such as giving direction or producing co-
ordinated outcomes. However, not all such enactments become leadership. My central
claim is that leadership as a phenomenon emerges from the everyday work that helps to
make mundane enactments of practice extraordinary. Critical here to the concept of lead-
ership is the expectation that what—or more often who—is viewed as ‘extraordinary’ will
pave the way towards some indeterminate but desired future (Grint 2001, pp. 413-419). I
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caution, however, that not everything goes when it comes to the production of leadership;
while leadership is multiple, it is never a relativistic a￿air.
I therefore want to argue that leadership as a phenomenon emerges from enacted
work that helps to make everyday material-discursive practices extraordinary. We can
therefore analytically distinguish between two sets of practices: what is ordinarily enacted
and what is enacted to make the ordinary extraordinary. Thus, I have already suggested,
based on the work of Ladkin (2010, p. 3) that a more apt ontological starting point from
which to understand leadership as a phenomenon is to turn towards the idea of practice
(Nicolini 2012; Reckwitz 2002; Schatzki 2002) as an enactment. I have suggested this be-
cause such practices already contain the idea of ‘leading’ as something inseparable from
the daily process of organising or establishing order. In other words, antecedent to ‘lead-
ership’, there are always already practices. Such enactments were present in the material-
discursive practices presented in all three empirical chapters. For example, in chapter 4
there is the enactment of pair programming. In chapter 5, there is the enactment of pair
emailing. Meanwhile, in chapter 6 there is the enactment of conference calls. Here I make
an analytical distinction in that while all practices are necessarily enactments, not all en-
actments are necessarily considered by members to be practices citationally mobilised
with the dimensions of leadership as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32.
Practices of entertainment, for example, may not be considered enactments of lead-
ership. I doubt, for example, that leadership would be ascribed to someone on the basis
of watching a movie. But I also want to be careful here not to set hard and fast rules, but
rather, to observe how people construct them in situ (Szymanski and Whalen 2011a, p. 6).
Thus, despite it being entertainment, people often dance as partners, where there exists
phenomena people refer to as ‘leading’ and ‘following’. And yet, in more modern forms
dancing, people dance with one another, but not in so structured a form, more on their
own and to their own individual sense. In this latter case, we might say someone is a great
dancer, but we would not say that they are great leaders. And so, I want to caution that
what I am presenting here is not a ￿xed set of rules by which leadership is instrumentally
produced, but rather a model to aid in the understanding of the general dynamics of its
processual emergence as per Sandberg and Tsoukas’s practical rationality (2011, p. 353).
This model of the proposed citational production of leadership is depicted as ￿gure 7.1.
At a minimum, a model of the citational production of leadership involves two
stages of material-discursive practice. The ￿rst stage, enactment, depicted on the left-hand
side of ￿gure 7.1, occurs when some material-discursive practice of ordering is performed,
as found in the practice of pair programming described in chapter 4, pair emailing de-
scribed in chapter 5, or in the enactment of conference calls as described in chapter 6.










The Production of Leadership
Enactment Citation
Figure 7.1: The Citational Production of Leadership
practice.
The second stage, citation, depicted on the right-hand side of ￿gure 7.1, involves
at least one, but possibly many more material-discursive practices. What distinguishes
such citational practices is the referencing of (Latour 1999, p. 71) one or more of the ￿ve
dimensions of leadership as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32. These are indicated in ￿g-
ure 7.1 by the left-pointing arrows that move from citation, through the ￿ve dimensions
of leadership and then point to an enactment. More speci￿cally, the citational material-
discursive practice can be applied towards a) the abstraction or general case of an enacted
material-discursive practice, b) an enacted material-discursive practice that occurred in
the past, c) within a material-discursive practice that is concurrent to/enfolded within the
present enactment, or d) a material-discursive practice that is to be enacted at some future
point.
In my theoretical model, enactment and citation thus operate performatively and
processually. Speci￿cally, once certain enactments of material-discursive practice are cited
through one or more of the ￿ve dimensions of leadership, such citational practices lead
to agential cuts (Barad 2003, p. 815) that include some possibilities while excluding oth-
ers in their materialisation. The materialisation of leadership is denoted by the recursive
arrow across the top in ￿gure 7.1 where the linkage between the citation, one or more of
the ￿ve dimensions, and the enactment is complete.2 Thus, an enactment, plus a citation
2This occurs alongside the ever-present possibility of an alternate form of citational material-discursive
practice not pictured in the ￿gure, contestation (Barad 2003, p. 824), which can produce alternative agential
cuts, dematerialising or changing themeaning of leadership or leadership practice. In this sense, a contestation
is a special case of a citation that produces an alternative materialisation.
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that mobilises one or more of ￿ve dimensions of leadership, all linked together through
successive material-discursive practices, produces leadership.
To illustrate this, as shown in chapter 4 on page 121, within an internal discussion
board system at Eta, an employee links speci￿c historical practices of pair programming
to leadership on the part of engineers as a management function. This is accomplished
by claiming e￿ective changes to business processes, binding this citation to the pair pro-
gramming practice through the dimensions of results and process as depicted in ￿gure 7.1.
Elsewhere within the same discussion board system, the CEO writes about the general
case of pair programming, citing all ￿ve dimensions of leadership as depicted in ￿gure 7.1
to cite what makes Eta, in the view of its CEO, unique. Note also, that these are not mere
discursive productions, as they are enacted throughmaterialised entanglements with com-
putational systems. Therefore, in order to encounter them, humans must enact speci￿c
material-discursive practices with their computational objects. According to my theory of
citational production, as these discussion threads are composed, posted, stored, retrieved,
rendered, read, and discussed (either within the discussion board system or in other forms
of human communication) by other members within the site—and without the statements
made therein ever being called into question or challenged—lack of challenge allows the
citations to continue materialising leadership.
Put di￿erently, when a material-discursive practice is not cited as leadership, its
status as leadership is indeterminate. In such cases, the enactment goes unrecognised
as leadership, or perhaps more accurately, does not materialise. For just as the enacted
material-discursive practices involving computational objects are indeterminate with re-
spect to leadership practice until they are cited as leadership, enactments that have already
been materialised as leadership are simultaneously in a state where an indeterminate pos-
sibility for contestation and subsequent dematerialisation remains open. Ergo, absence of
leadership holds the indeterminate possibility for its presence, while presence of leader-
ship holds the indeterminate possibility for its absence or dematerialisation.
Hence, in chapter 5 when Sebastian tells his subordinate that Ruby is his ‘boss’
when it comes to scheduling another meeting with him, leadership is materialised citing
‘boss’ through an association of position as depicted in ￿gure 7.1 with the future enactment
ofmaking an appointment to see him. Were Ruby to have respondedwith the contestation,
‘No, I am not’, Sebastian’s citation could have been called into question, and that moment
of leadership may have been dematerialised. This is analogous to the example I provided
in section 2.2.9 of Steve Jobs being cited by the Harvard Business Review as the world’s top
CEO, as well as the manner in which Fast Company cited results (as depicted in ￿gure 7.1)
accomplished by Cisco employees as a indicative of the leadership of its CEO. Such cita-
tions stand as materialised instances of leadership, but since all citations are always open
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to contestation, they simultaneously exist in a state of materialised indeterminacy with
the possibility that leadership could be foreclosed. This is evidenced in famous examples,
such as that of Dominique Strauss-Kahn, former president of the International Monetary
Fund, who resigned from this post after being accused of sexual assault. For example, in
response to these events, The Guardian reported:
France may have a habit of turning a blind eye to its leaders’ sexual indiscre-
tions, but the IMF chief’s arrest could end that (Willsher 2011).
Elsewhere, Xifra (2012) has explored in great depth how, in response to these alleg-
ations, Strauss-Kahn attempted to repair his image using particular rhetorical techniques,
which in this study, would be labelled material-discursive practices. Interestingly, Xifra
compares statements by Strauss-Kahn to those made by Bill Clinton some years before in
relation to Clinton’s a￿air withMonica Lewinsky. Whereas Clinton did not resign and pro-
ceedings to impeach him were acquitted (United States Senate 1999), and that his wife is,
as of the writing of this dissertation, running for U.S. president, suggests that Clinton has
bene￿ted from an alternative materialisation of leadership. In contrast, Strauss-Kahn, is
currently a defendant in a trial for being involved with a prostitution ring (Willsher 2013).
It remains to be seen whether he too will be acquitted. In line with my ￿ndings regarding
breakdowns in chapter 6, these divergent outcomes simply rea￿rm that the agencies in-
volved with materialising versions of leadership are not fully in the realm of intentional
control, but rather, entangled with a broader set of posthuman agencies, including com-
putational objects3 . However, in all of these cases, the same citational mechanism I am
describing here provides an explanation as to how leadership is produced—or not. This
pervasive indeterminacy which acknowledges the limit of individual human agency as
well as the ongoing nature of materialisation is noted by Salih when she says the follow-
ing:
The e￿ects of one’s words are incalculable, since performatives and their sig-
ni￿cations do not begin or end (2007, p. 66).
Thus, I reiterate a crucial point made in section 2.3.7.2 by underscoring my as-
sertion that agential cuts cannot be engineered. Instead, I ￿nd it helpful to think of the
agential cut as what Dirac refers to as ‘a choice on the part of nature’ (Dirac quoted in Stapp
2012, p. 603) to the possibilities for outcome arising from a particular material-discursive
arrangement. According to Stapp, von Neumann in his interpretation of quantum mech-
anics, pushes the cut ‘all the way up’ (ibid., p. 602) so that the ‘observed’ system contains all
3See section 2.3.5 for an elaboration of a posthuman perspective.
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things that, according to classical ideas, are physical things, including the physical bodies
and brains of all observers. These ‘physical’ things are all described in quantum mechan-
ical terms. The classically described features of our perceptions become, then, aspects of
an observing mental side of reality (Stapp 2012, p. 602).
In my reading, this perspective is crucial to understanding the agential cut; ac-
cording to this view, our ‘minds’ are part and parcel of what is ‘cut’. We are not ‘outside’
anything. We are at the e￿ect of the cut, and it is the universe that does the cutting, al-
though we, like any other apparatus, have an impact on how the cut is made. But to come
at the cut ‘as if’ we could ‘control’ it, is in my view, a misunderstanding of the whole
point of how ‘determinate’ state comes to be. To take an example here, we enter into an
‘experiment’ to see if members accept whether what a computational object is doing is
‘leadership’; we may convince the members, but we may not convince our peers. The cut,
in this case lies in the (re)con￿guration of the boundary between ‘peers’ and ‘informants’,
but any attempt to intentionally position the boundary will always include a broader set
of material-discursive agencies rather than a set of human intentions and, as such, cannot
be determined in advance.
Thus, agential cuts are enacted through apparatuses that extend well beyond the
intentionality of the human, and are entangled in a complex set of intra-actions that cannot
be accounted for by human actions or intentions alone. Yet, when leadership does mater-
ialise, it does so, I argue, through the citational model of material-discursive practice that
I have described.
Indeed, as I indicated in the previous ￿nding, one can locate additional evidence to
support the citational production of leadership by reviewing how other leadership schol-
ars report the phenomenon in their research. Here I present examples from qualitative,
critical, and quantitative streams of the leadership literature. First, Larsson and Lundholm
tell us that:
Our analysis of a short interactional sequence shows that interpersonal in￿u-
ence and something that reasonably can be referred to as leadership, may be
found in the midst of managerial work, in the highly routinized environment
that the bank represents (2010, p. 175).
Here, they have just completed the presentation of a transcript of what a man-
ager said to a subordinate. In this case, this is the enactment. Their statement acts as the
citation, mobilised as ‘interpersonal in￿uence’, that is, along the dimension of results as de-
picted in ￿gure 7.1. Thus, if the reader does not contest the citational material-discursive
practice, according to my theory, the material-discursive practice materialised leadership
is—for the time being—sustained. However, were the reader to write a paper critiquing
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their interpretation, there is a complex apparatus that would need to be taken into ac-
count in this imaginary scenario that includes, for example, a) the reader’s reaction to the
paper and decision to write a critique; b) the production of the critical article, involving
myriad engagements with various technologies, including computational objects; c) the
choice of the journal to which the critical article is submitted, including the computa-
tional infrastructure allowing submission; d) the receiving editor making a choice over its
suitability for reviewers and the review process, along with attendant human-computer-
-based intra-actions that may occur during any revision and resubmitting cycle(s); and
e) the ￿nal decision of the editor to publish or not to publish the critical paper. If that
paper is published and read by a number of people, some may side with the original au-
thor, while others may side with the critic. Thus, for those siding with the original author,
leadership is still materialised, while for those siding with the critic, it has e￿ectively been
vanquished.
Second, the following from Alvesson and Svenningsson’s can be taken as a cita-
tional contestation to dematerialise leadership. They tell us that:
[M]anagers in the studied organization—a very large and respected know-
ledge company—have rather vague and contradictory notions of leadership.
They embrace notions of working with ideas and visions, but seem to manage
to do so only in vague ways. It is di￿cult to see how the managers/leaders do
something distinct or establish a clear asymmetrical relationship where the
exercise of leadership makes managers more important than others (2003a,
p. 379).
In this quote, Alvesson and Svenningsson refer to the abstracted enactment of
people having ‘vague and contradictory notions’. They then associate this with ‘ideas
and vision’, that is, the leadership dimension of process as depicted in ￿gure 7.1. However,
instead of using these linkages to a￿rm andmaterialise leadership, they instead neutralise
it with their citational contestation asserting that ‘it is di￿cult see’, where ‘it’ refers to ‘the
exercise of leadership’. Thus, if one agrees with Alvesson and Sveningsson, leadership has
not happened, it has not materialised.
And ￿nally, when looking at a quantitative study of leadership, it becomes clear
that leadership is materialised in these studies in precisely the same fashion. Antonakis
and House, for example, tell us that:
E￿ective leadership re￿ects actions in￿uencing the transformation process
and ensuring organizational adaptation; leaders must thus (a) facilitate group
interaction and (b) accomplish task objectives (Antonakis and House 2014,
p. 747).
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For them, the enactment is abstracted as an action ‘in￿uencing the transformation
process’. The dimensions of leadership mobilised, both for point a and b are along the
leadership dimension of results as depicted in ￿gure 7.1. And ￿nally, the citation that
materialises leadership is located in the subject of the sentence ‘E￿ective leadership. . . ’.
My point in presenting these three di￿erent cases is not to criticise what these
scholars are doing. Rather, it is to underscore the point I made in section 2.3.7.2 on page 73
which asserted that we are not ‘outside’ of anything. There is no outside of any system to
get to, be that ‘language’ or ‘life’. According to the theoretical perspective I have taken,
for something to be materialised, it must be enacted. Thus, in chapter 5 when Sebastian
tells his subordinate that Ruby is his ‘boss’ and no one counters this claim, I suggest that
leadership is materialised. But this theoretical perspective has additional implications,
one of which I have already mentioned. For as I have shown here, even the best leader-
ship researchers across qualitative, critical, and quantitative approaches call on the same
methods that lay people do to materialise leadership. They cite it into, or out of, existence
along with the various material-discursive apparatuses that constitute those citations, be
they internal company bulletin boards or peer-reviewed academic papers.
The theoretical model I propose here does not belittle these material-discursive
practices, but rather in the ethnographic spirit, attempts to make them visible so that they
can be better understood for what they are—practices of constituting reality. It is for these
reasons that I suggest that leadership, following Ailon and Kunda, acts as a ‘symbolic re-
source’ (2003), standing for particular values within the context of a community, such as
an organisation. Following this line of reasoning, I suggest that on inspection, ‘leader-
ship’ always stands for something else for which the word ‘leadership’ acts as a proxy or
container; citation alerts us to an underlying process of categorisation (Bowker and Star
1999; Zuckerman 1999) of value and worth (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) embodied in
the material-discursive practice of citation.
7.3 Implications
In the previous section, I presented the ￿ndings of the present study. Here, I discuss their
implications, organised by ￿nding.
7.3.1 Entanglement
I ended my previous discussion of the principal ￿nding of the entanglement of computa-
tional objects with leadership practice by stating that a long and rich history of research
explored analogous relationships between technology and work practices (cf. Yates 1993,
2008; Zubo￿ 1988). More recently, these have been referred to as ‘assemblages’ (Latour
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1999, p. 40), ‘contitutive entanglements’ (Orlikowski 2007, p. 1439), ‘imbrications’ (Le-
onardi 2011), ‘material infrastructures’ (Nicolini, Mengis et al. 2011, p. 11), and ‘technolo-
gical embeddedness’ (Volko￿ et al. 2007). All of these build on an approach to social science
that looks to materiality with a renewed vigour (cf. Carlile et al. 2013; Law and Mol 1995;
Leonardi et al. 2012; Miller 2005). These approaches however, have not been mobilised
within leadership studies to any meaningful extent. The present study attempts to break
new ground in this direction by applying such an approach to the study of leadership.
Within the extant leadership literature, there are distributed (Denis, Langley and
Sergi 2012; Harris 2008), relational (Cunli￿e and Eriksen 2011; Uhl-Bien andOspina 2012b),
and phenomenological (Ladkin 2010) perspectives that go well beyond traditional ap-
proaches to studying leadership. All of these arise out of the most recent move in the
arc of social theory, unifying the subject and object, as discussed in chapter 2, section 2.3.5.
These approaches, while not strictly materialist, have nevertheless forged the way for a
more recent stream of leadership studies that take practice as its unit of analysis. These
studies go under the name leadership-as-practice (LAP) (Carroll et al. 2008; Crevani et al.
2010; Endrissat and Arx 2013). Within this stream of LAP studies begin to take materiality
seriously by exploring materialised practices, the body, and artefacts (Mailhot et al. 2014;
Pullen and Vachhani 2013) as a means to better understand leadership. This dissertation
therefore makes a novel contribution to the study LAP by including computational objects
as actants in the production of LAP, it extends the boundaries of this work in signi￿cant
ways.
The approach I have taken here is built on a theoretical hybrid of actor-network
theory (ANT) and agential realism, where the latter has a particularly radical respeci￿ca-
tion of matter such that matter is ‘not a thing but a doing, a congealing of agency’ (italics
in original Barad 2007, p. 151).4 Notably, agential realism views all phenomena arising out
of various entanglements; in other words, there is nothing that is not entangled.
With this focus on computational objects and the mobilisation of the agential real-
ism perspective in particular, this dissertation also contributes to the current debates on
sociomaterialty (cf. Carlile et al. 2013; Cecez-Kecmanovic et al. 2014; Kallinikos, Nardi et
al. 2012; Kautz and Jensen 2013; Leonardi et al. 2012; Mutch 2013; Orlikowski and Scott
2008; Scott and Orlikowski 2013) by showing the reframing bene￿ts of agential realism as
a theoretical perspective and, moreover, by demonstrating its theoretical purchase for the
development of novel theory in leadership studies.
However, this approach and the attendant ￿nding of entanglement between lead-
ership practices and computational objects also has signi￿cant implications for the study
of leadership, both theoretically and methodologically. If one takes the theory of agen-
4See chapter 2 on page 70 for an elaboration on Barad’s conception of matter.
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tial realism seriously, it suggests that leadership, like all other phenomena, is produced
by speci￿c material-discursive practices. Therefore, to understand leadership, it becomes
methodologically necessary to study how those practices are arranged and performed.
Following this kind of approach therefore requires presence in the ￿eld and a willing-
ness to go beyond what is readily observable for a human; that is, gaining visibility into
computational systems and the various intra-actions between them and other humans.
Moreover, at a practical and policy level, the ￿nding of entanglement suggests that
leadership development programmes would bene￿t from supporting leaders in developing
productive relationships with computational objects. Within this study, I demonstrated
how the life experience of human leaders in modern organisational environments implies
an intensive, entangled relationship with computational objects, whether taking the form
of Sebastian’s innovative ‘pair emailing’ or Marilyn’s more restricted backstage (Go￿man
1956, p. 69) checking of email described in chapter 5. For example, the development of
leadership development modules that include the idea of the ‘technological unconscious’
(Clough 2000, p. 2) as a sensitising concept could be employed to raise awareness of tech-
nological ‘blind spots’. This might include how computational objects produce various
distancing e￿ects (cf. Bligh and Riggio 2012a; Brown and Lightfoot 2002; Hinds and Kiesler
2002; Hooijberg et al. 2007; Weisband 2008), and could help leaders make more informed
decisions about how to engage computational objects to achieve their leadership aims.
7.3.2 Disjunction
The ￿nding of disjunction between authority and responsibility arose out of speci￿c obser-
vations within this study. Speci￿cally, computational objects were found to be routinely
placed in positions of authority, however, humans in the study did not see their enact-
ments in these roles as leadership. This reveals one of the signi￿cant ways leadership is
changing as it becomes increasingly entangled with computational objects. Historically,
within leadership theory, the exercise of authority has been tightly bound to responsibility
(MacGregor quoted in Bennis 1959, p. 261).
What agential realism helps us to see here is that as the agential boundaries of
what is possible have shifted, this has enabled humans to delegate authority to computa-
tional objects in a variety of ways, from managing groups of programmers as I presented
in chapter 4, to autonomous killing machines, such as drones, deployed by nation-states
(cf. Sharkey and Suchman 2013; Suchman 2013; Suchman and Weber 2014). In so doing,
the possibility for delegating authority and decoupling it from responsibility has been ex-
ponentially expanded, opening an indeterminate ￿eld with respect to responsibility.
To explain this phenomena, this study has proposed a theory of posthuman lead-
ership to account for enactments of computational objects that produce functionally equi-
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valent engagements and results as recognised leadership practices, yet, are not recognised
as leadership by group members.5 In other words, to the extent that humans overlook
computational objects and their authoritative roles in leadership practices, there is a dis-
junction of responsibility from authority in such delegation.
My theory of posthuman leadership suggests that ‘leadership’, in its performative
enactment, is now (re)con￿gured to include computational objects in ways that distrib-
ute the enactment of leadership while simultaneously obscuring it. The theory accom-
plishes this by building on agential realist’s concepts of indeterminacy6 and di￿raction7 to
identify a critical di￿erence: a disjuncture between authority and responsibility. Through
the identi￿cation of this phenomenon, my posthuman theory of leadership provides a co-
gent explanation as to how various situations come about in our modern world, where
people ￿nd themselves at the mercy of computational systems without ever realising it.
This is amply evidenced by a wide range of large-scale computational system failures that
include airline shutdowns (Nicas and Carey 2013) and major ￿nancial market instabilities
(US Commodity Futures Trading Commission and US Securities & Exchange Commission
2010), each of which has been accompanied by signi￿cant material consequences.
Theoretically, an implication for this ￿nding of disjuncture is that it was surfaced
through the deployment of the agential realist concepts of indeterminacy and methodo-
logical di￿raction. Agential realism thus brings attention to disjunctures and di￿erences
that are produced as various apparatuses are (re)con￿gured. As practices and apparatuses
evolve and change, I suggest that a valid and important line of research is to topograph-
ically explore the terrain as it changes in order to identify critical di￿erences and disjunc-
tures as they emerge. I would also add that the application of agential realism has brought
to bear a novel and detailed theoretical perspective on leadership that includes the role of
computational objects in leadership practices.
Another implication of this ￿nding of disjuncture is at a policy level. It suggests
that greater attention could be given to how responsibility should be addressed when com-
putational objects do not perform as expected—before things go awry. Rather than waiting
until after the fact and then trying to ￿nd out whose ‘fault’ it is, it may be more bene￿cial
for society if organisations that deploy computational technologies in authoritative roles
were to agree to certain responsibilities with respect to these delegations up front. This
is already evidenced in limited cases with so-called ‘service-level agreements’ (Goo et al.
2009) that pre-establish certain responsibilities an organisation has to a customer under
conditions of system failure, where a computational system is delegated an authoritative
role in execution of those services. To date, such agreements have been mostly limited to
5See section 2.3.5 for an elaboration of a posthuman perspective.
6See chapter 2 on page 59 for details on the concept of indeterminacy within agential realism.
7See chapter 3 on page 82 for details on a di￿ractive approach within agential realism.
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hardware and software companies; however, given the ubiquity of computational objects
in the workplace, this ￿nding of disjuncture along with ample evidence of widespread
mishap suggests that it may be advantageous for governments to explore an option of
expanding the role of such agreements to the regulation of airlines, stock exchanges, and
other industries that rely heavily on computational objects in authoritative roles.
7.3.3 Citationality
The ￿nding of citationality as a means of producing leadership has important implica-
tions. First, it expands beyond Butler and Derrida’s discursive notions of citationality
(1993 / Butler 2011, pp. xxi-xxiv; Derrida 1977, p. 18) by deploying an agential realist per-
spective which asserts that the discursive is always produced through material-discursive
practice. Therefore, the ￿nding of citationality is not merely a discursive act but rather
one which necessarily entails material doings, often on the part of computational objects.
Thus, when, at Eta, statements are made on a bulletin board system about leadership
and its relation to pair programming, as described in chapter 4, these necessarily involve
engagements with computational objects and a larger computational infrastructure as a
mechanism of materialisation. For that matter, the same is true for the spoken word, as
such utterances are materially produced by the body. The distinction here, however, has
to do with what Benjamin discussed in his essay Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduc-
tion (1936 / 1969), where the various types of mechanised and computerised media that
inform human experience are increasingly pervasive and allow for increased rates of the
reproduction or distributed materialisation of various phenomena that, according to my
argument, include leadership.
While a number of scholars take a discursive approach to the study of leader-
ship (Fairhurst and Connaughton 2014; Ford 2006), an implication for the approach this
study has taken is that, like Sergi (2013) and Fairhurst (Fairhurst and Cooren 2009), it
includes materiality as part of the conception of discourse and therefore looks to material-
discursive practice as the empirical source for data that can then be analysed. The ￿nding
of citationality, therefore, has methodological implications for the study of leadership, pla-
cing the materialisation of the phenomenon at site (Schatzki 2002, p. xi), where materiality
and meanings are (re)con￿gured and co-constituted.
Further, if the citational model for the production of leadership I have proposed is
accurate, a central implication is that it holds not only for practitioners, but for scholars
as well. Thus, scholars, by studying and communicating their ￿ndings, also contribute
to various materialisations of leadership. This is an unavoidable conclusion of the the-
ory I have presented, however, rather than viewing this as a weakness, I suggest that it
alerts us to the responsibility that accompanies the possibility for materialisation, both for
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researchers and for practitioners.
This is why, in chapter 2, section 2.2.7 I discuss Kempster et al.’s (2011) points
about purpose andMacIntyre’s internal goods (2004, 2007). For not only are these, in Kemp-
ster et al.’s view, moral and ethical ideas, they are also central to leadership. This is also
why, in chapter 3, section 3.2, I quote Barad’s perspective on ethicality being part of the
material fabric of the world (2007, p. 182). For Barad, responsibility and accountability
are unavoidable, speci￿cally because we ￿nd ourselves as materialised beings involved
with materialisation ourselves. We may ignore this responsibility, but even that does not
make it go away. Thus, the perspective of agential realism pushes the ideas of Kemp-
ster et al. even further, asserting that ethicality is not simply an aspect of leadership we
need to consider, but an ever-present part of timespacemattering. Seen in this light, there
is no escaping the responsibility of that which we are present to, which necessarily in-
cludes material-discursive practices of citational production. The ￿nding of citationality
therefore contains inescapable moral and ethical implications, suggesting that the way
we respond and how we are held/hold ourselves accountable in practice makes important
di￿erences in how leadership materialises and its subsequent e￿ects.
On this note of ethical responsibility towards what one is present to, I move on
to a discussion of the limitations of this study as a means to surface the issues which
necessarily situate and constrain any contributions this study may o￿er.
7.4 Limitations
All human endeavours, including the present research, are necessarily limited. Limita-
tion, from an agential realism perspective, is the cost of materialisation and located in the
agential cut,8 which ‘produce[s] determinate boundaries’ (ibid., p. 148) where ‘constitutive
exclusions emerge’ (ibid., p. 158). In this sense, all materialisation is an ongoing trade-o￿
of what will be kept and what will be left behind.
7.4.1 The Ethnographic Method
For this reason, in chapter 2, I previously asserted that the present study has been groun-
ded in the position that all knowledges are situated and partial (Haraway 1988; Harding
1991) and, moreover, that they can only be understood through the social contexts inwhich
they are mobilised. This is the same ‘social context’ Kunda refers to in his de￿nition of
ideology, a context whose ‘grounds’ legitimate the ‘assertion’ of ‘bodies of knowledge’
(1986, p. 54). Such a position reveals an ‘ethnographic sensibility [. . . ] in keeping with a
8For further details on the concept of agential cuts within agential realism, see chapter 2 on page 73.
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hermeneutic-phenomenological stance’ (Yanow, Ybema et al. 2012, p. 367), which is cent-
ral to my theoretical orientation. My focus here is on delineating shortcomings of this
position.
While the ethnographic approach brings one closer to the object of study, there are
issues with employing the researcher as an instrument (Van Maanen 1988, p. 14) that, like
all humans, can only ‘see the world through the forms we construct to grasp it’ (Taylor
1989, p. 472). For these reasons, I have attempted to look critically upon myself both
re￿exively and di￿ractively as an instrument of research, as a means to be more aware of
my own blind spots.
Issues of accountability and self-representation are of signi￿cant import in an eth-
nographic approach (Gorli et al. 2015; Van Maanen 1995; Woolgar 1988), and I have there-
fore attempted in chapter 3, section 3.1.3.1 to o￿er some semblance of the ways in which
my own background has in￿uenced the various decisions made in this study and, as well,
in the empirical chapters 4, 5, and 6 to describe my relationships and involvement with the
￿eld in a way that o￿ers the reader a sense of my own presence in the research. The reader
is left to decide whether the manner in which I have accounted for myself is adequate.
Following Czarniawska here, I do not claim that the methodology I have deployed
is the ‘right approach to ￿eld studies in modern societies, but I do claim to have joined
the search for such approaches’ (2007, p. 17) that, in my view, help to reveal what is often
overlooked.
7.4.2 Validity
An ethnographic approach inherently relies upon the researcher’s interpretation of the
data. For this reason, I collected and analysed the data in a systematic fashion, as de-
scribed in chapter 3, section 3.1.4, and took additional steps to ensure that the interpret-
ations I drew were plausible. For example, I included, as part of such procedures, asking
informants to clarify concepts that were unclear, sending them coded interviews and/or
￿eld notes for review and scheduling follow-up conversations, presenting ￿ndings to in-
formants in meetings, and sending them pre-press versions of my research for their review
and comments. While these cannot guarantee validity, it is my hope that by adhering to
these practices, I have done justice to my informants and their computational objects.
Even by mobilising such material-discursive practices to improve validity, I cannot
claim either a complete or objective presentation of the data. Other su￿cient accounts




Another set of limitations in the study relates to the method for site selection, which I
described in chapter 3, section 3.1.3.1 and the subsequent access I was granted.
A limitation of my site selection approach is that the various sites studied within
this research project were self-selecting. This willingness to allow a researcher to observe
normally hidden details of their work may constitute a form of selection bias. In contrast
to organisations where I conducted sensitising interviews and discussed the possibility
for shadowing, there were cases where I was initially given a positive indication, but ul-
timately I was declined. As I was not able to gain the same level of access to these latter
organisations, the ￿ndings in this study may not apply to them or to other organisations
where no contact whatsoever was made.
With some companies, I was also required to sign a non-disclosure agreement as
a pre-condition for access. This meant that, in some cases, there was data I had access to
that I was unable to include in this study.
Moreover, through the access Iwas granted, irrespective of what I was allowed and
not allowed, how this varied across sites, and how, even in cases where the broadest access
was allowed, limits of all sorts were present. The idea therefore was not to see everything,
but within the contexts I was given access to, to be faithful to an ethnographic sensib-
ility and attend to the mundane, the overlooked, and the details of habituated practice
(Alvesson and Sveningsson 2003b; Chia and MacKay 2007; Star 1999).
7.4.4 Generalisability
As a small, qualitative multi-site case study, one of the potential limitations that must be
faced is the generalisability of the ￿ndings. Therefore, it is important to distinguish the
kinds of generalisability this study may have achieved. Here Yin has observed that case
studies:
[A]re generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or uni-
verses (2003, p. 10).
Yin distinguishes between analytic and statistical generalization, where the former
is associated with the development of theory, while the latter ‘enumerate[s] frequencies’
(ibid.). Thus, a limitation of this study is that it does not attempt any statistical general-
isation but, instead, following the call of Sandberg and Tsoukas’s practical rationality, the
dissertation has sought to develop open-ended theories ‘in the sense that they are open
to further speci￿cation in particular cases’ (2011, p. 353). In this sense, it also aligns with
Law’s notion of the distinction between ‘live’ and ‘dead’ theories I discussed in chapter 2
in section 2.3.7 which, I argue, give me license to theorise as I have.
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As a study that has set out to interrogate the ‘unexplored area’ (Kahai 2012, p. 102)
between leadership practices and computational objects, thereby ‘opening up the techno-
logy black box [. . . in order to] discover new insights into how the Digital Age is a￿ecting
leadership’ (ibid.), it falls into a category for which Eisenhardt recommends an iterative
approach to theory induction based on the case study (1989, p. 532) and for which Lee
suggests such studies provide an environment for ‘natural experiments’ which integrate
ideographic and nomothetic approaches to the production of scienti￿c knowledge (1989,
p. 119).
7.5 Future Research
Despite these limitations, I believe that this exploratory study has broken new ground in its
attempt to map the terrain of relations between leadership practices and computational
objects. I therefore hope this research inspires others to take this research programme
forward in a number of directions. I brie￿y outline some of the possibilities here.
The particular settings I selected for this study could be greatly expanded. Stud-
ies following this in other kinds of organisations would help to build a better map of the
relationships that exist between leadership practices and computational objects. These
could include government, non-pro￿t, educational, and a wider range of corporate or-
ganisations. This work could also be expanded methodologically to include videos of
engagements between people and computational objects, adding a more explicit ethno-
methodological lens. Further, a focus on practices of strategy or innovation employing
a similar approach could be fruitfully explored, as these are commonly enacted within
computationally-centric environments.
It is also the case that certain phenomena have been documented by this study
where experimental testing could be undertaken. For example, a future study could test
under what cases a human and/or computational object is cited as a leader, comparing
the two. An interesting question might be to understand under what conditions might a
human cite leadership to a computational object.
My own interests lie in continuing a practice theory (PT)-based programme of re-
search. However, my present goal is to move beyond the computational object in a way
that is only alluded to in this dissertation, through a stronger focus on information infra-
structures (cf. Aanestad et al. 2014; Henfridsson and Bygstad 2013; Monteiro et al. 2013).
While my selection of computational objects has been pragmatic in that these objects
present a natural materiality for the observation and analysis of relations between humans
and their leadership practices, exploring the relation between leadership practice and in-
formation infrastructures o￿ers other possibilities. This direction holds promise because
213
it shifts the focus of information systems (IS) research beyond single-system paradigms
towards such possibilities as viewing infrastructures as complex apparatuses. Such an ap-
proach would present signi￿cant challenges over and above the present study, as more
robust methods to ‘reach in’ and ‘see’ what happens within an infrastructure would be
required. I am, however, intrigued with the possibilities that this focus may yield.
Finally, objects other than computational objects could be explored in terms of
their relations with leadership practice andmight include documents, furniture, or speci￿c
kinds of environments, such as board meetings or presentations, to explore the citational
production of leadership. Indeed, work along these lines is already beginning to emerge
(cf. Larsson and Lundholm 2010; Mailhot et al. 2014; Perillo 2008) out of the leadership-as-
practice (LAP) stream, and my hope is that work in this direction will continue to mount.
7.6 Contributions
The study has addressed an uncharted territory: the relationship between computational
objects and leadership practices (Avolio, Walumbwa et al. 2009, pp. 440-441). By adopting
well-established HCI and IS perspectives that assert a co-constitutive relationship between
technology and practice (Orlikowski 2000; Suchman 1987), I have developed a rich un-
derstanding of everyday leadership practices and the roles computational objects play in
their enactments. Additionally, through an interrogation of the material-discursive prac-
tice (Barad 2007, p. 178) between leadership practices and computational objects, I have
developed new understandings. I summarise the proposed contributions this study o￿ers
for the consideration of the reader:
Subject Matter In conducting a study that explores the relationship between leadership
practices and computational objects, I have contributed to the leadership literature
an exploratory map of this terrain by undertaking one of the ￿rst systematic stud-
ies conceptualising and explaining the roles of computational objects in leadership
practice.
Theoretical I have drawn my theoretical lenses from an analysis of the arc of social
theory and shown that there is an important relationship between the development
of social theory and leadership theory. Moreover, based on the most recent move in
social theory, I have adopted a hybrid actor-network theory (ANT) and an agential
realist theoretical lens that has helped take into account processual, posthuman, and
material aspects of the phenomena under study. Together, with this parallel focus on
computational objects and the mobilisation of the agential realism perspective, this
dissertation also contributes to the current debates on sociomaterialty (cf. Carlile
214
et al. 2013; Cecez-Kecmanovic et al. 2014; Kallinikos, Nardi et al. 2012; Kautz and
Jensen 2013; Leonardi et al. 2012; Mutch 2013; Orlikowski and Scott 2008; Scott
and Orlikowski 2013) by showing the reframing bene￿ts of agential realism as a
theoretical perspective and, moreover, by demonstrating its theoretical purchase
for the development of novel theory in leadership studies.
Methodological I have departed from traditional approaches to studying leadership by
leveraging a practice theory (PT)-based study of work to explore leadership, o￿ering
a rich and contextual account of the relationship between computational objects
and leadership practices. Moreover, I have utilised a di￿ractive methodology that
has combined a range of theoretical perspectives and viewed through one another
in order to produce useful and novel perspectives.
Substantive The study has demonstrated how leadership practices are enactedwith—and
through—computational objects.
Bridging Multiple Literatures By taking this approach, the study contributes to the
possibility of greater interdisciplinary dialogue among those who study practice,
technology, and leadership.
The leadership-as-practice (LAP) Literature This dissertation makes a contribution
to the study of LAP by including computational objects as actants in the production
of leadership in practice. Where previous work in this stream has focused primarily
on human practices rather than their relationship with artefacts, the present study
extends the boundaries of this work in a posthuman direction, that is, a view that
attempts to address the historic privileging of the human perspective by including
perspectives which go beyond the human.9
Original Theoretical Contributions I have proposed in this dissertation three di￿er-
ent original theoretical contributions to explain the phenomena of interest. The
￿rst is an analysis of the roles that computational objects play with respect to lead-
ership practice. The second, posthuman leadership, highlights a disjunction between
authority and responsiblity. The third, amodel of the citational production of leader-
ship, o￿ers an explanation as to how leadership ismaterialised in practice. Moreover,
by combining and extending Grint (2005a, p. 18) and Kempster et al.’s (2011) ￿vefold
model of leadership as depicted in ￿gure 2.4 on page 32, I have highlighted particular
material-discursive practices within the empirics that illustrate how both humans
and computational objects can be mobilised as categories within the ￿ve dimensions
9See section 2.3.5 for an elaboration of a posthuman perspective.
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of leadership: person, result, position, process, and purpose. I suggest that this syn-
thesis of Grint and Kepmster et al.’s theoretical perspectives is also a contribution to
the leadership literature through my proposals that their models be integrated and
my proposed extension to their work.
7.7 Final Words
This study has demonstrated the entangled relationship between computational objects
and leadership practices and o￿ered a novel conceptualisation of the roles computational
object play in these practices. It has also shown that as computational objects have been
increasingly placed in authoritative roles, there emerges a disjunction of authority from
responsibility in comparison to the delegation of humans. Thirdly, it has also presented an
original theory explaining how leadership is produced. For each of these three ￿ndings,
practical implications have also been discussed. I hope that these contributions will help
to advance leadership theory and practice by bringing attention to the perennially over-
looked aspect of technology in the study of leadership (Bass and Stogdill 1990b, p. xiii; Ka-
hai 2012; Lowe andGardner 2001, pp. 501-502). Further, I hope that this work helps to stim-
ulate an increase in the cross-fertilisation between leadership studies, human-computer
interaction (HCI), information systems (IS), and organisational studies (OS) where, I be-






CEO chief executive o￿cer
CFO chief ￿nancial o￿cer
CMS critical management studies
COO chief operating o￿cer
CTO chief technology o￿cer
EA executive assistant
ECC essentially contested concept
ESRC UK Economic and Social Research Council
GB gigabytes
GUI graphical user interface
HCI human-computer interaction










SMTP Simple Mail Transport Protocol
STS science and technology studies
TCP/IP Internet Protocol suite
UI user interface
UPS uninterruptible power supply
WITS work item tracking system
XP extreme programming




actant I employ Latour’s de￿nition: ‘The great interest of science studies is that it o￿ers,
through the study of laboratory practice, many cases of the emergence of an actor.
Instead of starting with entities that are already components of the world, science
studies focuses on the complex and controversial nature of what it is for an actor to
come into existence. The key is to de￿ne the actor bywhat it does— its performances
— under laboratory trials. Later its competence is deduced and made part of an
institution. Since in English “actor” is often limited to humans, the word “actant”,
borrowed from semiotics, is sometimes used to include nonhumans in the de￿nition’
(1999, p. 303).
agential realism Agential realism is ‘an epistemological-ontological-ethical framework
that provides an understanding of the role of human and nonhuman, material and
discursive, and natural and cultural factors in scienti￿c and other social-material
practices, thereby moving such considerations beyond the well-worn debates that
pit constructivism against realism, agency against structure, and idealism against
materialism. Indeed, the new philosophical framework that I propose entails a re-
thinking of fundamental concepts that support such binary thinking, including the
notions of matter, discourse, causality, agency, power, identity, embodiment, ob-
jectivity, space, and time’ (italics in original, Barad 2007, p. 26).
computational object I employ the term computational object to highlight the material-
ised interfaces throughwhich humans interact with broader computational systems.
Computational objects are phenomenologically distinctive; through them humans
experience and extend distributed computational platforms. They may be in the
form of a personal computer, smart phone, tablet, or embedded within other ob-
jects, such as automobiles or conference rooms. They are also distinctive from other
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forms of technology, such as airplanes or toasters, but share amaterial, physical, and
embodied aspect through which humans interact with them. I employ this trope to
simultaneously signal an emphasis on materiality, relationality, and a posthuman
perspective that moves away from human exceptionalism.
discursive practice I derive this term from Foucault where he de￿nes it as being associ-
ated with lived practices extending beyond the rational, forming a ‘body of anonym-
ous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have de￿ned a
given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the
conditions of operation of the enunciative function’ (1969 / 2002, p. 117).
ideology My use of this term follows Kunda’s de￿nition as ‘bodies of knowledge that
must be understood in the context of the social arrangements within which they
arise and which provide the grounds for their assertion’ (1986, p. 54).
leadership practice Within this study, leadership practices are those assemblages of
material-discursive practices that are either cited as such by members, generally
through the ￿ve dimensions of leadership as depicted in ￿gure 2.4, page 32 and are
so recognised, while also leaving open the possibility that uncited enactments may
also be forms of leadership that go unrecognised by members.
material-discursive practice I employ this term with speci￿c reference to the work of
Barad, who describes such practices as ‘possibilities of change entailed in recon￿g-
uring material-discursive apparatuses of bodily production, including the boundary
articulations and exclusions that are marked by those practices in the enactment of
a causal structure (2007, p. 178). My interpretation of this is that Barad asserts an
ontological inseparability between meaning and matter, substance and signi￿cance,
through the ‘material-discursive’ and their associated ‘apparatuses’ and/or ‘bodies’
enacted in practice.
pair programming Pair programming is an approach to writing software involving a
dyad where ‘One of the programmers, the driver, has control of the keyboard/mouse
and actively implements the program. The other programmer, the observer, con-
tinuously observes the work of the driver to identify tactical (syntactic, spelling,
etc.) defects, and also thinks strategically about the direction of the work. On de-
mand, the two programmers can brainstorm any challenging problem. Because the
two programmers periodically switch roles, they work together as equals to develop
software’ (Williams 2001, p. 27).
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sceptical constructivism This theoretical approach addresses charges raised by critics
of constructivismwho claim that constructivists see all truth claims as equally valid.
Sceptical constructivism avoids falling into a recursion of relativism by emphasising
that ‘the constructivist does not assert that all claims have equal status; instead she
asks which claims attract the most signi￿cant support and why’ (Grint andWoolgar
1997, p. 143). Thus, this approach to scienti￿c enquiry seeks not to identify truth as
such but instead to understand how that which is identi￿ed as truth comes to be.
source control system A source control system (SCS) is a software-based system, nor-
mally implemented through a database, that manages versions of ￿les. Such systems
are also referred to synonymously as ‘version control systems (VCS), source code
manager (SCM), a revision control system (RCS), and several other permutations
of the words “revision”, “version”, “code”, “content”, “control”, “management”, and
“system”’ (Loeliger and McCullough 2012, p. 1). Entries to such a system are com-
monly referred to by users as ‘check-ins’. This family of computational systems
enable a group of collaborative and often disparate users to ‘develop and maintain a
repository of content, provide access to historical editions of each datum, and record
all changes in a log’ (ibid.).
Weltanschauung German for worldview. The term is often employed to signal not only
its de￿nition, but also the history of its use in philosophical thought to ‘designate
the inherently obscure source of all cultural life and thinking’ (Staiti 2013, p. 34) and
an understanding of philosophy as ‘nothing but the conceptual articulation of pre-
theoretical worldviews that are inextricably related to the historical, psychological,
and cultural conditions of individual philosophers’ (ibid.).
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Appendix C
Text of 2013 Apple Advertisement:
‘Our Signature’
This is it.
This is what matters.
The experience of a product.
How it makes someone feel.
When you start by imagining
What that might be like,
You step back.
You think.
Who will this help?
Will it make life better?
Does this deserve to exist?
If you are busy making everything,
How can you perfect anything?
We don’t believe in coincidence.
Or dumb luck.
There are a thousand ‘no’s’
For every ‘’yes.’
We spend a lot of time
On a few things.
Until every idea we touch
Enhances each life it touches.
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We’re engineers and artists.
Craftsmen and inventors.
We sign our work.
You may rarely look at it.
But you’ll always feel it.
This is our signature.




Table D.1 enumerates the shadowing activities conductedwithin the scope of this research.
Date Site Informant Title
07-Oct-2012 Eta 1018 Director
01-Nov-2012 Eta 1018 Director
08-Nov-2012 Omicron 1020 Principal
09-Nov-2012 Omicron 1020 Principal
10-Nov-2012 Omicron 1020 Principal
13-Nov-2012 Eta 1018 COO
13-Nov-2012 Eta 1018 COO
10-Jan-2013 Eta 1018 COO
17-Jan-2013 Eta 1018 COO
25-Mar-2013 Eta 1030 Programmer
26-Mar-2013 Eta 1030 Programmer
28-Mar-2013 Eta 1030 Programmer
03-May-2013 Eta 1019 COO
08-May-2013 Eta 1019 COO
08-May-2013 Eta 1036 Executive assistant (EA)
10-May-2013 Eta 1019 COO
14-May-2013 Delta 1032 Manager
15-May-2013 Eta 1019 COO
16-May-2013 Delta 1031 Programmer
20-May-2013 Delta 1031 Programmer
29-May-2013 Eta 1042 Director
Table continued on next page. . .
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Date Site Informant Title
30-May-2013 Delta 1033 Manager
08-Aug-2013 Eta 1018 Director
23-Sep-2013 Eta 1058 Programmer
18-Nov-2013 Delta 1006 Chief Scientist
20-Nov-2013 Delta 1033 Manager
21-Nov-2013 Eta 1037 EA
22-Nov-2013 Delta 1031 Programmer
25-Nov-2013 Eta 1019 COO
03-Dec-2013 Delta 1036 EA




Table E.1 enumerates the interview activities conducted within the scope of this research.
Date Site Informant Title
18-Mar-2010 Epsilon 1059 CFO
18-Mar-2010 Epsilon 1060 Vice-President of Marketing
19-Mar-2010 Epsilon 1061 Vice-President of Operations
19-Mar-2010 Epsilon 1062 Vice-President of Sales
19-Mar-2010 Epsilon 1063 Vice-President of Product Development
19-Mar-2010 Epsilon 1064 Vice-President of Sales
18-Jul-2011 Theta 1000 Global Sr. Dir. of Engineer Education
25-Jan-2012 Alpha 1001 CEO
19-Mar-2012 Gamma 1002 Vice-President, Human Resources
19-Mar-2012 Gamma 1003 Sr. Dir., IT Talent & Career Development
28-Mar-2012 Delta 1004 Director, Platform Program Management
31-Mar-2012 Epsilon 1005 CEO
06-Apr-2012 Theta 1009 Director, Product Management
09-Apr-2012 Iota 1010 Sr. Vice-President and Corporate O￿cer
17-Apr-2012 Kappa 1011 Lieutenant Colonel
17-May-2012 Theta 1012 Sr. Program Mgr., Learning & Development
21-May-2012 Eta 1008 CEO
20-Jun-2012 Eta 1018 Director
25-Jun-2012 Eta 1019 COO
17-Jul-2012 Lambda 1013 CFO
11-Sep-2012 Zeta 1007 Chairman
Table continued on next page. . .
226
Date Site Informant Title
25-Sep-2012 Delta 1006 Chief Scientist
17-Oct-2012 Nu 1016 Senior Director of Human Resources
26-Oct-2012 Beta 1022 CTO
09-Jan-2013 Rho 1027 Principal
18-Jan-2013 Sigma 1029 Change Manager
23-Jan-2013 Beta 1002 Vice-President, Human Resources
25-Jan-2013 Sigma 1029 Change Manager
25-Jan-2013 Nu 1024 Senior Engineer
28-Jan-2013 Eta 1019 COO
14-Feb-2013 Delta 1006 Chief Scientist
25-Feb-2013 Eta 1008 CEO
19-Mar-2013 Eta 1019 COO
03-Apr-2013 Phi 1040 Marketing Manager
05-Apr-2013 Chi 1041 Customer Success Manager
06-May-2013 Pi 1025 Partner
09-May-2013 Delta 1033 Manager
09-May-2013 Psi 1045 COO
14-May-2013 Delta 1032 Manager
15-May-2013 Eta 1050 CFO
15-May-2013 Eta 1026 Sr. Manager, Human Resources
17-May-2013 Eta 1042 Director
31-May-2013 Theta 1012 Sr. Program Mgr., Learning & Development
18-Jun-2013 Omega 1046 Founding Director
19-Aug-2013 Eta 1026 Sr. Manager, Human Resources
07-Oct-2013 Eta 1019 COO
28-Oct-2013 Phi 1067 Managing Director
01-Nov-2013 Eta 1042 Director
08-Nov-2013 Phi 1067 Managing Director
13-Nov-2013 Eta 1008 CEO
15-Nov-2013 Eta 1042 Director
21-Nov-2013 Eta 1037 Executive assistant (EA)
03-Dec-2013 Eta 1036 EA
17-Dec-2013 Delta 1043 Site Reliability Systems Engineer
18-Dec-2013 Delta 1032 Manager
Table continued on next page. . .
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Date Site Informant Title
19-Dec-2013 Eta 1051 O￿ce Administrator
07-Jan-2014 Eta 1008 CEO
07-Feb-2014 Eta 1018 Director
03-Mar-2014 Eta 1036 EA




The data policy for this research project is based on the promise of anonymity to parti-
cipants. This is something that I take very seriously, for without this protection, I cannot
conduct research. Each participant is assigned a unique ID number. All transcript ￿les and
￿eld notes are stored under the ID numbers rather than the name of the individual. How-
ever, in many cases, participants mention names of people and organisations that would
later identify them. To further de-identify the data, all individual names, company names,
project names, and client names are given pseudonyms or described generically. For ex-
ample, a person named Barton may be referred to as Lucas, a company named Coca-Cola
may be referred to asAlpha, a project called El Capitanmay be designatedABC or as an en-
gineering project, and a client named the US Government may be named XYZ. The general
principle is that while the research strives to convey to its readers the lived experiences
of the people it depicts, they are written about in a way that protects their identity.
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